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ABSTRACT 
The  Origin  of  Usurpation  and  Tyranny: 
Nonagentic  Anti-Imperialism  of  the  Twenty-First  Century  and  the  Legacy  of  Chavismo 
by  Juan  Andrés  Bustillo 
 
As  Venezuela’s  Chavista  regime  presides  over  the  country’s  descent  into  Latin  America’s  worst 
refugee  and  humanitarian  crisis  in  modern  times,  a  mass  exodus  of  nearly  five  million 
Venezuelans  since  2015,  the  rhetoric  of  Western  anti-imperialists  and  the  regime  itself  has 
absolved  it  of  any  responsibility  for  the  crisis  and  the  increasing  authoritarianism  that  led  to  it  by 
abdicating  the  regime's  agency  to  act  according  to  its  own  free  will.  This  paper  develops  the 
discursive  concept  of  nonagentic  anti-imperialism,  a  rhetoric  that  effectively  absolves 
self-declared  anti-imperialist  regimes,  from  Castro’s  Cuba  to  Rajapaksa’s  Sri  Lanka,  of  human 
rights  abuses  and  democratic  erosions  by  arguing  that  these  leaders  had  no  choice  but  to  rule 
with  an  iron  fist  in  the  face  of  Western  imperialism.  Focusing  on  Chavismo,  this  paper  analyzes 
the  steps  towards  Venezuela’s  democratic  breakdown  taken  by  both  Hugo  Chávez  and  Nicolas 
Maduro,  the  nonagentic  anti-imperialist  rhetoric  that  deflected  the  true  intent  behind  these  steps, 
and  how  those  steps  led  the  country  to  the  manufactured  disaster  it  finds  itself  in  today.  It 
concludes  by  positing  that  the  legitimacy  of  supposedly  anti-imperialist  policies  hinges  not  on 
the  fierce  rhetoric  surrounding  them  but  rather  on  the  lived  ends  of  the  people  affected  by  them. 
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“ Pero  qué  vamos  a  hacer?  Aquí  estamos.  Luchando.  Para 
qué?  Para  salir  adelante.  Para  poner  en  alto  a  mi  país. 
 
“ But  what  are  we  going  to  do?  Here  we  are. 
Fighting.  For  what?  To  come  out  in  front.  To  put  my 
country  on  top. ” 
 
-Richard,  Venezuelan  caminante 
IX 
/
 
1. Introduction 
The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  critically  analyze  the  nonagentic  anti-imperialist  rhetoric 
surrounding  the  Chavista  regime  of  Venezuela,  espoused  by  both  its  supporters  and  its  members, 
focusing  on  the  lived  ends  of  all  members  of  Venezuelan  society  as  opposed  to  the  stated  aims  of 
the  regime  or  its  opponents,  in  order  to  better  understand  the  ways  in  which  the  liberating 
principles  of  anti-imperialism  have  been  exploited  to  uphold  a  regime  that  has  systematically 
eliminated  the  freedoms  it  claims  legitimacy  on.  Nonagentic  anti-imperialism  represents  an 
ideological  perversion  of  genuine  anti-imperialism  through  which  non-Western  regimes  and  their 
supporters  excuse  increasing  authoritarianism  against  their  own  people  as  the  only  recourse  for 
survival  in  the  face  of  real  or  perceived  Western  imperialism  against  the  regime.  Such  rhetorical 
defenses  strip  these  regimes  of  the  agency  to  do  harm  to  their  own  people,  instead  portraying 
them  as  victims  who  are  simply  doing  what  they  must  do  to  protect  against  a  bloodthirsty  West. 
The  contention  here  is  that  the  Chavista  regime  and  its  supporters  have  cloaked  its 
failures  in  the  rhetoric  of  anti-imperialism  as  a  means  of  deflecting  blame  onto  Western  capitalist 
states  for  antidemocratic  actions  over  which  it  has  had  more  control  than  nonagentic 
anti-imperialists  give  it,  such  as  the  legalistic  and  violent  repression  of  basic  freedoms,  the 
co-optation  of  legitimate  popular  movements  from  marginalized  sectors,  disastrous  economic 
mismanagement,  and  the  conscious  construction  of  a  kleptocratic  ruling  class  that  has  overseen 
the  transformation  of  Venezuela  into  an  effective  mafia  state.  These  realities  have  culminated  in  a 
legacy  now  defined  by  the  wholly  avoidable  manufacture  of  the  single  most  devastating  refugee 
crisis  in  the  contemporary  history  of  the  Western  hemisphere. 
1 
/
 
 
1.1 Literature  Review 
One  of  the  few  points  of  unity  among  anti-imperialists  is  the  collective  inability  to  agree 
on  a  concrete  definition  for  imperialism  in  the  face  of  constantly-developing  global  capitalism. 
Without  an  understanding  of  what  constitutes  “imperialism,”  it  becomes  increasingly  difficult  to 
determine  what  “anti-imperialism”  means.  In  his  1915  introduction  to  N.  I.  Bukharin’s  1917 
Imperialism  and  World  Economy ,  V.  I.  Lenin  claims  that  the  “scientific  concept  of  imperialism” 
had  been  “reduced  to  the  level  of  a  cuss-word,”  effectively  losing  the  meaning  Lenin  had 
inscribed  to  the  term  in  his  own Imperialism:  The  Highest  Stage  of  Capitalism (Bukharin  & 
Lenin  2017,  148) .  These  two  foundational  texts  argue  that  the  Great  War  is  the  logical 
culmination  of  capitalist  hegemony  –or  “monopoly”–  over  the  world’s  productive  powers  after 
capital  accumulation  led  to  underconsumption  within  the  national  boundaries  of  the  great 
powers.  Imperialism,  under  Lenin’s  paradigm,  is  the  division  of  the  colonial  lands  by  imperial 
militaries  in  which  finance  capital  is  exported  from  the  metropole  to  the  colonies  in  the  form  of 
investments  for  the  expansion  of  markets. 
If  these  works  were  borne  out  of  a  need  to  return  the  concept  of  imperialism  to  the 
serious  standing  it  merits  among  Marxists,  then  they  succeeded  only  until  global  capitalism 
developed  beyond  the  context  in  which  they  were  written.  Nearly  seven  decades  later, 
world-systems  scholar  Giovanni  Arrighi  observed  that  the  definition  was,  in  the  1980s,  as 
confused  as  it  ever  was  because  when  developments  in  the  capitalist  world-economy  came  about 
in  the  form  of  “macroscopic  anomalies,”  “most  Marxists  failed  to  heed  Lenin’s  warning  of  the 
relative  and  conditional  value  of  every  definition  -  all  more  cogent  in  the  case  of  a  definition  that 
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is  avowedly  historically  determinate  -  and  refused  to  abandon  Lenin’s  characterization  of 
imperialism”  (Arrighi  1983,  16).  Even  those  Marxists  who  were  “most  alert  to  the  changing 
pattern  of  international  capitalism”  failed  to  disengage  from  Lenin’s  analysis  when  it  became 
obsolete  in  the  face  of  new  developments,  such  as  the  fact  that  finance  capital  under  the  Bretton 
Woods  system  no  longer  requires  the  militaristic  territorial  division  of  the  colonized  world  the 
way  it  did  in  Lenin’s  day.  Arrighi  attributes  this  to  three  possible  justifications:  the  first  is  the 
need  of  some  Marxist  academics  to  pay  tribute  to  Lenin  in  the  form  of  ideological  adherence. 
The  second  is  the  fact  that  there  was  not  a  widespread  theory  to  replace  Lenin’s  paradigm.  The 
third  is  a  false  understanding  that  to  abandon  Lenin’s  theory  is  to  proclaim  an  end  to  imperialism, 
clearly  a  non-starter  with  the  might  of  imperial  powers  only  increasing  during  the  Cold  War 
(Arrighi  1983,  17018).  The  unfortunate  logical  consequence  of  this  undue  adherence  is  a 
muddled  theoretical  environment  in  which  the  legitimacy  of  Marxist  understandings  of 
imperialism  hinge  on  shaping  history  to  fit  it,  not  in  allowing  history  to  shape  the  theory. 
One  effort  to  counter  this  unscientific  approach  to  historical  analysis  comes  from  Rohini 
Hensman  in  her  book Indefensible:  Democracy,  Counterrevolution,  and  the  Rhetoric  of 
Anti-Imperialism ,  in  which  she  moves  beyond  Lenin  by  suggesting  an  alternative  view  of 
imperialism  that  stays  true  to  the  context  of  Lenin’s  writing  but  is  adaptable  to  new 
developments  in  global  capitalism.  In  her  critique  of  Lenin,  she  writes  that 
it  conflates  two  distinct  phases  of  capitalism  –  imperialism  and  finance 
capital  –  and  this  has  created  immense  confusion  on  the  left.  The  idea 
that  finance  capital  and  foreign  investments  constitute  imperialism  would 
lead  to  absurd  conclusions;  for  example,  that  China  is  an  imperialist 
power  in  the  US,  or  India  in  the  UK.  Instead, imperialism  should  be 
defined  as  political,  and  sometimes  military,  intervention  in  another 
country  in  order  to  install  or  keep  in  power  a  regime  that  acts  more  in 
the  interests  of  the  imperialist  power  than  in  the  interests  of  any  class  – 
even  capitalists  –  in  its  own  country.  Its  driving  force  is  nationalism  in 
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the  imperialist  country.  Imperialism  is  opposed  by  struggles  for  national 
liberation,  which  constitutes  one  element  in  a  democratic  revolution  –  the 
people  cannot  rule  themselves  so  long  as  they  are  ruled  by  another 
nation-state  –  but  not  the  only  one  (Hensman  2018,  21;  emphasis  added). 
 
In  recognizing  imperialism  as  a  “political,  and  sometimes  military,  intervention”  but  excluding 
capitalist  foreign  investments,  Hensman  separates  the  two  phases  of  global  capitalism  into  their 
distinct  categories.  Arrighi’s  third  justification  is  then  validated,  since  in  abandoning  Lenin’s 
overarching  theory  Hensman  has  in  fact  proclaimed  an  end  to  the  imperialist  stage.  But  by 
simultaneously  declaring  a  stage  even  higher  than  that,  she  has  not  proclaimed  an  imagined  end 
to  global  capitalism.  It  likewise  would  not  have  been  accurate  for  Arrighi  to  make  Hensman’s 
claim  at  the  time  of The  Geometry  of  Imperialism ’s  writing  in  1983,  but  Hensman  is  able  to 
assert  in  2018  that  “by  the  mid-1990s,  imperialism,  which  relies  on  militarism,  had  outlived  its 
usefulness  for  capital”  (Hensman  2018,  41).  Here  she  marks  the  shift  from  imperialism  to 
finance  capital.  Though  far  from  a  clean  break  from  the  old,  as  demonstrated  by  the  2003  U.S 
intervention  in  Iraq,  this  new  stage  saw  a  lessening  of  the  national  character  of  world-system 
hegemony.  David  Harvey  points  out  a  “peculiar  feature”  of  the  newly  neoliberal  world,  guided 
more  by  supranational  bodies  like  the  World  Trade  Organization  and  World  Bank,  was  “an 
increasingly  transnational  capitalist  class  of  financiers,  CEOs,  and  rentiers  [looking]  to  the 
territorial  hegemon  to  protect  their  interests  and  to  build  the  kind  of  institutional  architecture 
within  which  they  could  gather  the  wealth  of  the  world  unto  themselves.  This  class  paid  very 
little  heed  to  place-bound  or  national  loyalties  or  traditions.  It  could  be  multi-racial, 
multicultural,  and  cosmopolitan”  (Harvey  2003,  187).  Having  understood  this,  it  becomes  clear 
that  to  adhere  to  Lenin’s  theory  of  imperialism  today  is  to  misread  the  postwar  historical  context 
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in  which  the  transnational  capitalist  class  has  rendered  obsolete  the  claim  that  the  world  remains 
in  the  imperialism  stage. 
What,  then,  does  this  new  conceptualization  mean  for  the  anti-imperialist  movements  that 
have  risen  up  against  global  capitalism  in  all  its  forms?  It  is  no  surprise  that  anti-imperialism  has 
become  as  confused  a  term  as  imperialism  itself.  The  two  categories  of  anti-imperialism 
Hensman  names  are  simply  “genuine  anti-imperialism”  and  “pseudo-anti-imperialism.”  The 
former  is  easy  to  define–  it  is  the  opposition  to  all  imperialisms  (Hensman  2018,  21).  Genuine 
anti-imperialism  opposes  imperialism  not  only  from  the  traditional  powers  of  the  West,  but  also 
from  non-Western  imperialist  powers;  Russia’s  invasion  of  Crimea  comes  to  mind.  Genuine 
anti-imperialists  also  support  democratic  revolutions  and  struggles  against  oppression  in  the 
non-Western  world  regardless  of  whether  or  not  the  West  does.  To  make  sense  of 
pseudo-anti-imperialism,  Hensman  identified  three  different  strands  that  comprise  it: 
Western-centric,  neo-Stalinist,  and  tyrants/imperialists.  The  first  describes  those 
pseudo-anti-imperialists  who  are  only  opposed  to  Western  imperialism.  Still  stuck  in  a  nationalist 
past  where  the  Great  Western  Powers  of  Lenin’s  age  are  the  only  forces  capable  of  imperialism 
and  oppression,  they  (perhaps  inadvertently)  are  “oblivious  to  the  fact  that  people  in  other  parts 
of  the  world  have  agency  too,  and  that  they  can  exercise  it  both  to  oppress  others  and  to  fight 
against  oppression;  an  Orientalism  which  refuses  to  acknowledge  that  Third  World  peoples  can 
desire  and  fight  for  democratic  rights  and  freedoms  taken  for  granted  in  the  West;  and  a  complete 
lack  of  solidarity  with  people  who  do  undertake  such  struggles”  (Hensman  2018,  12-13).  Then 
there  are  the  neo-Stalinists,  who  will  support  brutal  regimes  supported  by  Russia  (in  its  Tsarist, 
Soviet,  or  modern  forms)  in  the  same  way  that  Western  liberals  supported  brutal  regimes 
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installed  by  the  United  States  during  the  Cold  War.  The  third  “consists  of  tyrants  and 
imperialists,  perpetrators  of  war  crimes,  crimes  against  humanity,  genocide  and  aggression,  who, 
as  soon  as  they  face  a  hint  of  criticism  from  the  West,  immediately  claim  that  they  are  being 
criticised  because  they  are  anti-imperialists”  (Hensman  2018,  13-14).  Hensman  notes  that  while 
this  claim  should  fall  flat  by  its  lack  of  merit,  proponents  of  the  previous  two  categories  are 
likely  to  justify  it  because  it  validates  their  own  perceptions.  So  argues  Samuel  Farber  in  his 
2011  book  Cuba:  A  Critical  Assessment  Since  the  Revolution  of  1959 ,  writing  that 
there  is  a  widespread,  and  often  less  than  fully  conscious,  attitude  on  the 
left  ignoring  or  justifying  the  absence  of  democracy  and  the  systematic 
violation  of  civil  liberties  in  Cuba  because  of  the  revolution’s 
achievements,  whether  real  or  imagined,  and  particularly  because  of  the 
country’s  stance  against  US  imperialism.  This  attitude,  at  least  implicitly 
absolving  the  revolutionary  leaders  of  any  blame  for  their  decisions, 
choices,  and  actions,  has  deep  roots  on  the  left  and  precedes  the  Cuban 
Revolution  (Farber  2011,  6-7). 
 
A  key  point  is  that  this  attitude  is  “often  less  than  fully  conscious,”  understandable  since  the 
instinct  of  many  on  the  left  is  to  support  antisystemic  movements  of  a  national  or  social 
character.  Cuba  is  a  prime  example  given  the  romantic  image  the  small  island  has  constructed  for 
itself  through  sixty  years  of  resisting  aggression  from  the  Global  North  as  an  outwardly 
Communist  state.  Anti-imperialists  must  not  fall  in  the  trap  of  justifying  democratic  erosions  and 
violations  of  basic  freedoms  by  similar  regimes  only  to  suppress  the  existence  of  democratic 
movements  and  calls  for  freedoms  within  those  states.  It  goes  without  saying  that  this  does  not 
mean,  sticking  with  the  example  of  Cuba,  that  anti-imperialists  must  all  of  a  sudden  support 
assaults  like  the  Bay  of  Pigs  invasion  or  the  US  embargo  against  Cuba.  It  does  mean,  however, 
that  anti-imperialists  must  advocate  for  an  end  to  political  repression  within  Cuba  to  allow 
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dissident  movements  to  flourish  from  below  and  openly  make  demands  of  their  government 
through  assembly  and  the  ballot  box  (DeCosse  1999,  27).  This  principle  can  be  applied  to  any 
antisystemic  government  to  ensure  that  popular  power  holds  state  power  accountable  rather  than 
the  other  way  around.  None  of  this  entails  the  proliferation  of  counterrevolutionary  actors  within 
a  state  nor  does  it  open  sovereign  affairs  to  imperialist  interventions.  What  it  does  entail,  though, 
is  an  understanding  that  even  in  the  face  of  opposition  from  the  West,  the  leadership  of 
anti-imperialist  regimes  continue  to  have  agency  in  the  direction  of  their  state.  Farber  writes  that 
Che  Guevara  himself  admitted  as  much  in  an  interview  where  he  said  that  “Our  commitment  to 
the  eastern  bloc  was  half  the  fruit  of  constraint  and  half  the  result  of  choice.”  Genuine 
anti-imperialism  cannot  justify  political  repression  and  cannot  deny  the  agency  of 
anti-imperialist  leaders,  pseudo-  or  otherwise,  to  act. 
 
1.2 Themes 
In  keeping  with  the  practice  of  recognizing  the  changing  trends  of  world  processes,  it  is 
similarly  necessary  to  understand  the  post-Cold  War  face  of  antidemocratic  regimes  in  a  world 
where  democracy  has  become  close  to  ubiquitous.  Whereas  the  authoritarian  regimes  of  the  past 
could  be  so  unabashed  by  openly  doing  away  with  or  repressing  the  exercise  of  democracy  in  a 
given  state,  those  of  today  are  more  likely  to  operate  performative  democracy  in  what  scholars 
Steven  Levitsky  and  Lucan  A.  Way  called  in  2010  “competitive  authoritarian”  regimes.  These 
are  “civilian  regimes  in  which  formal  democratic  institutions  exist  and  are  widely  viewed  as  the 
primary  ways  of  gaining  power,  but  in  which  incumbents’  abuse  of  the  state  places  them  at  a 
significant  advantage  vis-à-vis  their  opponents…competition  is  thus  real  but  unfair”  (Levitsky  & 
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Way  2013,  5).  The  veneer  of  democracy  allows  the  regimes  to  claim  a  false  legitimacy  and 
deflect  criticisms  against  it  using  the  rhetoric  of  national  sovereignty.  With  apparent  democratic 
legitimacy  on  their  side,  autocrats  can  act  unilaterally  while  positioning  themselves  as  the  voice 
of  the  people.  It  goes  without  saying,  then,  that  whether  or  not  a  state  is  democratic  demands  an 
exploration  of  its  institutions  and  the  use  of  state  power  in  facilitating  free  and  fair  elections. 
Complementing  their  analysis  is  the  framework  of  the  third  wave  of  autocratization,  coming  into 
being  around  the  mid-1990s  up  through  today,  in  which  “incumbents  legally  access  power  and 
then  gradually,  but  substantially,  undermine  democratic  norms  without  abolishing  key 
democratic  institutions”  (Lührmann  &  Lindberg  2019).  While  brazen  moves  to  restrict 
democratic  freedoms  are  susceptible  to  opposition  because  of  their  ubiquity,  the  erosive  effects 
of  third-wave  tactics  make  resistance  to  autocratization  increasingly  difficult. 
Before  applying  competitive  authoritarianism  to  Chavismo,  it  is  worth  exploring  what 
Chavismo  is  and  how  this  paper  will  use  the  term.  Similar  to  “imperialism,”  defining  Chavismo 
is  a  challenge  because  there  are  as  many  definitions  as  there  are  utterances  of  it.  For  our 
purposes,  “Chavismo”  will  describe  the  entirety  of  the  Bolivarian  Revolution  at  the 
governmental  level,  from  when  Chávez  took  power  in  1999  up  until  today.  An  analysis  of  the 
legacy  of  Chavismo  demands  understanding  it  in  its  entirety,  not  picking  and  choosing  the  best 
parts  or  the  worst  parts.  An  argument  can  be  made  that  it  is  unfair  to  essentially  lump  Chávez 
and  Maduro  together  under  the  same  banner,  but  the  reality  is  that  Maduro  was  handpicked  by 
Chávez  as  Chavismo’s  torch-bearer  and  to  treat  him  as  anything  else  will  be  misrepresentative. 
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2. Nonagentic  Anti-Imperialism 
Competitive  authoritarian  regimes  routinely  fall  back  on  Hensman’s  third  strand  as  a 
means  of  evading  criticism  when  their  legitimacy  is  challenged,  defending  themselves  by 
denying  their  own  agency  and  their  own  choices.  Western-centric  anti-imperialists  inevitably 
leap  to  the  support  of  non-Western  states  that  engage  in  this  deflection.  Though  “anti-imperialist” 
rarely  applies  to  right-wing  regimes,  their  ideologues  can  fall  into  a  similar  pattern.  A  recent 
example  is  in  Brazil,  where  President  Jair  Bolsonaro  justifies  his  authoritarianism  and  hostility  to 
the  Latin  American  left  by  invoking  the  specter  of  the  failures  of  the  Pink  Tide  (Petrov  2020).  In 
order  to  narrow  Hensman’s  framework  of  pseudo-anti-imperialism  to  fit  the  scope  of  this  paper 
and  adapt  it  specifically  to  Latin  America’s  competitive  authoritarian  regimes,  the  concept  of 
nonagentic  anti-imperialism  will  be  introduced.  It  builds  on  from  the  first  and  third  strands  and 
applies  them  to  supporters  of  the  regime  and  to  the  regime  itself,  respectively.  Specifically,  it 
refers  to  the  view  that  increasing  authoritarianism  is  the  only  recourse  available  for  non-Western 
governments  faced  with  staunch  political  and  economic  opposition  from  global  or  regional 
hegemonic  forces.  Further  characterizing  nonagentic  anti-imperialism  is  an  excessive  emphasis 
on  ideology  and  an  insufficient  emphasis  on  the  lived  ends  of  people  on  the  ground.  Adherence 
to  a  certain  ideology  by  a  regime  or  resistance  to  imperialism  becomes  a  more  important 
indicator  of  political  success  to  observers  than  the  reality  experienced  by  those  living  under  the 
regime.  This  is  why,  for  example,  nonagentic  anti-imperialists  will  quickly  and  accurately  point 
to  brutal  violations  of  human  rights  by  US-installed  puppets  in  Latin  America  like  Augusto 
Pinochet  as  evidence  of  their  illegitimacy  but  dismiss  the  human  rights  argument  as  a  “buzz 
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phrase”  when  applied  to  leftist  regimes.  Filmmaker  Oliver  Stone  did  as  much  in  his 
propagandistic South  of  the  Border documentary  about  Latin  America’s  Pink  Tide  while  at  the 
same  time  criticizing  Colombia’s  human  rights  record  under  a  US-backed  administration  (Rohter 
2010).  The  framework  of  human  rights  is  far  from  impervious  to  critique  from  an  anti-imperialist 
perspective,  but  to  outright  dismiss  it  as  a  “buzz  phrase”  only  in  its  application  to  certain  regimes 
as  Stone  did  is  self-evidently  hypocritical. 
Nonagentic  anti-imperialism  is  plainly  visible  everywhere  from  academia  to  online 
discussion  forums.  In  1983,  Arrighi  wrote  that  “by  the  end  of  the  60’s,  what  had  once  been  ‘the 
pride’  of  Marxism  –the  theory  of  imperialism–  had  become  a  ‘Tower  of  Babel’  in  which  not  even 
Marxists  knew  any  longer  how  to  find  their  way”  (Arrighi  1983,  17).  These  next  paragraphs  will 
outline  just  how  correct  Arrighi’s  analysis  was  by  highlighting  the  writings  of  John  Pilger,  an 
influential  nonagentic  anti-imperialist  working  today;  of  Venezuelan  state  media  outlet  TeleSUR, 
a  central  mouthpiece  for  Hensman’s  third  strand  of  pseudo-anti-imperialism;  and  of  the  debate 
surrounding  recent  protest  movements  in  Latin  America,  particularly  in  Chile,  Ecuador,  and 
Bolivia  because  they  represent  instances  where  right-left  binary  ideology  demands  stripping 
protesters  of  their  agency  to  be  angry  at  material  conditions,  instead  blaming  supposedly  imperial 
powers. 
John  Pilger,  an  Australian  journalist  and  documentarian,  is  a  shining  example  of 
nonagentic  anti-imperialism.  For  him  and  other  Western-centric  anti-imperialists,  North 
American  and  Western  European  imperialism  is  the  only  form  of  imperialism  and,  at  least  in  the 
scope  of  his  analysis,  solely  responsible  for  the  oppression  of  the  non-Western  world.  This  has 
led  Pilger  to  support  both  oppressive  regimes  and  imperialist  regimes,  always  under  the  guise  of 
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anti-imperialism.  The  gaps  in  the  guise  are  perhaps  clearest  in  his  perspective  of  the 
Russia-Crimea  relationship.  In  his  2001  book The  New  Rulers  of  the  World ,  he  writes  that  the 
West’s  “man  in  Moscow  used  to  be  Boris  Yeltsin,  a  drunk  who  handed  his  country’s  economy  to 
the  West.  His  successor,  Putin,  has  re-established  Russia  as  a  sovereign  nation;  that  is  his  crime” 
(Pilger  2016,  xvi).  Though  the  book  was  updated  and  revised  in  2016,  two  years  after  Putin’s 
invasion  of  Crimea,  he  did  not  see  fit  to  amend  this  statement–  despite  updating  the  previous 
paragraph  to  include  commentary  on  then-Vice  President  Joe  Biden’s  son’s  work  for  “Ukraine’s 
biggest  oil,  gas  and  fracking  company”  as  evidence  of  US  imperialist  aims  in  the  country  (Pilger 
2016,  xvi).  In  an  article  Pilger  wrote  for  The  Guardian  months  after  Russia’s  illegal  invasion  of 
Crimea  in  2014  titled  “In  Ukraine,  the  US  is  dragging  us  towards  war  with  Russia,”  he  argues 
that  the  only  aim  of  Russia  in  Crimea  is  to  fend  off  US  and  Western  aggression  “as  they  have 
done  against  every  threat  and  invasion  from  the  west  for  almost  a  century”  (Pilger  2014). 
Hensman  writes  that  “Pilger  implies  that  Crimea  has  always  been  part  of  Russia  when  he  says 
that  in  Crimea  ‘the  Russians  defended  themselves.’  This  is  simply  not  true,”  she  argues, 
explaining  how  indigenous  Crimean  Tatars  have  been  victims  of  Russian  annexation, 
colonization,  and  aggressive  militarism  since  at  least  the  late  eighteenth  century  (Hensman  2018, 
8-9).  She  quips  that  Pilger’s  claim  that  a  leased  Russian  naval  base  in  Crimea  is  “legitimate”  is 
akin  to  claiming  that  Guantanamo  Bay  is  part  of  the  United  States  because  it  is  leased  from 
Cuba.  It  is  not  difficult  to  imagine  that  Pilger’s  failure  to  amend  his  claim  of  Putin’s  sole  crime  in 
Rulers  was  less  a  lapse  and  more  a  doubling-down. 
Pilger’s  work  makes  it  clear  that  anti-imperialist  principles  do  not  guide  his  perspectives. 
They  are  guided  by  advocating  for  whatever  side  is  opposed  by  the  West,  even  if  this  requires 
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lying  about  the  facts.  How  else  can  his  explicit  support  for  an  open  imperialist  invasion  be 
explained?  In  justifying  Russia’s  settler-colonial  actions  as  natural  responses  to  US  aggression, 
Pilger  has  effectively  revoked  Russia’s  agency  to  oppress  in  the  way  Farber  described.  The 
imperialist  annexation  of  a  sovereign  territory  suddenly  becomes  part  of  the  struggle  against 
what  they  would  deem  legitimate  (read:  Western)  imperialism  and  aggression.This  playbook, 
employed  again  in  his  pro-Assadist  views,  consists  of  excusing  the  erosion  basic  civil  liberties, 
freedoms,  democratic  practices,  and  imperialist  foreign  policy  in  the  name  of  combating  real  or 
perceived  Western  imperialism  (Pilger  2015). 
When  nonagentic  anti-imperialism  becomes  official  state  policy,  government-run  media 
is  an  obvious  place  to  find  it.  And  in  Venezuela’s  case,  the  TeleSUR  news  agency  is  a  one-stop 
shop.  The  original  vision  for  TeleSUR  when  it  launched  in  2005  was  a  noble  one,  and  an  article 
in  Jacobin  magazine  highlights  that  “the  problem  that  teleSUR  identified  was  a  real  one.  Across 
the  region,  large  television  and  media  conglomerates  nearly  all  had  ties  to  the  Right,”  including 
both  Northern  outlets  like  CNN  and  the  BBC  as  well  as  Latin  American  services  with  strong  ties 
to  economic  elites  (Iber  2017).  A  Pan-Latin  American  counterhegemonic  news  service  funded  by 
Venezuela  as  well  as  the  ideologically-aligned  bloc  of  Venezuela,  Cuba,  Argentina,  and  Uruguay, 
modeled  after  and  partnered  with  Qatar’s  Al-Jazeera  was  essential  for  the  promotion  of  diverse 
viewpoints  within  regional  democracies  (Di  Rico  2012).  According  to  Uruguayan  intellectual 
Aram  Aharonian,  who  had  fled  right-wing  repression  in  his  native  land  and  later  became  the 
co-founder  and  first  director  general  of  the  network,  “the  idea  was  to  see  ourselves  as  we  truly 
were”  by  breaking  past  “a  colonial  mentality  as  blond  and  tall  and  European,  and  some  of  us  are, 
but  we’re  also  short,  dark,  Zambo,  and  Indian”  (Carroll  2014,  195). 
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In  the  midst  of  a  media  war  in  2007  spurred  by  what  Chávez  deemed  to  be  unfair 
coverage,  the  outlet  devolved  into  an  effective  mouthpiece  for  Chávez  and  his  regime. 
Aharonian,  who  was  forced  out  by  his  replacement  and  former  Information  Minister  Andrés 
Izarra  in  2008,  denounced  the  fact  that  Chávez  “installed  himself  in  TeleSUR  and  took  the 
reins,”  turning  it  less  “about  promoting  a  Latin  American  identity…but  serving  Chávez’s 
domestic  agenda  and  being  a  political  instrument.  That  meant  propaganda  as  rolling  news” 
(Carroll  2014,  195).  To  miscoin  a  phrase,  Chávez’s  goal  was  to  ensure  that  the  revolution  would 
be  televised.  The  practice  of  nonagentic  anti-imperialism  that  the  regime  had  been  engaging  in 
for  years  had  now  morphed  into  rhetoric  to  be  consumed  by  a  captive  audience.  An  example  of 
this  on  the  global  stage  is  TeleSUR’s  coverage  of  the  Arab  Spring,  which  actually  caused 
Al-Jazeera  to  split  away  from  the  network.  At  the  outset  of  the  Arab  Spring,  Chávez’s,  and  by 
extension  TeleSUR’s,  actually  supported  the  Assad  regime’s  crackdown  on  protests  in  2011  and 
2012  (Kozloff  2012).  That  support  comes  from  Chávez’s  fidelity  to  Syrian  leader  Bashar 
al-Assad  in  the  name  of  resisting  the  US  empire,  a  position  which  led  to  the  ideological  covering 
of  the  Arab  Spring  uprisings  rather  than  one  focused  on  the  people  resisting  oppression.  The 
network  is  happy  to  criticize  US  President  Donald  Trump’s  refusal  to  help  the  refugees  but 
makes  little  mention  of  its  support  for  the  violence  that  forced  the  refugees  in  the  first  place 
(“‘US  Accepted  Only  11  Syrian  Refugees  So  Far  This  Year’”  2018). 
The  last  example  of  nonagentic  anti-imperialism  can  be  found  in  the  global  response  to 
protests  in  Chile,  Ecuador,  and  Bolivia.  The  former  two  were  massive,  prolonged  manifestations 
against  neoliberal  governments  whose  austerity  harmed  workers.  A  3%  increase  in  metro  fares  in 
October  in  Chile,  previously  hailed  as  an  “oasis”  of  calm  in  a  turbulent  region,  incited 
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occasionally-violent  anti-neoliberal  protests  that  have  continued  into  2020  (Phillips  2019). 
Chilean  president  Sebastián  Piñera,  a  conservative  billionaire,  has  offered  tepid  concessions 
including  martial  law,  pension  increases,  and  minimum  wage  hikes,  but  nothing  has  quelled  the 
protesters.  A  referendum  to  draft  a  new  constitution  is  slated  for  April  2020  (Cuffe  2019). 
Chile’s  role  as  a  lab  rat  for  neoliberal  policies  under  the  dictatorship  of  Augusto  Pinochet  in  the 
1970s  and  80s  was  carried  into  the  twenty-first  century  by  democratic  rule,  defended  against 
significant  criticism  by  consistent  economic  growth  that  outperformed  much  of  the  region 
(Slobodian  2018,  Kindle  loc.  5595).  As  is  now  customary  with  neoliberal  regimes,  economic 
inequalities  led  to  and  were  reinforced  by  social  inequalities  that  divided  the  country  sharply 
along  class  lines,  creating  the  situation  for  a  spark  like  the  metro  fare  hike  to  inspire  nation-wide 
protests  all  across  the  country”  (“Counting  the  Cost  of  Neoliberalism  in  Chile”  2019). 
The  situation  in  Ecuador  was  similar,  albeit  less  dramatic.  After  a  cut  in  fuel  subsidies  by 
neoliberal  president  Lenín  Moreno’s  government,  indigenous-led  protests  rocked  the  streets  of 
Ecuador  for  approximately  two  weeks,  in  which  time  a  national  state  of  emergency  was  called 
and  riot  police  were  brought  out  to  control  the  largely  peaceful  protesters  (Brown  2019). 
Contrary  to  Chile,  indigenous  leaders  were  able  to  form  an  agreement  with  the  Moreno 
administration  under  which  the  protests  would  be  called  off  in  exchange  for  the  government 
retreating  from  its  IMF-backed  package  of  austerity  measures,  including  the  fuel  hikes  by  which 
fuel  costs  would  have  risen  by  approximately  30%  overnight  (“Ecuador  Protests  End  After  Deal 
Struck  with  Indigenous  Leaders”  2019). 
In  both  instances,  the  protesters  of  mostly  working  class  and  indigenous  backgrounds 
were  accused  by  the  Latin  American  right  of  being  manipulated  or  incited  by  the  Latin  American 
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left.  Xenophobic  propaganda  tactics  were  employed  as  Venezuelan  refugees  and  Cuban  migrants 
were  accused  of  being  agents  of  their  own  oppressive  governments  sent  to  destabilize  the 
seemingly  more  stable  right-wing  governments.  One  would  think  that  such  outlandish  theories, 
conceived  of  as  aN  ODD  reimagining  of  Che  Guevara’s foco  theory,  have  at  least  some  backing 
in  truth  (Pentón  2020).  Analyses  conducted  about  tweets  regarding  the  protests  found  that  the  1
vast  majority  of  them  came  from  Venezuela,  Cuba,  and  Nicaragua,  the  last  remaining  leftist 
strongholds  in  Latin  America,  with  the  conclusions  being  that  this  serves  as  evidence  that  these 
three  regimes  helped  incite  and  maintain  the  working  class  assault  on  the  Chilean  establishment. 
The  possibility  that  these  tweets  were  shows  of  solidarity  with  protesters  by  other  working  class 
Latin  Americans  does  not  appear  to  have  entered  the  discussion.  Additionally,  in  the  Quito 
airport,  19  Venezuelans  were  detained,  supposedly  on  suspicion  of  espionage,  but  were  released 
without  charges.  In  Chile,  around  50  foreigners,  mostly  Cubans  and  Venezuelans,  some  of  whom 
appear  to  have  participated  in  the  protests,  were  exiled  from  the  country  for  their  illegal  status. 
There  does  not  seem  to  be  any  evidence  that  any  of  these  individuals  incited  anything,  making 
these  claims  nothing  more  than  xenophobic,  pro-neoliberal  conspiracies  (Dannemann  2019). 
The  case  of  Bolivia,  despite  being  politically  antithetical  in  many  ways,  shares  significant 
themes  with  the  previous  two  cases.  After  left-wing  president  Evo  Morales,  the  country’s  first 
indigenous  president,  ran  for  a  fourth  term  (out  of  two  permitted  under  the  constitution  he  wrote 
himself  in  2009)  in  2019  despite  Bolivians  expressing  in  an  earlier  referendum  that  they  did  not 
want  him  to  run  for  the  then-illegal  fourth  term  (though  this  was  overturned  by  a  loyalist 
Supreme  Court  which  argued  that  term  limits  violate  his  human  rights),  his  slight  victory  was 
1  Che  Guevara’s  foco  theory  of  guerrilla  warfare  involves  setting  a  small  vanguard  paramilitary  regime  in  a  focused 
geographic  area  of  popular  discontent  with  the  goal  of  instigating  attacks  from  the  foco. 
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largely  recognized  as  fraudulent  (Vicanco  &  Pappier  2017).  To  his  credit,  Morales  accepted  the 
claims  and  set  up  a  second  election  in  November,  but  protests  exploded  onto  the  streets  days 
after  his  concession  demanding  his  resignation  (Johnson  2019).  It  wasn't  until  the  military  turned 
against  him  that  Morales  stepped  down  –with  a  proverbial  gun  to  his  head–  and  fled  to  Mexico 
(Kurmanaev  2019). 
The  protest  movement  and  subsequent  turn  by  the  military  were  labelled  by  significant 
portions  of  the  Bolivian-national  and  international  left  as  a  “coup”  in  the  mold  of  1954 
Guatemala  or  1973  Chile  (Field  2019).  Just  as  the  right-wing  of  Chile  and  Ecuador  dismissed  out 
of  hand  the  legitimate  frustrations  with  neoliberalism,  the  left-wing  dismissed  out  of  hand  the 
legitimate  concerns  about  Bolivian  democracy  in  the  face  of  Morales’  disregard  for  term  limits. 
The  true  reason  for  the  protests,  they  argue,  is  that  the  Global  North  wants  access  to  Bolivia’s 
lithium  reserves,  which  they  believe  Morales  was  protecting  from  capitalist  exploitation.  While 
on  its  face  this  appears  as  if  it  would  handily  fit  the  playbook  of  the  North,  substituting  lithium 
for  oil,  a  cursory  glance  at  Morales’  use  of  his  country’s  reserves  demonstrates  that  he  was  far 
from  an  obstacle  to  global  access  to  lithium.  Morales  had  long  talked  about  using  the  reserves  to 
spur  economic  growth  and  had  already  signed  billions  of  dollars  in  deals  with  Chinese  and 
German  firms  to  develop  the  mines.  His  decision  to  abruptly  cancel  a  deal  with  the  German  firm 
ACISA  was  hailed  on  the  left  as  proof  that  Morales  is  a  dutiful  obstacle  to  exploitation  (“Bolivia 
Scraps  Joint  Lithium  Project  with  German  Company”  2019;  Higgins  2019).  What  this  analysis 
chose  to  ignore  –an  appropriate  term  given  the  focus  leftist  media  claims  to  give  the  working 
class–  is  that  he  cancelled  it  because  locals  in  the  region  where  the  ACISA  facilities  were  set  to 
be  built  protested  because  they  did  not  believe  that  they  would  see  the  benefits  promised  to  them 
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(Johnson  &  Palmer  2019).  Tweets  and  Twitter  bots  were  again  cited  as  evidence  of  foreign 
interference  (Spencer  2019).  It  should  be  noted  that  this  Twitter-related  claim  appears  to  have 
more  legitimacy  on  its  face  than  the  ones  in  Chile,  though  whatever  impact  they  might  have  had 
was  still  largely  in  the  service  of  winning  international  sympathy  for  the  protesters.  Regardless, 
the  disregard  by  the  left  of  Bolivians’  real  concerns  for  their  democracy  has  been  on  full  display. 
It  remains  to  be  seen  if  the  unelected  interim  government  of  Jeanine  Áñez,  credibly  accused  of 
being  a  protofascist  given  her  vocal  stance  on  suppressing  indigenous  rights,  will  follow  through 
with  its  stated  promise  of  holding  democratic  elections,  or  if  Bolivia  will  become  the  latest 
formerly-democratic  Latin  American  state  to  fall  into  military  dictatorship  (Estes  2019). 
What  both  the  right  and  the  left  have  fallen  into  here  is  the  pattern  of  nonagentic 
anti-imperialism.  The  two  sides  of  the  binary  share  the  same  logic  that  “because  there  are  no 
legitimate  claims  against  the  establishment  I  support  [neoliberalism  or  left-populism],  then  any 
resistance  to  it  must  be  manufactured  by  hostile  outside  forces.”  This  belief  strips  the  protesters 
of  the  agency  to  be  angry  at  their  material  conditions  or  the  direction  of  their  politics.  The  anger 
must  be  artificial.  To  seriously  argue  that  the  events  in  Bolivia  are  imperialist  in  nature  proves 
Arrighi  correct  when  he  says  that  Marxists  have  lost  meaning  of  the  word  and  Hensman  correct 
when  she  says  that  anti-imperialists  are  using  the  term  to  describe  any  sort  of  Western  action  in 
the  non-Western  world.  These  three  events  in  late  2019  demonstrate  that  the  stripping  of  agency 
to  suit  political  aims  is  far  from  a  partisan  practice. 
The  prevalence  of  nonagentic  anti-imperialism  in  mainstream  discourse  hints  at  the  larger 
problem  of  a  black-and-white  view  of  US-Latin  America  relations.  It  is  an  admittedly  difficult 
balance  to  strike  between  recognizing  the  inherently  exploitative  nature  of  the  relationship  and 
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recognizing  that  Latin  American  states  are  not  powerless.  To  reconcile  these  two  tendencies,  the 
paper’s  focus  will  be  on  the  lived  ends  of  Venezuelans  and  Latin  Americans  affected  by 
Venezuela’s  actions.  Understanding  the  legacy  of  Chavismo  in  the  country  today  is  instrumental 
in  determining  the  validity  of  the  anti-imperialist  rhetoric  coming  from  the  regime  and  its 
supporters. 
The  aim  of  this  paper  is  not  for  the  Latin  American  right  to  point  to  and  claim  that  it  is 
justified  in  its  elitist  critique  of  anti-imperialist  movements.  It  is  likewise  not  for  the  Latin 
American  left  to  point  to  and  feel  justified  in  its  apologetics  for  authoritarianism.  It  is  for  the 
region  as  a  whole  to  recognize  the  lived  ends  of  individual  people,  including  the  poor,  women, 
and  indigenous  peoples,  within  a  democratic  system  is  the  only  measure  of  legitimacy.  This  is 
why  this  paper  will  look  beyond  left-right  binaries,  beyond  fiery  oratory,  and  beyond  ideological 
aims  when  assessing  the  legacy  of  Chavismo  and  the  validity  of  the  anti-imperialist  rhetoric 
surrounding  it.  This  will  mean  understanding  the  world-system  in  which  Chavismo  exists,  the 
extent  of  its  power  to  act  freely  within  that  world-system,  the  reality  of  life  under  those 
constraints,  and  the  disparity  between  Chavista  goals  and  Venezuelan  life.  
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3. Venezuela  1948-1998 
The  movement  that  gave  rise  to  Chavismo  was  born  in  a  Venezuela  that  was  itself  the 
product  of  deliberate  creation  almost  as  much  as  of  historical  flows  and  ebbs.  The  story  of  that 
manufactured  Venezuela  begins  loosely  in  1948  with  the  dictatorship  of  General  Marcos  Pérez 
Jiménez.  During  his  ten  year  rule  following  a  military  overthrow  of  the  country’s  first  elected 
President,  Pérez  Jiménez  and  his  administration  worked  towards  the  goal  of  modernizing 
Venezuela  in  the  image  of  developed  nations.  That  goal,  supported  by  the  United  States,  involved 
the  reshaping  of  the  physical  image  of  Venezuela  according  to  Pérez  Jiménez’s  “pledge  that 
nation  and  citizens  would  be  born  anew  was  not  just  a  rhetorical  conceit;  in  some  policies  it  had 
literal  consequences”  (Blackmore  2017,  57)  If  the  physical  image  of  Venezuela  was  to  resemble 
developed  Western  states,  then  the  country’s  ethnic  makeup  was  the  place  to  start.  Notions  of 
biological  determinism  regarding  black,  indigenous,  mulatto,  and  other  non-white  Venezuelans 
led  to  migrant  labor  programs  that  took  advantage  of  the  massive  postwar  emigration  from 
Europe.  Development  was  meant  to  come  through  the  miscegenistic  cleaning  of  Venezuela’s 
bloodline,  a  policy  whose  success  has  been  validated  by  pointing  to  the  country’s  repeated 
triumphs  at  the  Miss  Universe  competition  (Blackmore  2017,  57-59). 
Western-style  development  went  beyond  the  physical  look  of  the  people  and  toward  the 
physical  look  of  the  landscape.  To  prove  the  legitimacy  of  the  military  regime,  the  administration 
embarked  on  nationwide  mass  housing  operations  to  literally  bulldoze  the  aesthetic  problem  of 
informal  housing  where  approximately  40%  of  the  population  lived.  Lisa  Blackmore  writes  of 
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how  the  new  housing  projects  served  as  “springboards  to  a  modern  way  of  life  and  national 
development”  for  Venezuela’s  urban  and  rural  poor.  A  combination  of  government  propaganda 
and  the  “inward  pull”  of  oil  industry  labor  towards  urban  centers  contributed  heavily  to  the  mass 
domestic  migration  (Blackmore  2017,  50-55).  State  resources  were  thus  expanded  towards  these 
urban  centers,  the  capital  Caracas  in  particular,  to  reshape  the  landscape  in  the  image  of  rapid 
development  through  modern  buildings.  Former  barrio  residents  were  forcibly  relocated  to 
“universally  despised”  superblock  buildings  in  Caracas  (Davis  2017,  54-55).  At  the  same  time, 
poverty  began  rising  and  with  it  the  growth  of  slums  in  hills  bordering  large  cities  (Martinez  et 
al.  2010,  14).  European  migrants  with  agricultural  skills  were  incentivized  to  populate  the  rural 
interior  in  an  effort  to  develop  and  modernize  the  farming  and  agricultural  practices  of  the  land 
while  at  the  same  time  continuing  to  “clean”  Venezuelan  bloodlines  (Blackmore  2017,  58). 
The  ten  years  of  the  Pérez  Jiménez  dictatorship  created  through  deliberate  policy  a 
Venezuela  that  was  whiter,  more  European,  and  further  disconnected  from  its  rural  and 
indigenous  roots.  The  programme  was  accompanied  by  significant  use  of  military  force  and  state 
power  to  limit  opposition.  Half  a  century  later,  when  opponents  of  the  newly-elected  Chávez 
accused  him  of  rhetorically  splitting  the  country  between  rich  and  poor,  his  supporters  circulated 
a  meme  showcasing  the  Francisco  Fajardo  Highway  of  Caracas,  the  most  important  in  the  city, 
acting  as  “an  asphalt  ribbon  dividing  rich  from  poor”  with  the  caption  “It  was  Chávez  who 
divided  us?”  (Ciccariello-Maher  2016,  Kindle  loc.  371).  It  was  under  Pérez  Jiménez  that  these 
divisions  came  into  a  form  recognizable  today. 
The  post-dictatorship  regime  was  known  as  Puntofijismo,  after  the  1958  Pact  of  Punto 
Fijo  that  set  up  a  system  of  liberal  electoral  democracy.  It  was  signed  by  elites  of  the  three  major 
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anti-Communist  parties  in  the  country:  Acción  Democrática  (AD;  Democratic  Action),  Comité 
de  Organización  Política  Electoral  Independiente  (COPEI;  Social  Christian  Party),  and  the  Unión 
Republicana  Democrática  (URD;  Republican  Democratic  Union).  The  forty  years  between  then 
and  the  1998  election  of  Hugo  Chávez  would  see  those  elites  struggle  to  maintain  the  image  of 
stability  and  Venezuela’s  marginalized  communities  struggle  to  make  the  new  democratic  regime 
work  for  them.  In  the  thick  of  the  Cold  War  and  in  the  shadow  of  Cuba,  it  was  all  but  predictable 
that  these  two  struggles  should  come  into  conflict.  Local  Caracas  leader  Negro  Miguel  said  of 
these  times  that  “we  had  just  come  from  a  fierce  ten-year  dictatorship  under  Marcos  Pérez 
Jiménez.  And  then  came  the  incorrectly  called  ‘democracy.’  And  in  the  beginning,  we  saw  a 
change  in  things,  and  everything  was  very  hopeful,  but  it’s  like  a  party  and  the  day  after  you  have 
all  the  trash”  (Martinez  et  al.  2010,  15).  The  architects  of  Puntofijismo,  former  activists 
themselves  against  the  dictatorships  in  the  early  1930s  and  later  against  Pérez  Jiménez,  walked 
the  line  between  right-wing  demands  for  concentrated  power  as  a  means  of  jumpstarting  the  new 
democracy  and  left-wing  demands  for  social  and  economic  change  through  mass  mobilizations. 
An  example  of  this  balance  came  between  1958  and  the  1960  election  of  Rómulo  Betancourt, 
when  the  barrios  surrounding  the  big  cities  boomed  as  “the  governing  provisional  junta 
suspended  evictions  in  the  barrios  and  offered  public  relief  to  the  unemployed:  as  a  result, 
400,000  mostly  poor  people  moved  to  Caracas  in  little  more  than  a  year”  (Davis  2017,  59).  Elites 
of  AD  and  COPEI  erred  on  the  side  of  caution  by  opting  for  pragmatic  development  “based  on 
foreign  and  local  private  capital,  subsidies  to  the  private  sector,  principles  of  compensation  for 
any  land  reform,”  and  stability  by  all  means,  which  also  meant  excluding  the  left  from  most 
political  processes  (Diamond  et  al.  1989,  258-259). 
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The  positive  experience  of  Venezuelan  elites  under  Puntofijismo  was  inevitably  different 
from  that  of  Venezuelans  in  marginalized  communities.  To  help  take  down  Pérez  Jiménez, 
women  used  a  “conjunctural  coalition-building”  model  developed  by  them  in  which  they  worked 
with  both  legal  and  illegal  political  organizations  across  party  lines;  but  when  power  was 
consolidated  between  only  AD  and  COPEI  (URD  had  left  the  establishment  after  Betancourt 
condemned  revolutionary  Cuba),  that  pluralistic  unity  across  parties  was  seen  as  a  threat  by  the 
Puntofijismo  pact  that  wanted  to  exclude  more  radical  and  left-wing  parties  (Silva  Michelena 
1971,  68;  Elfenbein  2019,  40).  Women  and  indigenous  organizers  were  effectively  demobilized 
by  democratic  centralization,  which  concentrated  power  in  the  hands  of  the  establishment,  and 
were  left  outside  the  channels  to  political  power  by  the  two  parties.  Limited  numbers  (only 
around  2%  of  Venezuelans  are  indigenous)  and  financial  resources  meant  that  indigenous 
movements  couldn't  mobilize  their  own  candidates  inside  or  outside  of  the  clientelist  party 
establishment  (Donna  Lee  2010,  185).  Additional  barriers  to  political  participation  by  indigenous 
peoples  include  the  lack  of  support  from  nonindigenous  voters,  “fears  of  co-optation  or 
exploitation  [due  to]  a  belief  that  non-Indians  are  incapable  of  understanding  indigenous 
aspirations  and  cultures,”  and  the  leftist  nature  indigenous  movements  in  Venezuela,  making  the 
formal  lack  of  leftist  representation  in  federal  politics  a  major  roadblock  (Donna  Lee  2010, 
183-84;  Diamond  et  al.  1989,  259).  
Despite  the  challenges  faced  by  marginalized  groups,  advances  were  still  made  even  if  it 
meant  circumventing  the  liberal  democratic  model.  The  1970s,  for  example,  saw  the  formation  of 
“nonhierarchical,  noncentralized  alliances  across  the  political  and  class  affiliations  to  advance” 
the  gender  interests  of  women  who  were  dissatisfied  with  the  “rise  of  middle-class  and 
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popular-sector  women’s  organizations.”  In  1975,  the  recognition  of  the  economic  value  of  unpaid 
housework  traditionally  relegated  to  women  became  judicial  precedent  by  judge  Yolanda  Poleo 
de  Baez,  who  was  also  the  leader  of  the  Venezuelan  Women  Lawyer’s  Federation  (FEVA).  The 
ruling  received  little  national  attention  but  informed  the  future  demands  of  popular  women’s 
organizing  (Elfenbein  2019,  41).  In  the  late  70s,  networks  of  women’s  rights-based  NGOs 
proliferated  after  organizing  led  to  the  creation  of  the  Ministry  for  Women’s  Participation  in 
Development  and  gains  for  gender  and  children’s  equality.  Further  labor-based  social  protection 
for  homeworkers  and  domestic  workers,  however,  was  subsequently  prevented  from  inclusion  in 
labor  laws  by  middle-  and  upper-class  women  involved  in  women’s  rights  movements  in  the  80s 
and  90s  (Elfenbein  2019,  43).  
For  indigenous  movements,  the  question  of  sovereignty  largely  defined  their  struggle 
against  the  state.  From  before  Pérez  Jiménez,  unofficial  state  policy  was  to  incorporate 
indigenous  tribes  into  national  life  in  order  to  provide  them  with  healthcare  and  education.  The 
work,  particularly  in  territories  such  as  Amazonas  which  were  essentially  cut  off  from  the  rest  of 
the  country,  was  still  relegated  mainly  to  nonstate  religious  organizations.  Bureaucratic 
inefficiencies  and  the  fact  that  indigenous  issues  are  a  low  priority  meant  that  few  results  came  of 
this  (Angosto-Ferrández  2015,  44-46).  Even  some  pro-indigenous  movements  on  the  progressive 
left  sought  to  repress  indigenous  claims  to  territorial  sovereignty  in  favor  of  bringing  them  into 
the  mainstream  national  imagination  (Angosto-Ferrández  2015,  42).  Despite  widespread 
conflicts  over  indigenous  lands,  72%  of  indigenous  communities  in  the  early  90s  had  no  land 
titles  (Angosto-Ferrández  2015,  54).  Furthermore,  a  lack  of  unity  among  indigenous  groups,  due 
to  the  fact  that  they  were  divided  between  rural  and  urban  settings  across  states,  meant  that 
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organizing  always  remained  local  and  never  elevated  to  the  federal  level.  One  success  came 
when  the  territory  of  Amazonas  became  a  state  in  1992  and  organized  indigenous  resistance 
ensured  that  the  state’s  constitution  included  language  inclusive  to  indigenous  territorial  claims 
and  identity. 
One  of  the  clearest  examples  of  popular  organization  in  Venezuela  came  in  the  form  of 
communes  in  the  1980s,  where  poor  barrio  residents  met  in  assemblies  to  discuss  everything 
from  local  affairs  to  the  realities  of  revolutionary  praxis  in  the  face  of  democratic  exclusion.  This 
was  done  entirely  unofficially,  as  this  form  of  organization  was  not  recognized  by  the  state.  They 
expanded  into  barrio  networks  through  larger  and  larger  swaths  of  land,  becoming  one  of  the 
most  direct  forms  of  antisystemic  resistance  to  the  capitalist  world-system  albeit  in  a  highly 
localized  manner.  More  specifically,  communes  “aim  to  produce  the  things  that  people  need 
locally  through  socialist  enterprises”  that  are  explicitly  anti-capitalist.  In  a  general  sense,  the 
theory  is  that  the  community  best  knows  what  the  community  needs,  so  it  should  provide  for 
itself  (Ciccariello-Maher  2016,  17-18).  The  limited  resources  and  off-the-books  status  of  the 
communes  did  limit  their  extent  and  overall  success,  but  regardless  the  communes  did  prove  that 
popular  self-organization  was  possible  and  that  its  proliferation  did  not  necessarily  depend  on 
state  infrastructure.  
Puntofijismo  survived  in  Venezuela  because  of  its  ability  to  project  an  image  of  stability, 
perpetuated  by  oil  wealth  that  kept  the  economy  afloat  and  savvy  governance  that  kept 
potentially  radical  elements  at  bay.  Social  organizations  and  labor  unions,  for  example,  were 
often  subsidized  by  the  government  and  their  leaders  knew  that  compliance  with  state  power 
could  grant  them  seats  on  official  boards.  According  to  some,  the  image  of  Venezuela’s  stability 
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covered  up  thousands  of  disappearances  and  assassinations  by  Venezuelan  security  forces  during 
the  60s  and  70s  (Martinez  et  al.  2010,  16).  This  was  the  age  of  the  “Magical  State,”  as  Fernando 
Coronil  dubbed  it,  in  which  “the  myth  of  Venezuela  as  a  wealthy  democratic  nation  steadily 
advancing  toward  modernity”  persisted  despite  numerous  indicators  that  it  was  just  that–  a  myth, 
a  facade  (Coronil  1997,  368).  Seemingly  unlimited  oil  wealth  allowed  for  everything  from  social 
programs  to  funding  for  organizations  aiding  marginalized  communities,  such  as  the 
unsuccessful  missions  to  indigenous  lands.  Political  leaders  were  seen  as  magicians  who  could 
conjure  progress  out  of  a  hat.  None  was  more  successful  than  Carlos  Andrés  Pérez  (CAP), 
president  from  1974  to  79.  A  historic  rise  in  oil  prices  gave  him  new  powers  with  which  to 
modernize  the  nation,  and  the  ruse  worked.  The  prevailing  view  of  Puntofijismo’s  magic  is 
represented  in  a  historiography  by  Daniel  H.  Levine  in  which  he  argues  that  this  socioeconomic 
development  “solved”  the  problem  of  the  peasantry  as  a  social  group–  a  solution  which 
overlooks  “the  explosive  expansion  of  informal  barrios”  in  Caracas,  to  the  point  where  the 
country  went  from  “being  30  percent  urban  to  30  percent  rural”  in  the  60s  (Davis  2017,  59).  The 
elitist  tinge  of  the  magic  becomes  clear  when  he  claims  (writing  prior  to  1989)  that  “there  are  no 
politically  significant  racial,  ethnic,  or  linguistic  splits  in  Venezuela”  (Diamond  et  al.  1989, 
276-277). 
The  onslaught  of  neoliberalism  made  a  slow  entrance  into  Venezuela,  first  through  the 
successive  presidents  who  piggybacked  off  CAP’s  wizardry  and  then,  ironically,  through  CAP 
himself  in  his  second  term  from  1989-93.  The  magical  veneer  wore  off  after  the  inevitable  oil 
bust,  meaning  that  “if  the  growing  poor  didn't  see  the  money  that  gushed  into  Venezuela's 
petrol-class  through  the  booming  1960s  and  1970s,  they  sure  didn't  see  it  after”  that  (Martinez  et 
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al.  2010,  16).  After  campaigning  by  calling  the  IMF  a  “neutron  bomb  that  killed  people  but  left 
buildings  standing,”  he  accepted  $4.5  billion  in  IMF  loans  mere  weeks  after  taking  office 
(Fastenberg  2011).  Rapid  neoliberalization  from  the  mid-80s  to  the  early  90s  meant  that  what 
little  oil  wealth  was  used  in  support  of  social  movements  disappeared,  particularly  for  women’s 
organizations.  For  indigenous  communities,  however,  decentralization  under  neoliberalism 
opened  up  new  opportunities  as  indigenous-focused  agencies  boomed  with  similar  goals  of 
incorporation  through  access  to  public  services  and  citizenship.  But  as  Luis  F. 
Angosto-Ferrández  writes,  if  this  was  the  goal,  it  “was  clearly  a  failure.  By  1992,  the  national 
census  established  that  65%  of  indigenous  communities  were  deprived  of  schools  and  nearly 
87%  lacked  even  a  pharmacy”  (Angosto-Ferrández  2015,  47).  Levine’s  comment  is  indicative  of 
a  larger  trend  in  Venezuela  during  this  time.  Relegated  to  the  hills  surrounding  big  cities,  to  the 
distant  Amazon,  and  to  kitchens  nationwide,  Venezuelans  of  marginalized  communities  were 
made  invisible  to  Puntofijismo  and  its  benefactors.  The  racist  and  elitist  legacy  of  Pérez  Jiménez 
was  alive  and  well  in  the  Magical  State.  But  for  an  invisible  population  beaten  down  even  harder 
by  neoliberalism,  the  logical  remedy  was  to  make  themselves  visible  in  the  most  forceful  way 
possible. 
The  opportunity  came  on  the  last  Monday  of  February  in  1989.  When  Caracas’  workers 
woke  up  early  in  the  morning  to  discover  that  CAP’s  austerity  measures  had  doubled  gasoline 
costs  literally  overnight,  riots  and  burning  busses  were  already  being  reported  as  they  refused  to 
pay  the  higher  costs.  By  7:30  A.M.,  demonstrations  were  already  underway  and  looting  was 
taking  place  in  the  capital’s  heavily  Afro-Venezuelan  east.  The  anger  initially  directed  at  the  gas 
price  hikes  spread  politically  to  cover  both  the  entire  neoliberal  package  and  physically  to  cover 
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significant  parts  of  the  entire  country  within  a  few  hours.  Scholar  George  Ciccariello-Maher 
argues  that  it  was  not  the  students,  nor  the  low-wage  working  class,  nor  the  peasants  who 
sparked  the  revolution;  it  was  the  urban  poor  who  came  from  the  hills  they  had  been  corralled 
into  for  decades  and  made  themselves  seen  through  a  mixture  of  coordinated,  on-the-ground 
organizing  and  spontaneous  riots  across  the  major  cities  nationwide.  Evidence  shows  that  the 
looting  was  primarily  of  basic  necessities,  from  household  items  to  food,  though  whiskey  and 
champagne  were  certainly  not  left  untouched  (Ciccariello-Maher  2013,  93).  Some  reports 
claimed  that  rioters  ended  up  firing  back  at  the  state  forces  at  some  point  and  that  the  motives  for 
the  riots  had  moved  beyond  the  initial  economic  frustration  and  into  indiscriminate  destruction  of 
private  and  public  property.  
The Caracazo ,  as  these  riots  came  to  be  known,  walked  the  peculiar  line  between 
organization  and  spontaneity.  To  the  middle  classes  and  the  elites,  they  must  have  felt  like  a 
highly  coordinated  assault  undertaken  by  professional  militants.  Reports  of  Cuban  involvement, 
including  by  former  Venezuelan  military  general  Carlos  Peñaloza,  persist  to  this  day  with  little 
hard  evidence  (Peñaloza  2014,  185).  What  is  known  is  that  the  “‘spontaneity’  had  been  practiced 
in  the  streets  for  several  years  before  the  revolt  and  in  many  ways  resulted  from  conscious  and 
organized  efforts  to  overcome  the  failures  of  the  guerrilla  struggle”  after  decades  of  forceful 
repression  against  an  emergent  Left  in  Venezuela  (Ciccariello-Maher  2013,  95).  But  the 
invisibility  of  the  barrios  under  Puntofijismo  allowed  these  efforts  to  run  unsurveilled.  Relegated 
to  the  hills  surrounding  the  cities,  struggles  against  the  AD-COPEI  “partyarchy”  and  encroaching 
neoliberalism  continued  because  they  could  not  be  spoken  out  of  existence.  What  made  the 
Caracazo  different,  and  the  reason  why  it  is  still  remembered  with  either  fondness  or  horror 
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today,  is  that  it  was  the  first  time  that  forty  years  of  struggle  spilled  out  from  the  hills  and  forced 
itself  into  the  view  of  the  Venezuelan  elite. 
With  hindsight  encompassing  over  thirty  years  of  Global  South  neoliberalization  today, 
the  response  by  the  state  to  the  Caracazo  was  all  but  expected.  But  for  the  masses  of  the  urban 
poor  in  1989,  it  would  be  an  understatement  to  say  that  they  were  underprepared.  February  28 
began  with  police  firing  indiscriminately  at  rioters  in  some  areas,  whereas  in  other  areas  the 
police  either  monitored  the  looting  or  partook  themselves.  At  6  P.M.  that  day,  CAP  got  on 
national  television  and  announced  Decree  #49,  which  suspended  the  individual  rights  to  liberty 
and  security,  the  inviolability  of  the  home,  and  the  rights  of  assembly  and  peaceful  protest.  The 
suspension  of  rights  lasted  until  March  22,  creating  nearly  a  month  in  which  the  government  was 
essentially  able  to  act  without  constitutional  restriction  that  state  security  forces  took  full 
advantage  of  (Carey  &  Shugart  1998,  157-58).  Violators  of  an  overnight  curfew  were  treated 
with  predictable  brutality,  particularly  in  the  large  barrios  of  Caracas.  The  Catia  and  23  de  Enero 
barrios  were  identified  by  the  state  as  the  “organizational  brain  of  the  rebellion”  and  saw  
known  organizers…dragged  from  their  homes  to  be  either  executed  or 
“disappeared,”  and  when  security  forces  met  resistance  from  rooftop 
snipers,  they  sprayed  entire  apartment  blocks  with  automatic  machine 
guns.  Just  as  the  bullet  holes  left  in  these  apartment  blocks  in  the  1960s 
remained  as  scars  and  political  reminders  well  into  the  1970s,  so  too  are 
the  bullet  holes  from  the  Caracazo  visible  to  this  very  day.  Turning 
attention  toward  Petare,  which  today  is  the  largest  and  most  violent  of 
Caracas'  slums,  up  to  twenty  were  killed  in  a  single  incident  when,  on 
March  1,  the  army  infamously  opened  fire  on  the  Mesuca  stairway.  Much 
of  the  country  was  “pacified”  after  three  days  of  such  incidents,  whereas 
Caracas  saw  rioting  for  more  than  five  (Ciccariello-Maher  2013,  96-97). 
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Official  figures  place  the  death  toll  at  around  300,  but  popular  figures  place  the  toll  closer 
to  3,000.  The  combination  of  an  effective  government  blackout  amid  the  repressions  (meaning 
that  no  documents  during  this  time  are  available),  government  obstructions  to  investigations  into 
the  violence,  and  the  sheer  geographic  spread  of  the  riots  have  made  it  all  but  impossible  to 
determine  the  reality  (Carey  &  Shugart  1998,  157).  Those  potentially  thousands  of  Venezuelans 
were  not,  however,  the  only  casualties.  So  too  had  died  the  illusion  of  the  Magical  State,  of 
Puntofijismo,  and  of  the  peripheral  urban  poor  who  remained  in  their  hills.  The  government 
knew  that  its  image  had  been  shattered  in  the  eyes  of  many  of  its  most  important  subjects, 
namely  the  low-wage  and  informal  workers  who  served  as  its  real  engine,  and  thus  it  responded 
“with  a  series  of  measures  attempting  to  restore  Puntofijismo’s  legitimacy  within  a  neoliberal 
framework”  (Elfenbein  2019,  45).  But  after  living  conditions  worsened  still  and  people  lost  faith 
in  the  state’s  ability  to  uphold  the  collective  good,  the  state  lost  people’s  compliance. 
In  the  short  term,  the  impact  of  the  Caracazo  was  contradictory.  On  the  one  hand, 
newfound  anti-establishment  energy  had  literally  rocked  the  streets  and  reinvigorated  the 
long-gestating  social  movements  that  gave  birth  to  it.  But  on  the  other  hand,  the  neoliberal 
infection  that  mobilized  the  rioters  persisted,  resulting  in  less  availability  of  funding  and  state 
resources  to  social  organizations  relative  to  the  pre-neoliberal  era  of  Puntofijismo.  It  ushered  in 
an  era  of  further  anti-neoliberal  organizing  entirely  from  the  grassroots  perspective.  The 
Puntofijista  establishment  itself  provided  an  important  boost  to  that  aim  through  a  series  of 
decentralization  reforms  following  the  Caracazo,  which  made  it  to  where  mayors  and  governors 
could  now  be  elected  by  a  direct  vote.  This  had  the  obvious  effect  of  opening  space  for 
nontraditional  candidates  to  take  power,  which  in  turn  spread  even  further  the  antisystemic 
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energy  (Corrales  &  Penfold  2015,  17).  But  for  that  energy  to  really  challenge  the  behemoth  of 
global  capitalism,  the  social  nature  of  the  Bolivarian  antisystemic  movement  would  need  to  take 
on  a  national  face  and  use  state  power  to  challenge  state  power. 
On  the  fourth  of  February  in  1992,  that  challenge  came  in  the  form  of  an  attempted 
military  coup  d'état  against  CAP  led  by  lieutenant-colonel  Hugo  Chávez.  Chávez,  whose 
anti-government  sentiment  was  known  by  the  government  at  the  time  of  the  Caracazo, 
capitalized  on  the  widespread  post-Caracazo  popular  dissatisfaction  with  Puntofijismo,  to  lead  a 
rebellion  on  the  house  of  government  that  ended  with  his  arrest.  After  the  attempt  failed, 
however,  a  press  interview  gave  Bolivarianism  its  most  direct  voice  yet  when  Chávez  articulated 
that  “friends,  unfortunately,  for  now,  the  objectives  we  strived  for  were  not  reached  in  the  capital 
city”  (Marco  2017).  That  “for  now”  sent  shockwaves  throughout  Venezuela.  It  was  famous  then 
for  the  message  it  sent  to  the  social  movements  who  could  again  believe  that  there  is  hope  for  a 
better  future.  And  it  is  infamous  today  for  its  remarkable  prescience  that  continues  to  haunt  the 
country  to  this  very  day. 
As  part  of  a  plan  to  distance  himself  from  the  neoliberal  disaster  of  1989,  President 
Rafael  Caldera  in  1994  released  Hugo  Chávez  from  prison  with  a  pardon.  Chávez  mounted  an 
ultimately  successful  campaign  for  President  four  years  later  as  an  anti-neoliberal  candidate 
(Painter  2011).  Even  in  a  country  as  business-friendly  as  Venezuela,  anti-business  and 
anti-neoliberal  sentiment  combined  with  “outlier  business  elites”  helped  secure  the  victory  of  his 
platform  built  on  ending  corruption,  poverty,  and  democratic  exclusion  (Gates  2010,  133).  He 
generated  widespread  excitement  among  the  populations  that  had  been  systematically  excluded 
from  democracy,  giving  his  incoming  government  in  1999  a  massive  popular  mandate  in  which 
30 
/
 
forty  years  of  organizing  placed  their  trust.  Indeed,  the  rise  of  Chavismo  represented  the 
ascension  of  Bolivarianism  as  a  series  of  antisystemic  social  movements  into  a  single 
antisystemic  national  movement  with  the  promise  of  representing  their  interests.  The  following 
sections  will  depart  from  a  chronological  study  and  address  various  elements  associated  with 
Chavismo  and  explore  how  the  rhetoric  of  nonagentic  anti-imperialism  engages  them. 
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4. Chavismo 
When  Ciccariello-Maher,  himself  a  nonagentic  anti-imperialist,  attempts  to  sell  the  image 
of  Chávez  to  his  readers  on  the  left,  he  does  so  by  promoting  the  formation  of  what  he  calls 
“radical  democracy,”  which  takes  form  through  the  practice  of  local  power  such  as  communes. 
This  is  the  first  point  addressed  in  this  section  because  to  many,  it  cuts  to  the  heart  of  the  essence 
of  Chavismo–  building  democracy  from  the  bottom-up.  Grassroots  democracy  meant  to  give  a 
voice  to  those  who  were  denied  access  to  top-down  democracy  for  so  long,  even  with  the  help  of 
the  social  movements  described  above.  While  the  “council-socialist”  tradition  of  communes 
wasn't  official  state  policy  until  2006,  the  language  of  “‘participatory  and  protagonistic 
democracy’  based  on  a  broad  conception  of  participation  that…encompasses  social,  economic 
and  cultural  rights  [with]  collective  rights  for  specific  groups”  was  inscribed  in  Chávez’s 
popularly  ratified  1999  constitution  from  the  beginning  (Azzellini  2018,  5).  Dario  Azzellini 
describes  this  as  part  of  a  “two-track”  approach  to  dealing  with  20th  century  questions  of 
whether  antisystemic  social  movements  can  remain  effective  after  “seizing  the  state”  and 
becoming  national;  Venezuela’s  answer  was  to  have  social  movements  essentially  guide  the  state 
from  below.  This  was  Chávez’s  famous  “third  way”  between  capitalism  and  socialism  (Azzellini 
2018,  9).  Local  power  and  autonomy  took  many  forms,  each  contributing  to  a  restructuring  of  the 
linkages  between  citizens  and  the  state.  The  aim  of  this  section  is  not  to  determine  if  this 
restructuring  was  for  better  or  for  worse;  rather,  it  is  to  understand  its  significance  and  ultimate 
effect  on  the  democratic  ideals  of  Chavismo  as  established  in  the  1999  constitution.  The  forms 
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that  will  be  examined  here  are  the  1999  housing  reforms,  the  2003  establishment  of  the  misiónes, 
and  the  2006  turn  towards  local  organization  through  communes. 
In  promising  citizens  the  right  of  participation  in  the  administration  and  execution  of 
housing  policy,  the  administration  clearly  repudiated  the  neoliberal  housing  establishment  that 
had  led  to  and  maintained  the  physical  segregation  between  rich  and  poor  in  urban  areas.  More 
importantly,  the  1999  housing  reforms  built  on  a  decade  of  bottom-up  organizing,  such  as  the 
1991  Assembly  of  Barrios,  through  which  citizens  demanded  greater  control  over  land  rights  and 
tenancy  (Smilde  &  Hellinger  2011,  85-86).  Chávez  seized  on  these  movements  during  his 
campaign  and  gave  them  the  political  legitimacy  that  they  had  lacked.  A  centerpiece  of  these 
reforms  are  Urban  Land  Committees  (CTUs),  established  in  2002.  Article  1  of  Decree  1.666 
declares  the  goal  of  “initiating  the  protagonistic  participation  of  organized  communities  in  order 
to  achieve  the  regulation  of  urban  land  tenancy  in  popular  neighborhoods  through  proper 
inter-institutional  coordination,”  effectively  creating  CTUs  as  the  method  through  which  citizens 
would  take  the  lead  in  housing  reform  (Smilde  &  Hellinger  2011,  88).  CTUs  are  organized  on  a 
“basis  of  communal  solidarity”  and  focus  on  the  cultural  elements  that  make  up  a  community, 
such  as  local  traditions  and  shared  histories  (Smilde  &  Hellinger  2011,  91).  Venezuelan  scholar 
María  Pilar  García-Guadilla  writes  in  her  chapter  of Venezuela’s  Bolivarian  Democracy that  there 
is  an  inherent  contradiction  in  having  top-down  approaches  sanctioning  bottom-up  movements. 
The  fact  that  the  legitimacy  of  these  movements  hinges  on  presidential  decrees  and  bureaucratic 
mechanisms  creates  self-evident  limits  on  their  autonomy  and  opens  the  door  to  “political 
co-optation  to  the  extent  that  the  CTUs’  objectives  are  conditioned  upon  political  loyalty  – 
especially  given  the  relationship  of  the  popular  sectors  with  such  a  highly  charismatic  leader  as 
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Chávez”  (Smilde  &  Hellinger  2011,  99)  This  unavoidable  contradiction  will  be  apparent  in  any 
similar  piece  of  supposedly  pro-autonomy  legislation,  including  the  ones  examined  below. 
The  second  form  of  “radical  democracy”  is  probably  the  most  prolific.  Chávez’s 
misiones,  or  social  programs,  were  a  cornerstone  of  his  socioeconomic  platform  and  stretched 
across  significant  shares  of  the  population,  going  far  beyond  the  reach  of  the  Puntofijista 
establishment.  The  push  for  misiones  began  in  2003  following  a  very  turbulent  2002  and 
preceding  a  recall  referendum,  making  them  a  clear  play  to  prove  to  the  electorate  that  concrete 
gains  had  in  fact  been  made.  Between  2003  and  2006  alone  there  were  nearly  20  misiones 
carried  out,  providing  services  and  aid  to  the  poor,  to  women,  to  indigenous  communities,  and 
other  groups.  It  is  impossible  to  address  all  of  them  here,  so  only  Barrio  Adentro (2003), 
Robinson  (2003),  and  Vuelvan  Caras  (2004)  will  be  highlighted  because  they  represent  a  diverse 
assortment  of  issues  addressed  by  the  misiones. 
Barrio  Adentro  was  the  first  misión  to  be  put  into  action.  Its  aim  was  to  provide  free 
medical  care  nationwide  to  those  who  needed  it,  using  tens  of  thousands  of  Cuban  doctors  and 
thousands  of  Venezuelan  medical  students.  The  Cuban  export  of  doctors  throughout  the 
developing  world  had  reached  Venezuela  first  in  1999  after  a  natural  disaster,  something  that  set 
the  foundations  for  what  eventually  became  Barrio  Adentro.  Though  the  program  first  began 
offering  only  primary  aid,  it  quickly  grew  to  include  more  elaborate  treatment  centers  and  within 
a  year  had  the  additional  goal  of  consolidating  “much  of  the  traditional  public  health  care  system 
within Barrio  Adentro  while  maintaining  its  emphasis  on  free  health  care  and  expanded  local 
access”  (Smilde  &  Hellinger  2011,  197).  The  importance  of  the  accessible  provision  of  medical 
care  to  poor  communities  cannot  be  understated;  for  many  of  Venezuela’s  poor,  particularly  in 
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the  program’s  early  years  when  it  focused  on  primary  care,  it  was  a  literal  lifeline.  The 
characteristically  opaque  nature  of  Venezuelan  government  affairs  means  that  it  is  impossible  to 
know  how  much  the  program  actually  cost,  but  the  state  oil  firm  PDVSA  claims  it  invested 
US$6.36  billion  in  the  program  from  2003-2010. 
Along  with  healthcare,  education  is  another  pillar  on  which  the  Chavista  regime  hitched 
its  legitimacy.  Public  education  programs  were  a  stated  priority,  and  the  Misión  Robinson  (Phase 
I)  program,  started  in  2003,  was  arguably  its  shining  light.  It  involved  sending  volunteers,  either 
civilian  or  military,  into  areas  previously  untouched  by  public  education  efforts  to  teach  citizens 
how  to  read  and  write.  It  began  heavily  orientated  towards  the  grassroots,  with  municipal 
coordinators  working  with  communities  to  create  regulatory  parameters  based  on  local  needs,  but 
within  a  couple  of  years  it  became  more  bureaucratized  and  regulated  from  above.  Gauging  the 
success  of  Misión  Robinson  is  particularly  difficult  because  the  only  figures  available  come 
either  directly  from  the  government,  with  little  sourcing  beyond  just  their  word,  or  from 
explicitly  anti-Chavista  researchers  and  journalists.  The  government  claimed  that  in  its  first  year, 
Robinson  taught  1.5  million  Venezuelans  to  read  using  around  130,000  facilitators,  declaring 
Venezuela  an  illiteracy-free  country  by  2005  (“‘Aló,  Presidente’  Número  227  Declara  Hoy  a 
Venezuela  Territorio  Libre  De  Analfabetismo”  2005).  The  retrospective  blog  of  elite  inner-circle 
Chavista  Diosdado  Cabello  described  the  accomplishment  as  the  result  of  “Supreme  leader  of  the 
Bolivarian  Revolution”  Chávez’s  “goal  to  give  liberty  to  the  people  and  break  with  imperialist 
oppression”  (“¡Yo  Sí  Puedo!  Misión  Robinson”  2019).  While  the  figures  are  disputed,  it  is  worth 
noting  that  no  effort  like  this  had  ever  been  undertaken  in  Venezuela  and  its  ambition  should  be 
recognized. 
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Misión  Vuelvan  Caras  of  2004  promoted  “endogenous  development  centers”  by  training 
participants  for  work  largely  in  worker  cooperatives.  More  broadly,  the  goal  was  to  create 
popular  power  by  addressing  low  unemployment  and  high  poverty  rates  through 
locally-organized  work  structures  in  areas  where  industry  did  not  reach  (McIlroy  &  Wynter 
2016).  The  focus  on  cooperative  forms  of  labor  organizing  represents  one  of  the  strongest 
concrete  breaks  from  capitalist  modes  of  labor  organizing  before  2006.  Additionally,  Vuelvan 
Caras  represented  one  of  the  first  opportunities  for  poor  women  to  train  for  work  and  become 
working  members  of  cooperatives.  The  program  consisted  of  sending  teams  of  facilitators  out  to 
communities  around  the  country  to  provide  citizens  with  “technical  information,  political 
knowledge  and  the  opportunity  to  begin  to  work  with  the  practical  skills  they  have  gained  in  the 
course”  (McIlroy  &  Wynter  2016).  There  is  much  less  information  available  about  this  misión 
compared  to  Barrio  Adentro  since  it  never  reached  the  same  scope,  but  from  what  is  available 
from  researchers  and  journalists  in  Venezuela,  the  program  appears  to  have  provided  thousands 
of  poor  citizens  outside  of  urban  cities  with  new  opportunities  for  self-organization. 
And  finally,  the  third  form  of  “radical  democracy”  studied  in  this  section  is  that  of 
communes  and  colectivos,  the  most  direct  forms  of  local  organizing  that  the  regime  supported. 
The  two  are  not  necessarily  synonymous,  though  they  do  share  enough  qualities  to  merit 
inclusion  in  the  same  section  not  only  by  their  supposed  autonomy  but  also  in  the  fact  that  both 
“came  under  the  umbrella  of  the  government’s  ‘communal  councils’”  (“Venezuela:  A  Mafia 
State?”  2018).  Azzellini  posits  that  communes  are  the  pathway  to  devolve  the  traditional  state 
into  a  communal  state.  To  address  the  contradiction  brought  up  above,  he  argues  that  the  state 
cannot  be  the  driver  of  the  transition  towards  socialism,  but  only  provide  the  local  organizers  the 
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power  with  which  to  do  so  (Azzellini  2018,  1010).  The  history  of  local  autonomy  as  an 
alternative  form  of  organization  has  deep  roots  in  Venezuela,  from  early  Marxist  thinkers  to 
indigenous  peoples  and  Afro  communities  descending  from  emancipated  slaves.  2006  was  the 
year  in  which  Chávez  formally  moved  his  government  towards  a  socialist  vision,  as  opposed  to 
the  more  vaguely  anti-neoliberal  one  from  before,  with  the  Law  of  Communal  Councils. 
Communes  had  existed  in  Venezuela  for  decades,  but  it  was  this  law  that  finally  recognized  them 
as  legitimate  forms  of  organization  able  to  receive  government  support  (National  Assembly 
2006).  A  little  over  a  year  later,  the  Ministry  of  Participation  and  Social  Development  announced 
that  around  19,500  communes  were  in  existence  (“Minpades  Registra  19  Mil  500  Consejos 
Comunales”  2007).  Local  self-organization  allowed  the  poor  in  both  urban  and  rural  areas  to 
reach  new  levels  of  self-sufficiency  and,  true  to  the  law’s  aim,  disengage  from  the  centrality  of 
the  state  in  certain  respects.  Ciccariello-Maher  writes  of  the  El  Maizal  commune,  created  in 
2009,  and  how  it  autonomously  produces  corn  to  be  ground  up  and  made  into  flour  for  arepas,  a 
staple  of  Venezuelan  food,  on  land  expropriated  from  landowners  by  Chávez  (Ciccariello-Maher 
2016,  KIndle  loc.  981).  Production  is  able  to  take  place  independently  of  industry  and  put  power 
in  the  hand  of  the  community. 
The  colectivos  have  a  different  history,  loosely  emerging  in  the  1980s  as  armed  militias 
engaged  in  self-defense,  contrary  to  the  communes’  goal  of  autonomous  self-sufficiency.  They 
were  formalized  in  2001  when  Chávez  “asked  his  supporters  to  form  civic  action  groups  so  that 
communities  would  have  more  clout  in  lobbying  central  government  directly  for  funds,”  though 
they  were  seen  by  many  as  paramilitary  groups  operating  in  support  of  the  regime  (Morsbach 
2002).  That  view  was  validated  during  the  2002  coup  attempt  when  members  of  the  Bolivarian 
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Circles  –early  versions  of  these  paramilitaries–  opened  fire  against  the  pro-coup  Opposition, 
something  Ciccariello-Maher  argues  was  “not  to  attack  the  constitutional  order,  but  to  protect 
and  restore  it”  (“Venezuela:  A  Mafia  State?”  2018;  Ciccariello-Maher  2016,  Kindle  loc.  805)  An 
example  of  a  colectivo  is  that  of  La  Piedrita,  with  roots  dating  back  to  the  1980s  in  23  de  Enero 
(23rd  of  January,  a  name  commemorating  the  date  of  the  coup  that  toppled  Pérez  Jiménez)  barrio 
in  Caracas.  Born  out  of  strong  Marxist-Leninist  principles,  it  was  created  to  defend  against  the 
cycle  of  violence  that  rocked  the  barrio.  Ciccariello-Maher  also  writes  that  its  authority 
supersedes  that  of  the  state,  a  point  emphasized  by  a 
hand-painted  sign  that  greets  all  visitors:  “Here  La  Piedrita  gives  the 
orders  and  the  government  obeys.”  This  is  no  exaggeration:  the  Chávez 
government  once  sent  a  captain  of  the  military  reserves  into  the  zone, 
who  was  immediately  taken  into  custody  by  the  collective.  When  the 
official  protested,  explaining  that  he  was  merely  there  to  scope  out  a 
possible  escape  route  for  the  president  in  the  event  of  a  repeat  of  the 
2002  coup,  the  response  from  La  Piedrita  was  unambiguous:  the 
government  does  not  tell  us  anything,  it  must  ask  (Ciccariello-Maher 
2015). 
 
Such  descriptions  of  autonomy  certainly  lend  credence  to  the  notion  that  Venezuela's  radical 
democracy,  with  roots  in  pre-Colombian  indigenous  organization  but  formalized  by  Chávez,  has 
set  the  country  on  a  path  to  the  devolution  of  the  state  in  favor  of  locally-organized  popular 
power  based  on  community  traditions  and  shared  histories.  There  is  unsurprisingly  a  great 
variety  in  the  form,  management,  and  productive  capabilities  of  different  communes;  dedicating 
a  couple  of  sentences  to  only  two  of  the  tens  of  thousands  of  communes  in  Venezuela  may  seem 
like  more  of  an  insult  than  an  overview.  Those  sentences  aim  only  to  introduce  that  variety  and 
outline  the  structures  that  supposedly  form  the  basis  of  revolutionary  democracy. 
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Having  briefly  reviewed  three  forms  of  “radical  democracy”  that  sought  to  reshape 
citizen-state  relations  and  decentralize  state  power,  it  is  time  to  revisit  the  aforementioned 
contradiction  of  top-down  approaches  to  bottom-up  autonomy,  especially  when  it  comes  to 
Chavismo.  It  is  a  contradiction  addressed  by  the  scholars  cited  above.  Ciccariello-Maher 
concedes  that  top-down  reaches  “from  above  toward  the  popular  movements  from  below…is  not 
without  either  its  contradictions  or  dangers.  The  contradictions  are  as  old  as  sovereignty  itself: 
the  state  does  not  like  to  share  power,  and  much  less  does  the  military”  (Ciccariello-Maher  2013, 
250).  Azzellini  similarly  acknowledges  the  difficulty  in  a  bourgeois  state  existing  under  the 
capitalist  world-system  with  institutions  which,  “out  of  their  own  inherent  logic,  try  to  control 
the  social  processes  and  reproduce  themselves”  (Azzellini  2018,  56).  The  first  barrier  to  the 
autonomy  of  these  “radical  democracy”  initiatives  is  their  legal  adscription  to  the  powerful 
executive.  All  were  either  created  or  formally  recognized  by  federal  law,  meaning  that  the  power 
ultimately  rests  there.  In  the  case  of  the  CTUs,  García-Guadilla  claims  that  this  opens  them  up  to 
co-optation  by  the  regime  when  questions  regarding  competition  for  the  top-down  distribution  of 
resources  emerge.  Similarly,  a  challenge  for  autonomy  arises  when  significant  governmental 
influence  restricts  the  ability  of  the  CTUs  to  forge  their  own  identities,  a  necessary  development 
when  the  entire  goal  of  this  method  of  housing  policy  is  supposed  to  be  as  localized  as  possible 
(Smilde  &  Hellinger  2011,  99-100).  When  the  federal  executive  is  the  fountain  for  whose 
resources  the  network  of  autonomous  CTUs  must  compete,  an  inevitable  result  of  these  is  that 
the  communities  that  side  more  with  the  government  will  receive  more  of  the  benefits.  The  same 
issue  is  apparent  in  Chávez’s  misiones,  an  issue  which  was  the  focus  of  the  chapter  by  Hawkins, 
Rosas,  and  Johnson  in Venezuela’s  Bolivarian  Democracy .  They  sought  in  2005  to  understand  if 
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the  misiones  were  programmatic  or  clientelistic;  in  other  words,  were  the  program  resources 
impartially  distributed  where  needed,  or  were  they  used  in  direct  exchange  for  votes  and  political 
support?  Their  answer  is  somewhere  in  the  middle–  what  they  call  “charismatic/populist” 
(Smilde  &  Hellinger  2011,  201).  They  found  that  for  the  missions  they  analyzed  (including 
Barrio  Adentro  and  Robinson,  but  not  Vuelvan  Caras),  the  allocation  of  resources  was  in  fact 
determined  in  large  part  by  whether  or  not  a  certain  community  politically  supported  the  regime. 
For  Misión  Mercal,  for  example,  which  established  a  nationwide  chain  of  stores  selling 
subsidized  food,  the  correlation  they  found  is  that  richer  communities  actually  had  a  higher 
chance  of  receiving  a  Mercal  store  than  poor  ones,  “conditional  on  the  percent  of  the  2000  vote 
for  Chávez”  (Smilde  &  Hellinger  2011,  201-205).  Hawkins,  Rosas,  and  Johnson  also  found, 
however,  that  recipients  of  the  services  of  the  misiones  were  mostly  unaware  of  that 
conditionality.  They  “conclude  that  screening  sometimes  occurred…but  that  the  misiones  were 
not  using  any  kind  of  overt  conditionality  at  the  time  we  studied  them”  (Smilde  &  Hellinger 
2011,  208).  This  means  that  the  programs  were  far  from  impartial,  but  the  people  they  did  benefit 
did  not  feel  that  their  reception  of  the  services  depended  on  support  for  the  government.  The 
primary  reason  the  authors  cite  for  this  is  Chávez’s  charisma  and  sheer  popularity  in  many  poor 
communities  during  this  time,  which  made  it  to  where  residents  were  receptive  to  anything  since 
it  was  provided  by  Chávez  (Smilde  &  Hellinger  2011,  206-207).  This  has  a  number  of 
implications,  many  of  which  hinge  on  developments  following  the  timeframe  in  which  this  study 
was  conducted. 
One  of  those  developments  was  reported  by  the  New  York  Times  in  a  March  2019  article. 
It  agrees  with  Hawkins,  Rosas,  and  Johnson  in  that  Chávez’s  popularity  and  charisma  were  a 
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large  component  of  what  allowed  the  programs  to  promote  the  regime  with  conditionality  but 
without  coercion.  As  soon  as  Chávez  died  and  was  replaced  by  Maduro,  however,  coercion  had 
to  step  in  where  his  charisma  failed.  The  article  speaks  of  sixteen  Cuban  doctors  who  made  up 
the  medical  workforce  of  Barrio  Adentro,  most  of  whom  spoke  under  the  condition  of  anonymity 
out  of  fear.  They  spoke  of  their  actions  preceding  the  fraudulent  2018  election,  where  they  were 
instructed  to  employ  a  number  of  coercive  tactics  to  secure  a  greater  number  of  votes  for  the 
ruling  PSUV  party.  Those  maneuvers,  part  of  Barrio  Adentro,  ranged  from  benign  “reminders  to 
vote  for  the  government  to  denying  treatment  for  opposition  supporters  with  life-threatening 
ailments.”  One  doctor  admitted  that  it  “became  a  form  of  blackmail.”  Some  of  the  Cubans 
reported  being  given  false  identification  cards  that  allowed  them  to  vote  in  the  election  while 
“others  were  told  to  give  precise  voting  instructions  to  elderly  patients,  whose  infirmities  made 
them  particularly  easy  to  manipulate”  (Casey  2019 a ).  The  article  delves  into  many  more  forms 
of  coercion,  but  no  more  need  to  be  mentioned  here  to  underline  the  point:  the  top-down  social 
programs  created  by  the  Chavista  executive  meant  to  create  popular  power  through  local 
organization,  healthcare,  and  education  very  much  retain  the  power  with  the  executive,  not 
communities.  The  Barrio  Adentro  coercion  is  only  one  of  the  most  obvious  means  through  which 
that  power  has  been  used. 
Misión  Robinson  has  also  come  under  scrutiny  not  for  dangling  necessities  in  front  of 
Venezuelans  in  exchange  for  support  the  way  Barrio  Adentro  did,  but  for  the  government  greatly 
exaggerating  its  successes  and  using  it  as  a  vehicle  to  spread  propaganda  rather  than  education. 
Economists  Daniel  Ortega  and  Francisco  Rodriguez,  the  latter  a  former  Chavista  and  economist 
for  the  regime,  conducted  a  study  in  2008  to  see  if  the  government’s  claims  of  wiping  out 
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illiteracy  were  legitimate.  Their  study,  predicated  on  self-reported  Household  Surveys  later 
compared  to  official  government  figures,  found  “evidence  for,  at  most,  small  positive  literacy 
gains  as  a  result  of  the  program,  though  in  many  specifications  the  Misión  Robinson  program’s 
impacts  are  statistically  indistinguishable  from  zero”  (Ortega  &  Ramirez  2008).  The  authors  also 
claim  that  Venezuela  had  fewer  than  1.5  million  illiterate  citizens  before  the  program  started, 
making  the  government’s  claim  an  impossibility,  something  backed  up  by  the  fact  that  the 
government  has  never  cited  a  source  other  than  itself  for  the  1.5  million  figure  (Ortega  & 
Ramirez  2008).  Even  if  this  doesn't  lead  one  to  recognize  the  reality  of  the  misiones  described 
here,  as  was  the  case  with  Chávez’s  brother  and  Education  Minister  Adán  Chávez  when  he 
claimed  the  figures  were  manipulated  by  the  regime’s  enemies,  it  should  at  least  put  a  major 
asterisk  next  to  the  regime’s  claims  (“Propaganda,  Not  Policy”  2008).  By  holding  these 
initiatives  up  to  the  light  and  understanding  not  only  their  aims  but  also  their  actual  impact  on 
people,  it  becomes  clear  that  they  were  often  conditional  upon  recipient’s  support  of  the  regime, 
something  that  became  more  obvious  only  as  Chavismo  had  to  start  relying  more  on  coercion 
instead  of  charisma.  They  began  in  part  as  tools  to  boost  Chávez’s  chances  through  the  recall 
referendum  and  continued  more  as  a  spectacle  to  hold  up  and  prove  Chavismo’s  legitimacy  as 
opposed  to  actual  grassroots  attempts  at  a  real  revolution. 
Even  the  communes  and  colectivos,  hailed  as  the  most  radical  form  of  local  democracy, 
have  been  subject  to  co-optation,  albeit  in  a  fundamentally  different  way.  The  close  association 
with  Chávez  by  way  not  only  of  unwavering  partisanship  but  also  of  special  access  to 
government  funds  “considerably  reduced  the  diversity  of  participating  sectors,  distancing  the 
Circles  from  their  original  objectives  and  facilitating  their  political  co-optation”  (Smilde  & 
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Hellinger  2011,  87).  The  inclusion  of  the  Circles  in  the  Law  of  Communes  made  it  so  they  could 
receive  more  “state  funding  and  resources,  including  weapons.  They  were  granted  legitimacy  and 
real  power  in  their  areas  of  influence”  (“Venezuela:  A  Mafia  State?”  2018).  La  Piedrita,  the 
colectivo  Ciccariello-Maher  speaks  highly  of  as  being  dedicated  to  the  defense  of  the  revolution, 
is  perfectly  representative  of  the  ways  this  co-optation  has  manifested  and  is  in  action  today. 
Based  out  of  the  23  de  Enero  barrio,  it  operates  in  many  ways  like  a  commune,  running  a  small 
community-owned  farm  and  selling  produce  to  local  buyers.  It  is  also  a  hyperviolent  colectivo 
known  for  doing  the  regime’s  dirty  work,  especially  after  Chávez  disbanded  the  Metropolitan 
police  in  2011  (“Venezuela  Suprimirá  La  Policía  Metropolitana  Por  Bolivariana”  2017).  That 
dirty  work  includes  everything  from  attacking  anti-government  demonstrators  in  the  streets  to 
tear-gassing  television  stations  to  even  conducting  executions  inside  the  barrios  that  the  regime 
would  rather  keep  its  hands  clean  of  (“Venezuela:  A  Mafia  State?”  2018).  There  is  much  more  to 
be  said  about  the  ways  in  which  many  of  these  autonomous  communes  and  colectivos  have  been 
co-opted  by  the  Chavista  regime  to  carry  out  its  most  violent  wishes,  but  it  should  be  clear  by 
now  that  autonomy  in  Venezuela  is  only  to  be  had  in  service  to  the  government;  anything  outside 
of  that  must  be  reined  in. 
It  would  be  easy  to  dismiss  these  programs  of  “radical  democracy,”  their  promises,  and 
their  outcomes  as  domestic  policy  matters  separate  from  the  question  of  nonagentic 
anti-imperialism.  The  quote  from  Cabello,  however,  provides  a  key  insight  into  why  the 
domestic  programs  of  Chávez,  from  the  CTUs  to  the  misiones  to  the  colectivos  is  still  relevant  to 
the  question  of  anti-imperialism.  Though  it  appears  to  be  juvenile  rambling  at  first,  the 
connection  of  high  literacy  with  “imperialist  oppression”  actually  zeroes  in  on  the  role  of  the 
43 
/
 
capitalist  world-system  in  the  underdevelopment  of  the  periphery.  Azzellini’s  framing  of  the 
contradiction  –that  it  stems  from  the  “inherent  logic”  of  the  capitalist  world-system– 
intellectualizes  Cabello’s  sycophantism  and  effectively  places  the  blame  of  Venezuela’s  inability 
to  fully  devolve  into  a  communal  state  on  the  imperialist  powers  of  the  core  that  have  forced 
bourgeois  state  organization  on  the  periphery.  The  lesson  from  Azzellini’s  point  of  view  is  that 
the  failures  of  these  programs,  the  corruption  that  surrounds  them,  and  the  basic  reality  that  these 
locally  organized  forms  of  popular  power  are  autonomous  only  to  the  extent  that  the  state 
approves  of  them  is  not  the  result  of  conscious  decisions  by  the  Chavista  regime,  but  rather  of  the 
imperial  powers  whose  specter  haunts  its  every  action.  Supporting  the  regime  in  its  actions, 
which,  according  to  this  argument,  are  inherently  positive,  is  therefore  an  anti-imperialist 
position.  Their  failures,  if  they  are  even  acknowledged,  are  thus  not  to  be  looked  at  as  the  fault  of 
the  well-intentioned  regime,  but  as  that  of  the  imperialists.  All  one  can  do  in  this  case  is  continue 
to  support  the  regime  in  the  face  of  opposition  so  it  can  continue  to  chip  away  from  the  core 
hegemony  that  has  swallowed  the  key  to  its  shackles.  That  this  falls  under  the  category  of 
nonagentic  anti-imperialism  is  only  logical.  It  is  also  logical,  of  course,  to  recognize  that  the  kind 
of  radical  change  Chavismo  claimed  to  pursue  would  face  significant  obstacles  under  the 
capitalist  world-system.  But  based  on  the  evidence  laid  out  above,  the  greatest  obstacle  came  not 
from  the  imperialist  powers  of  the  West  but  from  the  regime  itself;  from  its  ineptitude  and  its 
own  intention  to  maintain  power  over  supposedly-autonomous  segments  of  Venezuela.  The 
regime  employed  its  agency  to  undermine  its  own  public  efforts  of  creating  an  autonomy  that 
was  never  intended  to  materialize.  Removing  the  role  that  the  regime  itself  played  in  the  failure 
of  this  socialistic  vision  in  favor  of  blaming  the  “imperial  oppression”  identified  by  Cabello 
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represents  a  key  means  through  which  nonagentic  anti-imperialists  continue  to  uphold  the  regime 
on  false  grounds. 
If  the  case  is  made  that  Chavismo  is  primarily  at  fault  for  its  failure  to  construct  a 
communal  state  through  grassroots  autonomous  organization  rather  than  the  omnipresent 
capitalist  world-system,  then  there  must  be  an  explanation  of  how  the  regime  could  have  used  its 
agency  to  make  the  experiment  work  despite  the  “imperialist  oppression.”  This  explanation 
begins  and  ends  with  finding  a  way  out  of  the  contradiction  from  above.  By  sanctioning  the 
grassroots  movements  with  presidential  decrees,  Chávez  retained  ultimate  control  over  the 
projects,  be  they  CTUs,  misiones,  or  communes.  He  poured  billions  of  petrodollars  into  these 
initiatives,  attempting  to  buy  the  revolution  rather  than  build  it.  Securing  more  popular  support 
by  way  of  charisma  or  coercion  was  always  the  goal,  since  a  truly  autonomous  sector  would  have 
challenged  his  own  power.  To  build  that  autonomy,  the  petrodollars  should  have  gone  to  the 
development  of  infrastructure  capable  of  handling  the  enormous  demands  of  programs  like 
Barrio  Adentro  and  Robinson  and  building  an  environment  in  which  an  autonomous  sector  can 
thrive  without  competing  against  itself  for  government  resources.  As  Venezuelan  journalist 
Franscisco  Toro  wrote  in  2012,  “if  the  government  had  invested  a  fraction  of  the  effort  it  devoted 
to  publicizing  Misión  Robinson’s  supposed  achievements  to  optimizing  the  program’s  efficiency, 
Venezuela  would  have  eradicated  illiteracy  long  ago”  (Toro  2012). 
 
4.1 The  Centralization  of  Power 
The  previous  section  outlines  how  Chávez  was  successful  in  institutionalizing  democracy 
at  the  grassroots  level,  something  that  social  movements  had  struggled  to  do  for  decades.  This 
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section  will  outline  how,  once  in  power,  Chavismo  took  a  battering  ram  to  the  democracy  it  had 
supposedly  aimed  to  build  up.  In Antisystemic  Movements ,  Arrighi,  Hopkins,  and  Wallerstein 
observe  that  once  a  regime  has  taken  power  in  opposition  to  a  country’s  elite,  as  Chávez  did,  “the 
class  struggle  within  the  country  was  de-legitimized  as  an  obstacle  to  the  former  struggle,  which 
was  itself  defined  as  class  struggle  at  a  higher  level”  (Arrighi  et  al.  2012,  66).  The  Chávez 
playbook  mirrored  their  analysis.  Through  a  variety  of  means,  the  vehicles  through  which  the 
Bolivarian  class  struggle  was  waged  throughout  Puntofijismo  were  eliminated,  precisely  as 
obstacles  to  the  continuation  of  the  revolution  that  was  cemented  in  1998. 
Javier  Corrales  and  Michael  Penfold  ask  near  the  beginning  of  their  2011  book The 
Dragon  in  the  Tropics how  “a  grassroots  movement  that  began  in  1998  as  an  effort  to  bring  more 
democracy  to  Venezuela  transformed  itself  into  a  movement  intent  on  empowering  the  executive 
branch  above  any  other  actor”  (Corrales  &  Penfold  2015,  14).  How  this  expansion  of  centralized 
power  squares  with  the  parallel  expansion  of  local  and  antisystemic  will  be  an  important  question 
to  investigate  as  it  defines  one  of  the  key  contradictions  of  Chavista  Venezuela.  The  clear 
motivator  for  concentrating  power  in  the  first  months  of  his  administration  was  the  rooting  out  of 
the  partyarchy  that  voters  had  overwhelmingly  rejected,  and  part  of  that  was  eliminating  the 
power  that  the  old  guard  held  in  the  judicial  and  legislative  branches.  Through  a  series  of  legal 
maneuvers  and  procedural  tricks,  boosted  by  historic  approval  ratings,  Chávez  did  just  that  in  the 
constitution,  which  included  little  input  from  oppositional  parties.  The  presidency  now  became 
the  most  powerful  instrument  in  Venezuelan  politics,  with  heavy  influence  at  best  and  indirect 
control  at  worst  over  most  of  the  country’s  institutions,  such  as  the  courts  and  the  electoral 
monitoring  body  CNE  (Corrales  &  Penfold  2015,  18-20). 
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4.2 Media  Controls 
National  antisystemic  movements  with  state  power  are  constantly  under  pressure  from 
the  Core  and  its  allies  to  conform  to  the  capitalist  world-system.  One  need  only  look  at  the 
propaganda  campaign  that  preceded  the  1954  CIA-backed  coup  in  Guatemala,  where,  among 
various  other  forms  of  psychological  operations  (psyops),  Miami-based  radio  announcers 
broadcasting  in  Guatemala  denounced  the  democratically-elected  communist  Arbenz  regime  as 
“based  on  absurdities”  and  ignoring  “the  existence  of  moral  values”  (The  Sherwood  Tapes  1954). 
This  has  been  a  tough  reality  for  many  antisystemic  leaders,  and  is  increasingly  becoming  an 
issue  even  for  Core  states  by  way  of  destabilizing  disinformation  campaigns  by  rival  states 
(Glenza  2020).  That  leaders  aim  to  ensure  that  propaganda  is  not  weaponized  by  rivals  is  not 
antidemocratic;  indeed,  it  is  the  opposite.  But  when  it  comes  to  the  fine  line  between  protecting 
truthful  information  and  censorship,  nonagentic  anti-imperialist  leaders  take  a  stand  firmly  at  the 
latter.  
The  Chavista  regime  is  no  different,  with  the  foundations  for  censorship  being  laid  in  the 
1999  constitution  with  Article  58,  which  states  that  “everyone  has  the  right  to  timely, truthful  and 
impartial  information,  without  censorship”  (Venezuelan  Constitution  1999;  emphasis  added). 
Though  the  state  had  the  power  to  determine  what  does  and  does  not  count  as  truthful,  the  media 
remained  moderately  free  of  state  interference  until  2007–  though  it  was  not  uncommon  for  pro- 
and  anti-Chavista  journalists  to  be  attacked  or  harassed.  It  began  with  the  government's  refusal  to 
renew  the  broadcasting  license  of  Radio  Caracas  Televisión  (RCTV),  the  country’s  oldest  private 
television  network,  because  of  its  unfavorable  coverage  (Lauria  &  Rodriguez  2007).  The 
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crackdown  has  continued  since  then,  with  news  organizations  forced  to  either  subject  themselves 
to  state  censorship  or  censor  themselves.  Journalists  critical  of  the  government  have  been 
imprisoned  and  leaders  of  antigovernment  outlets  have  been  subject  to  persecution  by  the  regime 
(“Venezuelan  Columnist  Sentenced  to  Prison  for  Defamation”  2010;  “Venezuela  Media  Bills 
Would  Harm  Freedom  of  Expression”  2010).  With  TeleSUR  filling  the  media  void  and  becoming 
a  mouthpiece  for  Chavismo,  the  Venezuelan  state  was  able  to  control  far  more  of  the  media  than 
any  antisystemic  state  should  even  with  the  reality  described  above. 
The  simplistic,  black-and-white  view  of  international  relations  that  colored  TeleSUR’s 
coverage  of  Syria’s  Arab  Spring  –US  allies  are  bad,  US  enemies  are  good–  is  unsurprisingly 
replicated  in  Venezuela.  Its  ideological  outlook  views  the  West  as  the  only  real  source  of 
violence  and  oppression,  which  leads  to  rightfully  critical  coverage  of  Trump’s  treatment  of 
Central  America  refugees  at  the  US-Mexico  border  and  the  patent  invisibilization  of  Venezuela’s 
own  refugee  and  humanitarian  crisis  (Ceja  2016).  For  nonagentic  anti-imperialists  outside  of 
government,  Hensman  notes,  the  confirmation  bias  provided  by  such  ideological  coverage  “is 
especially  dangerous  in  cases  where  the  despots  have  well-funded  and  fairly  sophisticated  state 
media  through  which  they  disseminate  a  mixture  of  genuine  news  and  propaganda  (like  the 
Russian  RT  and  the  Iranian  Press  TV),  as  well  as  paid  and  unpaid  ideologues  who  do  the  same” 
(Hensman  2018,  14).  TeleSUR  has  succeeded  not  only  in  acting  as  a  mouthpiece  for  Chavismo, 
but  more  importantly  in  either  hiding  or  embellishing  the  regime’s  social  and  political  impact  on 
certain  groups  as  it  saw  fit. 
The  rise  of  TeleSUR  was  made  possible  as  well  by  the  practice  of  media  censorship, 
began  by  Chávez  and  enthusiastically  continued  by  Maduro.  Maduro’s  campaign  against  El 
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Nacional,  one  of  Venezuela’s  “last  independent  newspapers,”  demonstrates  the  extent  (Krygier  & 
Faiola  2018).  Months  after  his  2013  election,  Maduro  accused  El  Nacional  of  being 
“manipulators,”  and  then  calling  it  “El  Nazi-onal”  (Marino  2013).  Coordinated  pressure 
continued  as  recently  as  2018,  notably  as  El  Nacional  reported  on  the  ever-worsening 
humanitarian  crisis,  when  the  regime  blocked  the  paper’s  website  (Krygier  &  Faiola  2018). 
Chávez’s  crusade  against  renewing  broadcasting  licenses  had  a  recognizable  rhetorical 
flair.  A  Committee  to  Protect  Journalists  report  writes  that  in  2006  
Chávez  threatened  to  block  the  license  renewals  of  unnamed  television 
and  radio  stations  that  were  waging  “psychological  war  to  divide, 
weaken,  and  destroy  the  nation”  as  part  of  an  “imperialist  plan”  to 
overthrow  the  government…After  having  won  re-election,  Chávez 
singled  out  RCTV  in  a  December  28  address  to  Venezuelan  troops. 
“There  won’t  be  any  new  concession  for  that  coup-mongering  channel 
that  was  known  as  Radio  Caracas  Televisión,”  Chávez  said.  “Venezuela 
must  be  respected.”  That  applies  to  international  observers,  too,  he  made 
plain  (Lauria  &  Rodriguez  2007). 
 
The  story  of  Venezuela’s  media  censorship  and  repression  of  journalists  goes  much  further  than 
simply  refusing  to  renew  licenses,  but  this  does  present  one  of  the  most  glaring  examples  of 
state-led  censorship.  The  strategy  is  clear:  if  unfavorable  media  coverage  is  characterized  as  an 
“imperialist  plan”  for  destabilization,  then  blatant  media  censorship  can  be  characterized  as 
anti-imperialist  by  definition.  By  invoking  the  memory  of  the  CIA’s  psyops,  Chavismo  frames 
the  debate  as  one  not  of  press  freedom,  but  of  an  invasive  force  that  the  state  has  no  choice  but  to 
rule  with  an  iron  first  in  order  to  stop.  That  this  is  an  argument  in  bad  faith  should  be 
self-evident;  undemocratic  influence  over  the  media  has  allowed  Chavismo  to  hide  in  plain  sight 
the  refugee  crisis  it  created,  to  force  its  own  narrative  about  itself  into  the  mainstream,  and  to 
have  undue  control  over  supposedly  democratic  elections. 
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4.3 2017  Protests 
The  reality  of  Chavismo’s  failed  economic  policies  trickled  down  to  the  general  public 
after  the  massive  drop  in  oil  revenues  meant  that  social  programs  could  no  longer  be  sustained 
and  resources  could  no  longer  be  redistributed.  The  ensuing  shortages,  combined  with  the  more 
obvious  antidemocratic  moves  by  Maduro,  led  to  a  major  series  of  Opposition-led  protests  in 
2014  and  2017.  This  section  will  focus  on  the  latter  because  it  developed  within  the  context  of 
the  humanitarian  crisis  becoming  significantly  more  widespread  than  in  2014. 
In  the  last  days  of  March  in  2017,  Maduro  flexed  his  dictatorial  muscle  by  having  his 
Supreme  Tribunal  of  Justice  (TSJ)  effectively  dissolve  the  combative  National  Assembly  (AN) 
by  unilaterally  taking  over  its  legislative  duties  (Oré  2017).  Outraged  citizens  took  to  the  streets, 
leading  to  the  TSJ  reversing  its  decision  days  later  after  protester  demands  (“Tribunal  Supremo 
De  Venezuela  Suprime  Partes  De  Las  Polémicas  Sentencias  y  Ya  No  Se  Atribuye  Poderes  De  La 
Asamblea  Nacional”  2017).  But  the  cat  was  out  of  the  bag.  Venezuela’s  constitutional  crisis,  the 
product  of  one  of  the  clearest  acts  of  authoritarianism  during  Maduro’s  tenure,  gave  birth  to  the 
largest  series  of  protests  of  the  Chavista  generation.  The  protests  transcended  economic  class, 
drawing  ire  not  only  from  the  middle-  and  upper-class  elites,  but  also  from  poor  Black  and 
mestizo  residents  throughout  the  country.  Even  in  Chávez’s  hometown  of  Barinas,  residents 
began  demonstrating  the  day  of  the  takeover  announcement.  These  demonstrations  escalated  to 
all-out  riots  in  Barinas  in  late  May,  during  which  Chávez’s  childhood  home  was  set  ablaze  along 
with  five  statues  of  the  late  president  in  a  symbolic  act  of  resistance  (Sanchez  &  Dreier  2019). 
Former  Chavistas  joined  in,  denouncing  Maduro  as  a  “tyrant”  in  acts  of  civil  disobedience  (“Ex 
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Chavistas  Se  Declararon  En  Desobediencia  Civil  En  Barinas”  2017).  According  to  estimates 
from  Venezuelan  polling  firm  Meganálisis,  one  out  of  every  five  Venezuelans  –six  million  total 
nationwide–  was  on  the  streets  protesting  on  April  19  in  what  was  known  as  the  “Mother  of  All 
Marches.”  More  demonstrations  took  place  nearly  every  day  during  this  period,  with  hundreds  of 
thousands  joining  in  around  the  country.  The  goal  of  the  protesters,  beyond  merely  expressing 
legitimate  rage  against  the  constitutional  crisis,  became  to  stop  a  proposed  drafting  of  a  new 
constitution,  announced  by  Maduro  on  May  1.  Under  that  proposal,  Maduro  would  handpick  a 
group  of  loyalists  under  a  Constituent  Assembly,  who  would  then  go  on  to  write  the  new 
constitution.  After  the  protesters  failed  to  stop  both  the  June  Constituent  Assembly  and  the 
illegal  July  vote  that  ratified  it,  the  energy  died  (Semple  2017). 
The  real  tragedy  of  these  months-long  protests,  however,  does  not  come  from  the  failure 
to  stop  authoritarian  advances.  It  comes  from  the  resurrection  of  the  ghosts  of  1989;  of  the  brutal 
violence  of  the  state  in  efforts  to  repress  popular  will.  Before  proceeding,  it  should  be  made  clear 
that  even  conservative  estimates  of  the  Caracazo  death  toll  greatly  outweigh  those  of  the  2017 
protests,  a  fact  made  more  significant  by  considering  the  duration  of  both.  It  goes  without  saying, 
however,  that  this  does  not  lessen  the  power  of  the  2017  protester  demands.  Venezuelan  NGO 
Observatorio  Venezolano  de  Conflictividad  Civil  (Venezuelan  Observatory  of  Civil  Conflict) 
claims  that  from  April  1  to  July  31,  there  were  6,729  individual  protests  that  left  163  dead–  a 
number  composed  primarily  of  protesters,  but  also  of  National  Guardsmen  to  a  lesser  degree. 
“Violent  actions”  on  behalf  of  the colectivos mentioned  earlier  occurred  in  at  least  523  protests, 
further  highlighting  their  role  as  unofficial  paramilitary  allies  of  the  regime  engaging  in  violent 
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repression  of  dissent  (“Venezuela:  6.729  Protestas  y  163  Fallecidos  Desde  El  1  De  Abril  De 
2017”  2017). 
To  the  regime,  the  protests  were  not  demonstrations  against  their  actions;  the  protests 
were  part  of  a  “fascist”  coup  plot.  Maduro  framed  his  regime  as  “the  new  Jews  of  the  twenty-first 
century”  who  “don't  carry  the  yellow  Star  of  David…we  carry  a  red  heart,  the  will  to  fight  for 
human  dignity,  and  we  will  defeat  these  Nazis  of  the  twenty-first  century,  these  fascists” 
(“Nicolás  Maduro  Compara  a  Los  Chavistas  Con  Las  Víctimas  Del  Holocausto  Nazi”.  2017). 
Not  much  additional  commentary  is  needed  to  demonstrate  the  sheer  absurdity  of  this  framing, 
painting  the  violent  repression  as  somehow  necessary  to  combat  demands  for  democratic 
accountability.  But  such  is  the  logic  of  the  nonagentic  anti-imperialists. 
 
4.4 Civil  Society  Organizations  Under  Chavismo 
Chavismo  rose  on  the  back  of  decades  of  social  movements  and  a  vibrant  civil  society 
that  proliferated  behind  the  watchful  eyes  of  pre-1998  governments.  Recall  that  these 
organizations  and  movements  took  the  form  of  everything  from  communal  decision-making  in 
the  barrios  in  the  80s  to  legal  resistance  against  the  disregard  for  women’s  unpaid  labor  in  the 
70s.  The  strongest  indicator  that  Chávez  recognized  the  importance  of  such  organization  doesn't 
come  from  his  speeches  and  flowery  rhetoric.  It  comes  from  his  administration’s  efforts  to  render 
subsequent  popular  organizing  against  his  administration  illegal  and  illegitimate.  The  logic  is 
simple.  If  Chávez’s  aim  is  to  remain  in  power,  then  shutting  down  the  very  paths  to  power  he 
took  is  an  obvious  step.  This  entails  severely  limiting  the  ability  of  organizations  that  are  not  in 
alignment  with  the  regime  to  operate  effectively  and  independently. 
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The  strategy  of  the  regime  since  2007  regarding  civil  society  organizations  (CSOs)  has 
consisted  of  either  modifying  existing  laws  or  enacting  new  ones  to  greatly  restrict  the  ability  of 
critical  politically-  and  legally-oriented  CSOs  to  organize,  fundraise,  and  disseminate 
information  without  criminal  prosecution  or  intimidation–  all  under  the  all-powerful  rhetorical 
veneer  of  democracy  and  human  rights.  That  year,  the  executive  attempted  to  pass  new 
legislation  known  as  “Laws  of  People's  Power”  that  attempted  to  “monopolize  all  forms  of  social 
organizations  and  combine  them  into  a  new  branch  of  the  State  called  ‘Organizations  of  People's 
Power’”  (“Venezuela”  2018).  Though  the  proposal  was  shot  down  by  a  slim  margin  in  the  AN,  it 
eventually  passed  in  2010  (National  Assembly  2010 a ).  Independent  CSOs  could  now  be 
arbitrarily  denied  access  to  government  resources  and  be  criminalized  for,  or  restricted  from, 
exercising  freedoms  of  expression  and  assembly.  The  Law  for  the  Defense  of  Political 
Sovereignty  and  National  Self-Determination  was  passed  that  same  year.  It  prohibits 
“organizations  with  political  aims  or  organizations  that  defend  political  rights”  from  receiving 
financial  assistance  provided  by  foreign  entities.  Additionally,  foreign  individuals  invited  by  a 
CSO  who  participate  in  domestic  activities  (events,  speeches,  etc.)  are  subject  to  deportation 
from  the  country  (National  Assembly  2010 b ).  In  other  words,  CSOs  critical  of  the  government 
cannot  accept  out-of-state  donations  or  host  critical  guests.  The  multi-decade  effort  aimed  at 
weakening  CSOs,  which  has  attracted  condemnation  from  regional  governments,  the  OAS,  the 
Inter-American  Commission  on  Human  Rights  (IACHR),  and  the  UN,  has  resulted  in  an 
estimated  60%  drop  in  active  domestic  CSOs  between  2011  and  2013  (“Venezuela”  2018).  There 
is  much  more  that  can  be  said  about  the  political  repression  against  independent  civil  society,  but 
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this  window  offers  a  brief  look  at  the  politically  repressive  environment  facing  the  NGOs  that 
have  survived  the  autocratic  assault. 
The  case  of  Venezuelan  NGO  El  Foro  Penal  Venezolano  (FPV)  demonstrates  how  such 
repression  affects  on-the-ground  organizations.  FPV  is  a  5000-person  strong  human  rights 
organization,  comprised  of  lawyers  and  volunteers,  that  has  provided  pro  bono  legal  assistance  to 
victims,  or  families  of  victims,  of  arbitrary  detention,  torture,  assault,  or  murder,  particularly 
during  protests  since  2002.  Given  the  Chavista  regime’s  loose  regard  for  human  rights  and  civil 
liberties  described  in  the  previous  section,  one  would  be  correct  in  assuming  that  its  relationship 
with  FPV  is  contentious,  to  say  the  least.  An  analysis  of  FPV’s  publications  between  2002  and 
mid-2019  showcases  the  direct  ways  in  which  the  work  of  NGOs  has  been  affected  if  their  work 
questions  the  regime’s  actions.  Arguably  the  most  important  indicator  within  these  reports  for 
determining  how  FPV  navigates  the  political  environment  is  by  its  mentioning  of  the  perpetrators 
of  human  rights  violations.  It  is  one  thing  to  call  out  the  violations  and  name  the  victims,  but  by 
bringing  the  regime  itself  into  it,  FPV  is  putting  itself  directly  in  its  crosshairs.  Starting  with 
references  to  government  agencies,  the  reports  rarely  attempt  to  hide  the  perpetrators.  The 
Guardia  Nacional  Bolivariana  (GNB),  or  Bolivarian  National  Guard,  is  mentioned  263  times  in 
FPV’s  2014  report,  the  first  one  available  on  their  website.  The  report  sticks  to  depoliticized 
mentions  for  the  most  part,  limiting  references  to  instances  of  violence.  While  the  vast  majority 
of  mentions  remain  objective,  FPV  does  not  avoid  giving  opinions  in  its  analysis.  The  report  says 
in  reference  to  the  use  of  security  as  a  pretext  for  increasingly  punitive  measures  that: 
 
Added  to  the  repressive  actions  of  security  agencies  are  paramilitary 
groups  and  armed  civilians,  clearly  in  coordination  with  military  and 
police  forces,  that  attack  protesters  throughout  the  country.  During  recent 
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protests,  they  have  increased  their  repressive  actions.  While  human  rights 
organizations  have  documented  the  participation  of  these  groups  in  the 
quelling  of  protest,  their  increased  capacities  and  coordination  with 
security  organs  and  the  military  constitutes  a  grave  risk  to  human  rights 
(El  Foro  Penal  Venezolano  2014,  30). 
 
The  report  outwardly  criticizes  the  GNB,  as  well  as  its colectivo  allies,  but  still  ties  the  criticism 
back  to  the  issue  of  human  rights.  It  is  a  microcosm  of  FPV’s  greater  strategy  of  implicit 
criticism  of  the  regime  through  a  broader  discussion  on  human  rights,  one  that  has  continued  in 
the  years  since.  This  first  2014  report  also  features  a  section  titled Personas  Fallecidas  en  el 
Contexto  de  las  Manifestaciones  (People  Killed  in  the  Context  of  Protests),  and  features  many 
members  of  the  GNB  itself  who  were  killed.  As  the  years  progressed  and  more  reports  were  2
published,  the  mentions  of  the  GNB  and  other  security  agencies  became  even  less  political, 
limited  almost  exclusively  to  datasets,  tables,  and  impartial  summaries  of  events.  They  stay 
neutral  when  it  comes  to  calling  out  the  perpetrators  of  abuses,  only  doing  so  in  the  context  of 
human  rights  discussions. 
The  next  important  element  to  analyze  is  how  FPV  deals  with  the  main  players  in  the 
regime  itself.  Namely,  Cabello,  Tareck  El-Aissami,  and  Maduro.  These  three  represent  the  most 
powerful  elements  of  the  regime  and  arguably  hold  the  most  leverage  over  FPV.  The  former  two 
frequently  rotate  in  and  out  of  positions  like  the  Vice  Presidency  and  various  Ministries,  so  to 
attempt  to  label  their  current  title  is  something  of  a  futile  act.  For  an  autocratic  regime  bent  on 
protecting  its  own  image  and  hiding  its  responsibility  for  the  abuses,  naming  names  can  be  a 
combative  and  political  act.  
2  There  is  no  information  regarding  who  killed  these  particular  individuals,  so  it  isn't  known  which  deaths  were  a 
result  of  friendly  fire  and  which  were  due  to  the  Opposition.  Given  the  ubiquitous  lack  of  arms  possessed  by  the 
Opposition,  however,  it  is  safe  to  say  that  they  are  likely  not  responsible. 
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The  vast  majority  of  Maduro’s  mentions  are  restricted  to  descriptions  of  his  position  in 
the  government  or  of  accepted  history  as  it  relates  to  the  crisis.  Surprisingly,  other  than  this  one 
mention  from  2014,  there  are  no  explicit  references  to  the  nationwide  shortages  or  even  to 
interim  president  Juan  Guaidó  in  the  later  releases.  A  cynical  observer,  however,  might  argue  that 
even  in  that  limited  capacity,  sections  with  phrasing  like  “with  the  arrival  of  the  government  of 
Nicolás  Maduro,  the  repression  has  increased”  indicate  a  political  position  by  the  organization 
(El  Foro  Penal  Venezolano  2016). 
One  of  these  cynics  is  Diosdado  Cabello,  widely  recognized  as  the  “criminal 
mastermind”  behind  the  Maduro  regime.  That  view  is  what  led  him  to  publicly  criticize  FPV  in 
2014,  an  incident  that  will  be  expanded  upon  below.  His  mentions  are  remarkably  limited  given 
the  immense  power  he  holds  within  the  regime,  with  only  three  of  the  27  available  reports 
mentioning  him  by  name.  The  first  2014  report  does  so  more  than  the  rest,  almost  exclusively  in 
reference  to  statements  Cabello  made  on  his  show  “Con  el  Mazo  Dando,”  such  as  one  statement 
where,  true  nonagentic  anti-imperialist  fashion,  he  baselessly  accused  a  detained  20-year-old 
protester  of  terrorist  activity  with  intentions  to  “create  destabilization”  (El  Foro  Penal 
Venezolano  2014,  75).  The  third  official  is  Tareck  El-Aissami,  who  has  been  exposed  as  the 
primary  link  between  the  regime  and  drug-trafficking  cells  of  Hezbollah  (Casey  2019 b ). 
El-Aissami  is  known  as  a  close  confidant  to  Maduro  and  another  strong  component  of  the 
regime’s  iron  fist,  which  makes  it  all  the  more  remarkable  that  he  isn't  mentioned  by  name  in  a 
single  report.  This  is  perhaps  the  strongest  evidence  of  FPV  making  a  conscious  attempt  at 
separating  the  legal  from  the  political.  Were  El-Aissami  to  be  mentioned  with  even  the  limited 
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frequency  of  Cabello,  the  organization  would  risk  veering  into  political  territory  and  opening 
itself  up  to  further  attacks  from  the  regime. 
Despite  FPV’s  precautions,  it  has  still  been  targeted  by  the  regime.  According  to  that 
2014  report,  then-Minister  of  the  Popular  Power  for  Interior,  Justice,  and  Peace  Miguel 
Rodriguez  Torres  publicly  accused  FPV  and  other  NGOs  of  being  part  of  a  destabilization 
conspiracy–  another  piece  in  a  clear  pattern.  The  report  cites  this  as  the  “fortification  and 
corroboration”  of  a  new  phase  of  persecution  against  lawyers  and  human  rights  activists  (El  Foro 
Penal  Venezolano  2014,  63).  This  incident  is  expanded  upon  in  a  December  2015  report,  where  it 
mentions  that  Torres  had  accused  Vice  President-Director  Gonzalo  Himiob  in  particular  of 
participating  in  terrorism  (El  Foro  Penal  Venezolano  2015,  23).  This  was  followed  up  by 
Diosdado  Cabello,  then-president  of  the  AN,  accusing  FPV  President-Director  Alfredo  Romero 
of  being  part  of  a  conspiracy  to  destabilize  the  country.  Cabello  also  claimed  to  have  evidence  of 
FPV  and  other  NGOs  taking  foreign  donations  to  finance  this  conspiracy,  the  clear  implication 
being  that  outside  groups  were  using  these  organizations  as  vehicles  for  violations  of  Venezuela’s 
sovereignty  (El  Foro  Penal  Venezolano  2014,  63).  While  information  of  FPV’s  funding  is  not 
available  online,  Cabello  never  provided  his  evidence.  About  a  month  later,  Maduro  himself 
stated  that  he  would  “expose”  the  human  rights-based  NGOs  that  participated  in  a  celebration  of 
the  International  Covenant  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights  (ICESCR).  He  publicly  said 
of  the  participating  NGOs  that  they  are  “bandits”  who  will  “speak  poorly  of  the  country  and  earn 
thousands  of  dollars”  (El  Foro  Penal  Venezolano  2016,  32). 
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The  2015  report  also  claims  that  incidents  of  intimidation  against  Romero  in  particular 
have  increased  since  he  attended  a  session  on  the  UN  Convention  Against  Torture  (CAT)  in 
November  of  2014.   According  to  the  report: 3
Romero  hasn't  only  been  singled  out  systematically  by  top-level 
government  officials  through  various  state-run  television  stations  and 
discredited  or  intimidated  through  a  variety  of  means,  but  he  was  even 
intercepted  by  a  vehicle  in  the  streets  and  had  a  firearm  aimed  at  him,  all 
approximately  thirty  minutes  after  being  named  on  television  (El  Foro 
Penal  Venezolano  2015,  22). 
 
Here  it  is  easy  to  see  the  costs  of  navigating  a  political  environment  like  this  one.  Despite  the 
steps  FPV  has  taken  to  prevent  retaliation  from  the  regime,  the  very  nature  of  their  work  is  a 
direct  challenge  to  it.  The  legal  has  become  the  political,  and  it  has  put  the  lives  of  the  FPV 
leadership  in  jeopardy.  Even  through  all  of  this  danger,  however,  an  obvious  fact  must  be  stated: 
FPV  is  still  operating  to  this  day.  By  refraining  from  directly  antagonizing  the  regime  unless 
absolutely  necessary,  FPV  has  been  able  to  remain  independent  from  the  government  and 
continue  its  human  rights-based  advocacy.  This  is  far  from  an  exhaustive  exploration  of 
Chavismo’s  restrictions  of  a  politically  active  civil  society,  but  the  case  of  FPV  demonstrates  the 
barriers  that  are  put  in  the  way  of  organizations  attempting  to  hold  the  regime  accountable  for  its 
abuses.  These  restrictions  are  particularly  insightful  because  they  reinforce  the  notion  throughout 
this  paper  that  Maduro  is  an  extension  of  Chávez,  both  existing  under  the  banner  of  Chavismo. 
 
3  Also  of  note  is  the  irony  of  the  regime’s  strident  opposition  to  the  ICESCR  and  CAT,  two  major  contributions  to 
human  rights  law  made  by  the  Global  South  and  the  Non-Aligned  Movement  as  a  way  of  holding  the  North 
accountable  and  preserving  its  own  paths  to  self-determination  (Moyn  2018,  110;  Jensen  2016,  255). 
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4.5 A  Nonagentic  Anti-Imperialist  Foreign  Policy 
Anti-imperialist  solidarity  between  “Third  World”  countries  has  for  decades  been 
undermined  by  the  invisible  burden  of  dependency  on  global  powers.  Oil  markets  gave 
Chavismo  the  opportunity  to  actually  support  the  international  working  class  and  governments 
aiming  to  break  from  the  capitalist  world-system.  After  two  decades,  however,  the  Chavista 
foreign  policy  has  been  defined  by  uncritical  support  for  Chávez’s  authoritarian  allies,  as  its 
backing  of  Assad  demonstrated;  a  steady  fall  from  dependency  on  the  West  to  dependency  on  the 
non-Western  world  through  debt  and  oil  contracts;  and  a  proud  anti-Americanism  rounded  out  by 
episodes  like  Chávez  claiming  to  smell  sulfur  at  the  podium  of  the  UN  General  Assembly  after 
“the  devil”  George  Bush  had  spoken  there  the  day  before.  That  anti-Americanism  is  the  basis  on 
which  Chavista  foreign  policy  is  based,  a  philosophy  rooted  in  the  nonagentic  anti-imperialist 
notion  that  the  only  international  actors  capable  of  oppression  come  from  the  West. 
The  example  of  Iran  clearly  demonstrates  this  logic  in  action.  Since  the  1979  Revolution, 
actions  undertaken  by  the  theocratic  regime  have  included  the  murders  of  Communist  dissidents 
as  well  as  the  theocratic  oppression  of  women  and  ethnoreligious  minorities  (Hensman  2018, 
Kindle  loc.  2819).  As  Hensman  puts  it,  “The  rationale  is  simple:  Iran  is  opposed  to  the  US, 
therefore  supporting  the  theocratic  regime  constitutes  ‘anti-imperialism’”  (Hensman  2018,  119) 
Such  was  the  logic  behind  Chávez’s  relationship  with  Iranian  President  Mahmoud  Ahmadinejad 
from  2005-2013,  crudely  described  in  an  article  in  The  Atlantic  as  “the  Thelma  and  Louise  of 
international  dictators”  (Abad-Santos  2013).  One  example  of  the  operationalizing  of  this 
relationship  came  in  2009,  when  an  estimated  500,000  Iranians  took  to  the  streets  in  protest  of 
irregularities  leading  to  Ahmadinejad’s  “landslide”  reelection  victory  for  nearly  a  week  and  faced 
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violent  repression,  Chávez  called  the  election  an  “extraordinary  democratic  development”  and 
demanded  “the  immediate  end  to  manoeuvres  to  intimidate  and  destabilise  the  Islamic 
Revolution”  (Tait  et  al.  2009;  “Chávez  Sides  with  the  Clerical  Dictatorship  against  Iran's  Youth, 
Workers  and  Women”  2009).  The  tactic  is  obvious:  portray  a  power-grab  as  a  healthy  response  to 
outside  “destabilization”  efforts  and  condemn  the  protesters  by  painting  them  as  unwitting  agents 
of  foreign  agitators.  Anti-imperialism  is  not  the  foundation  of  the  foreign  policy  relationships 
under  Chavismo.  It  should  come  as  no  surprise  then  that  even  in  those  cases  when  Western 
powers  use  their  institutions  to  actually  uphold  human  rights  law,  nonagentic  anti-imperialists 
interfere.  Such  was  the  case  in  2009  when  numerous  United  Nations  Human  Rights  Council 
(UNHRC)  members  like  the  EU  states  and  Canada  attempted  to  open  an  independent 
investigation  into  the  high  civilian  body  count  of  the  Sri  Lankan  civil  war  and  to  provide 
humanitarian  aid  to  internally  displaced  people  detained  in  military  camps  by  the  self-declared 
“anti-imperialist”  Rajapaksa  regime.  Instead,  a  a  cadre  of  nonagentic  anti-imperialists  regimes, 
including  Daniel  Ortega’s  Nicaragua,  Castro’s  Cuba,  Morales’  Bolivia,  Putin’s  Russia  and  Xi’s 
China,  with  predictable  support  from  Chávez’s  Venezuela,  actually  succeeded  in  passing  a 
resolution  “commending  the  government  for  addressing  the  needs  of  the  IDPs  and  welcoming 
‘the  continued  commitment  of  Sri  Lanka  to  the  promotion  and  protection  of  all  human  rights’” 
(Hensman  2018,  14). 
Iran  and  Sri  Lanka  exemplify  nonagentic  anti-imperialist  solidarity  on  a  more  ideological 
level.  The  reality  changes  when  Russia  and  China  enter  the  picture  because  these  states  in 
particular  do  not  operate  on  a  basis  of  solidarity  or  cooperation;  they  operate  on  the  basis  of 
dependency.  On  the  issue  of  debt,  Venezuela  has  been  the  largest  recipient  of  Chinese  finance, 
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receiving  over  $62  billion  in  loans  from  the  Chinese  Development  Bank  from  2007  to  2016– 
more  than  twice  the  second-largest  recipient  in  the  continent  (“China-Latin  America  Finance 
Database”  2018).  Since  2006,  Venezuela  has  also  received  at  least  $17  billion  in  loans  from  the 
Russian  government  and  its  state-owned  oil  giant  Rosneft  (Korsunskaya  2018).  It  is  no  surprise 
that  these  debt-based  relationships  began  under  Chávez,  when  oil  prices  were  high  and 
Venezuela  could  offer  its  prize  resource  as  repayment.  The  loans  were  for  much  more  than  to 
fund  the  aforementioned  social  programs,  however.  With  the  perpetual  imminence  of  an  invasion 
from  the  North  as  his  excuse,  Chávez  amassed  “one  of  the  largest  military  stockpiles  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere”  thanks  to  weapons  purchases  primarily  from  Russia,  with  China  a  distant 
second  (Berg  &  Martínez-Fernández  2019).  As  resistance  to  Maduro’s  reign  grows  both  inside 
and  outside  the  country,  he  has  continued  the  buildup  despite  already  defaulting  on  debt 
payments  even  with  efforts  to  restructure  (Gillespie  2017).  For  nonagentic  anti-imperialists,  the 
relationship  of  Venezuela  to  these  two  far  stronger  global  powers  is  an  example  of  third-world 
solidarity  simply  because  they  oppose  US  hegemony–  it  doesn't  matter  that  both  aim  to  become 
hegemons  themselves  rather  than  create  a  more  equitable  world-system.  In  an  article  for Latin 
American  Perspectives titled  “China  and  Venezuela:  South-South  Cooperation  or  Rearticulated 
Dependency?,”  Emma  Miriam  Yin-Hang  To  and  Rodrigo  Acuña  argue  that  while  China’s 
influence  in  Venezuela  is  not  at  the  same  level  as  that  of  the  United  States  before  Chávez, 
particularly  because  there  are  marginal  efforts  at  cooperation  nonetheless  overshadowed  by 
rentier  politics,  “the  relationship  between  PDVSA  and  Chinese  oil  companies  and  the  manner  in 
which  Chinese  companies  carry  out  Venezuelan  government  contracts  reflect  the  wider  shift  of 
Chinese  participation  in  the  global  economy  in  which  Chinese  companies  are  now  key  players 
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and  their  behavior  in  relation  to  Venezuela  does  not  differ  markedly  from  the  previous  behavior 
of  U.S.  or  European  capital”  (To  &  Acuña  2018).  The  same  can  be  said  for  Russia  to  a  lesser 
degree.  The  ardent  defense  of  these  two  regimes  is  based  on  protecting  capital  interests,  not 
anti-imperialism;  this  is  why  Guaidó  and  his  team  have  been  attempting  to  see  it  that  a 
post-Maduro  Venezuela  will  be  more  suitable  for  debt  repayments  (“Venezuela’s  Guaido  Wants 
China  to  See  Maduro  Is  Bad  for  Business”  2019). 
If  legitimate  anti-imperialism  is  rooted  in  self-determination  for  the  people  of  a  nation, 
then  the  rhetoric  of  anti-imperialism  cannot  be  used  to  justify  dictatorships  and  despots.  Chavista 
foreign  policy  has  to  a  large  degree  replicated  the  patterns  of  dependency  that  have  trapped  Latin 
America  in  with  hegemonic  Western  capital  interests  for  decades,  simply  substituting  the  latter 
with  non-Western  capital  interests.  It  has  also  used  its  alliances  to  cover  up  and  defend  human 
rights  abuses  beyond  its  borders,  something  anti-imperialists  rightly  criticize  when,  for  example, 
the  United  States  defends  human  rights  abuses  by  Saudi  Arabia  or  by  any  of  its  twentieth  century 
puppets  like  Pinochet. 
Venezuela’s  relationship  with  Cuba  exists  on  an  entirely  different  plane.  It  dates  back 
decades,  from  Betancourt  being  Fidel  Castro’s  first  foreign  state  visit  after  the  Revolution  to 
Cuba  attempting  a  guerrilla  invasion  of  Venezuela  in  1962  (Bermúdez  2019).  The  history  that 
brought  these  two  nations  together  is  a  long  one  but  can  be  summarized  briefly  as  follows.  The 
Soviet  Union  stepped  in  as  a  “buyer-of-last-resort”  for  Cuba  by  becoming  the  primary  market  for 
Cuban  exports  after  it  severed  ties  with  the  United  States  and  global  trade  links  in  the  1960s 
(Corrales  &  Penfold  2015,  117).  Additional  Soviet  support  for  Cuba  totaled  billions  of  dollars  in 
economic  and  military  aid  during  the  70s  and  80s  (Anderson  1983).  Soviet  money  kept  Cuba’s 
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ineffective  economy  afloat  in  exchange  for  a  strategic  footing  in  the  Western  hemisphere. 
Predictably,  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union  sent  Cuba’s  economy  spiraling  out  of  control  for  the 
time  in  the  1990s  known  as  the  Special  Period  (Voss  2018).  With  the  legitimacy  of  his  revolution 
hanging  by  a  thread,  Castro  saw  a  glimmer  of  hope  in  a  young  lieutenant-colonel  in  Venezuela– 
one  who  was  just  imprisoned  for  a  failed  coup  attempt. 
After  his  release  by  Caldera,  Chávez  was  invited  to  Havana  by  Castro  for  a  meeting 
(Carrasco  2019).  Chávez’s  Presidential  victory  five  years  later  marked  a  tight  relationship  the 
likes  of  which  are  not  too  common  between  two  states.  How  this  relationship  manifested 
depends  largely  on  whether  one  asks  commentators  supportive  of  Chavismo  or  those  opposed  to 
it.  For  some  it  is  the  epitome  of  anti-imperialist  solidarity,  while  for  others,  Cuba  is  akin  to  an 
invading  force  that  brainwashes  the  poor  into  supporting  Chavismo.  Neither  extreme  is  true. 
Cuba  has  certainly  helped  Venezuela  by  sending  doctors  in  exchange  for  oil;  however,  the  role  of 
those  doctors  in  the  destabilization  of  Venezuelan  democracy,  including  through  the  means 
explored  above  relating  to  Barrio  Adentro,  raises  questions  about  the  true  goals  behind  the 
relationship  (Casey  2019 a ).  The  heavily  influence  of  Cuban  military  and  security  personnel  –in 
what  might  be  called  an  infiltration  were  it  not  for  the  blessing  of  Chávez–  has  served  the  double 
purpose  of  ensuring  that  the  Venezuelan  political  system  and  oil-pumping  machine  remains  loyal 
to  Cuban  interests  and  of  providing  additional  intelligence  help  in  the  repression  of  domestic 
challenges  to  the  regime.  According  to  Reuters,  the  Cuban  military  presence  in  Venezuela  was 
stepped  up  after  Chávez  lost  his  first  election  in  2007,  a  move  meant  to  not  only  increase  control 
of  dissenters  on  the  streets  but  also  spy  “on  its  own  armed  forces,  instilling  fear  and  paranoia  and 
quashing  dissent”  (Berwick  2019).  The  true  extent  of  this  influence  is  unknown.  There  is  debate 
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among  scholars  about  whether  the  Venezuelans  or  Cubans  actually  call  the  shots  in  Venezuela.  If 
the  latter  is  true  and  the  Venezuelan  state  apparatus  is  more  loyal  to  Cuban  interests  than  those  of 
its  own  people,  it  would  be  possible  to  call  Cuba  an  imperialist  power  in  Venezuela,  according  to 
Hensman’s  definition–  though  there  is  not  enough  hard  evidence  to  definitively  make  this 
understandably  controversial  claim.  
Regardless  of  who  calls  the  shots,  however,  the  effect  of  the  influence  is  undeniable  and 
certainly  goes  beyond  simple  cooperation  in  healthcare.  The  Cuban  government  has  been 
instrumental  in  Venezuela’s  transformation  into  a  mafia  state,  the  details  of  which  will  be 
discussed  below  (Dickey  2018).  The  partnership  also  appears  asymmetrically  lucrative  for  Cuba 
(Piccone  &  Trinkunas  2014).  For  the  past  decade  or  so,  Venezuela  has  shipped  approximately 
100,000  barrels  of  heavily  subsidized  crude  to  Cuba,  which  the  island  then  refines  and  sells 
internationally  for  a  profit.  While  that  number  has  decreased  in  recent  years,  it  was  upped  to 
173,000  barrels  a  day  in  February  of  2020  despite  Venezuela’s  crippling  energy  crisis. 
The  depth  of  this  secretive  relationship  may  never  be  known,  but  its  asymmetries  are 
clear  and  its  goals  can  be  deduced.  It  is  far  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper  to  argue  that  the 
relationship  is  imperialist  in  nature,  but  it  should  be  made  clear  that  it  is  also  not  anti-imperialist. 
The  substantial  Cuban  presence  in  Venezuela  has  glaringly  contributed  to  the  devolution  of  its 
democracy  and  the  establishment  of  its  mafia  state  elements.  In  response  to  then-President 
Obama’s  2017  designation  of  Venezuela  as  an  “unusual  and  extraordinary”  threat  given  the  drug 
charges,  Cabello  responded  that  “‘Yes,  we’re  a  threat  because  we  want  peace…because  we’re 
socialists…because  we’re  revolutionaries…because  we’re  chavista”  (“Cabello  Responde  a 
Obama:  ‘Sí,  Somos  Una  Amenaza’”  2017).  Regardless  of  one’s  feelings  towards  Obama’s 
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declaration,  it  is  impossible  to  defend  the  actions  of  Venezuela’s  mafia  state,  and  Cuba’s  role  in 
building  it,  by  citing  “anti-imperialism.”  Venezuela,  like  Cuba,  has  had  a  choice  in  how  it  goes 
about  resisting  Western  hegemony.  It  decided  –on  its  own  volition–  to  do  it  by  bringing  another 
state’s  intelligence  services  to  spy  on  its  own  military  after  losing  an  election.  Legitimate 
anti-imperialists  must  not  fall  into  the  trap  of  supporting  autocratic  actions,  even  when  it  is  done 
in  the  name  of  an  anti-imperialist  foreign  policy. 
 
4.6 Food  Shortages 
According  to  the  nonagentic  anti-imperialists  leading  the  Chavista  regime  in  Venezuela, 
the  food  shortages  that  have  led  the  country’s  descent  into  crisis  are  the  result  of  US  sanctions.  A 
February  2020  article  in  TeleSUR  blames  them  for  the  restriction  of  “the  import  of  food,  seeds, 
fertilizers,  machinery,  and  other  basic  necessities,”  resulting  in  food  production  registering  “a  60 
percent  decrease  at  the  national  level.”  The  article  goes  on  to  describe  the  efforts  of  “several 
cooperatives  and  communes  to  revitalize  food  production  at  the  national  level,  to  meet  the 
country’s  food  needs”  (Monjane  2020).  The  framing  serves  two  purposes.  First,  it  absolves  the 
regime  of  any  blame  whatsoever  for  the  shortages,  not  bothering  to  ask  why  Venezuela  has  to 
import  70%  of  its  food  supply  in  the  first  place  when  it  could  once  produce  two-thirds  of  it 
(Graham-Harrison  2017).  Second,  it  posits  ideological  Chavismo  as  the  solution  to  these 
imperialist  aggressions.  The  reality  is  that  the  logic  of  nonagentic  anti-imperialism  here  is  used 
to  excuse  the  failure  of  the  regime’s  economic  policies. 
The  food  shortages  for  which  Venezuela  has  lamentably  become  globally  recognized  for 
originated  with  and  were  perpetuated  by  Chavismo  itself,  though  it  took  until  the  fall  of  oil  prices 
65 
/
 
for  the  deadly  flaws  to  reveal  themselves.  Like  much  of  the  regime’s  policies,  its  food  policy 
began  with  noble  aims  of  increasing  food  independence  and  making  productive  use  of  the  lands. 
A  2001  agrarian  reform  law  gave  the  government  largely  free  reign  to  expropriate  unproductive 
private  lands,  and  after  the  law  was  strengthened  in  2005,  Chávez  made  full  use  of  this  power 
(“Venezuela's  Nationalizations  under  Chávez”  2011).  The  goal  was  to  use  these  unproductive 
lands,  or  those  without  proper  land  titles,  to  create  an  alternative  food  system  using  those  local 
cooperatives  and  communes.  Patrick  Clark  writes  in  an  article  for  the Humboldt  Journal  of 
Social  Relations  that  “Venezuela's  unique  position  to  self-finance  these  reforms  and  its 
endogenous  development  model…have  allowed  it  to  transcend  the  conditions  placed  on  aid  or 
credit  offered  by  international  financial  institutions  and  northern  governments”  (Clark  2010). 
These  policies  are  what  gave  birth  to  the  El  Maizal  commune  mentioned  earlier.  The  ideological 
underpinnings  of  the  strategy  make  sense.  Unfortunately,  this  is  only  step  one.  Step  two  involves 
actually  making  the  land  productive  for  sustainable  agricultural  production.  Rampant 
mismanagement  of  these  lands  and  “chaotic  administration  of  state-backed  agricultural 
cooperatives”  destroyed  local  food  production  so  profoundly  that  the  government  had  to  rush  to 
import  so  much  food  amid  a  2008  shortage  that  “thousands  of  tons  rotted  at  the  ports”  (Carroll 
2013).  This,  to  answer  the  question  that  TeleSUR  never  asked,  is  how  Venezuela  went  from 
producing  two-thirds  of  its  food  supply  to  having  to  import  70%  of  it. 
High  oil  prices  were  able  to  sustain  this  dramatic  shift  until  they  suddenly  couldn't. 
Combined  with  the  massive  international  debt  and  unstoppable  inflation,  the  country  was  thrown 
into  the  crippling  humanitarian  crisis  of  today.  Rather  than  reverse  the  trend  his  predecessor  set, 
Maduro  has  instead  turned  to  other  forms  of  constructive  solutions.  In  2017,  a  plan  baptized  as 
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“Plan  Rabbit”  mandated  that  rabbits  be  distributed  to  popular  sectors  for  consumption,  arguing 
that  “they  have  taught  us  that  rabbits  are  pretty  pets,  but  they  are  two  and  a  half  kilos  of 
high-protein  meat  without  cholesterol”  (Scharfenberg  2017).  Rather  than  admit  to  and  fix  his  and 
his  predecessor's  mistakes,  Maduro  turned  to  the  rhetoric  of  nonagentic  anti-imperialism  by 
hoping  that  “  the  small  mammal  [would]  counter  the  impact  of  what  he  calls  a  huge  ‘economic 
war’  waged  against  him  by  ‘imperialists’”  (Reeves  2017).  US  sanctions  were  not  behind  the 
brutal  mismanagement  of  seized  arable  land  and  US  aggression  was  not  behind  the  conscious 
decision  to  push  forth  with  the  absolute  failure  that  was  the  agrarian  reform  project;  yet  if  one 
only  listens  to  nonagentic  anti-imperialists,  the  Maduro  regime  had  no  choice  but  to  address  his 
peoples’  starvation  with  “Let  Them  Eat  Rabbit”  (Reeves  2017). 
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5. Venezuela  Under  Chavismo 
It  is  necessary  to  include  analysis  of  marginalized  communities  when  discussing 
nonagentic  anti-imperialism  precisely  because  these  communities  have  been  traditionally 
excluded  from  the  masculinist  national  imaginations  of  the  nation-state  system.  The  rhetoric  of 
anti-imperialism  has  historically  sought  to  include  these  marginalized  communities  in 
revolutionary  conceptions  of  the  nation.  As  Benedict  Anderson  notes  in  his Imagined 
Communities ,  these  anti-imperialist  movements  have  always  wrapped  themselves  in  an  inclusive 
nationalist  rhetoric  even  at  the  social  antisystemic  phase  (Anderson  2016,  KIndle  loc.  147).  As 
the  previous  sections  have  made  clear,  Chávez’s  Venezuela  was  no  different.  Chavistas  have 
claimed,  for  example,  that  “the  revolution  has  a  woman’s  face”  as  a  means  of  separating  it  from 
masculinist  nationalist  projects  (Elfenbein  2019,  3).  Feminist  scholar  Nira  Yuval-Davis  argues 
that  all  modern  conceptions  of  the  nation  rely  heavily  on  gender  roles,  and  in  effect  construct 
“notions  of  femininity  and  masculinity,  naturalize  power  relations  [that]  reproduce…national 
collectivities”  (Yuval-Davis  2003).  At  least  in  rhetoric,  anti-imperialist  movements  have  sought 
to  overcome  such  gendered  divisions  (Arrighi  et  al.  2012,  104).  Similar  rhetoric  has  surrounded 
the  inclusion  of  indigenous  peoples  into  the  national  imagination  of  Chávez’s  Venezuela,  evident 
by  the  efforts  behind  the  misiónes  described  above.  The  politics  of  indigenous  exclusion  from 
traditional  nation-states  is  intimately  connected  to  the  politics  of  empire  because  of  the  history  of 
Spanish  and  Portuguese  settler-colonialism,  which  makes  indigenous  inclusion  a  matter  of 
anti-imperialism. 
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As  important  as  rhetoric  and  language  can  be  in  bringing  these  marginalized  communities 
into  that  national  imagination,  the  concern  of  this  paper  is  with  whether  or  not  that  rhetoric  has 
translated  into  better  lived  ends  for  them.  It  was,  after  all,  largely  the  activism  of  these  groups 
that  got  Chávez  elected  in  the  first  place.  This  section  will  focus  on  the  lived  ends  of  popular 
women  and  indigenous  communities  under  Chavismo  in  order  to  determine  whether  the 
anti-imperialist  language  of  national  inclusion  went  beyond  mere  performativity  or  was  nothing 
but  empty  rhetoric. 
Article  88  of  Chávez’s  1999  constitution  laid  the  groundwork  for  the  legislation  of 
popular  women’s  demands.  It  reads  that  “The  State  guarantees  the  equality  and  equitable 
treatment  of  men  and  women  in  the  exercise  of  the  right  to  work.  The  state  recognizes  work  at 
home  as  an  economic  activity  that  creates  added  value  and  produces  social  welfare  and  wealth. 
Housewives  are  entitled  to  Social  Security  in  accordance  with  law”  (“Constitution  of  the 
Bolivarian  Republic  of  Venezuela”  2010).  Importantly,  Article  88  only  outlines  the  principle  of 
recognizing  women’s  unpaid  labor.  Not  even  when  the  Chavistas  had  overwhelming  legislative 
control  from  2006-2011,  however,  did  the  regime  translate  that  principle  into  law.  Rachel 
Elfenbein  writes  that  “the  dialectical  relationship  between  forces  from  above  and  below 
intersected  with  tensions  and  popular  women’s  gendered  positioning  in  the  revolution, 
undercutting  popular  women's  organizing”  efforts,  particularly  when  it  came  to  actually 
legislating  into  effect  the  promises  made  to  women  regarding  new  labor  laws  (Elfenbein  2019, 
174).  Numerous  popular  women’s  groups  offered  proposals  for  feminist  labor  laws,  and  finally 
in  2012  they  succeeded  in  getting  Chávez’s  word  that  he  would  organize  a  commission  to  draft 
the  law.  
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What  followed  fits  the  mold  of  Yuval-Davis’  description  of  masculine  conceptions  of  the 
nation.  Despite  the  anti-imperialist  notion  of  a  revolution  with  women  at  the  forefront,  the 
commission  only  featured  one  woman  and  zero  members  involved  in  feminist  organizing.  Input 
from  popular  women’s  organizations,  limited  as  it  was  during  such  an  opaque  process,  only  took 
into  account  demands  from  those  organizations  that  openly  supported  the  regime.  The  resultant 
law  “did  specifically  recognize  workers  outside  of  employment  relationships  both  as  workers  and 
as  subjects  of  social  security  rights  and  responsibilities,”  but  it  did  not  guarantee  the  social 
security  benefits  promised  under  the  1999  constitution  (Elfenbein  2019,  193).  Some  demands 
included  in  the  law,  however,  include  extended  maternity  leave  and  the  outlawing  of  workplace 
sexual  harassment  and  gender-based  discrimination.  As  Elfenbein  notes,  the  significant  and 
deliberate  lack  of  transparency  means  that  no  one  truly  knows  how  decisions  were  made.  It  only 
made  clear  that  “decision-making  about  the  law  remained  outside  the  public  sphere,”  a  process 
ensuring  that  control  over  the  law  always  lay  with  the  masculine-dominated  levers  of  power  from 
above  (Elfenbein  2019,  196). 
The  example  of  the  2012  labor  law  is  used  here  to  represent  Chavismo’s  relationship  to 
popular  women’s  demands  because  this  is  when  an  explicit  effort  was  made  to  follow  through 
with  a  promise  made  thirteen  years  prior.  That  effort  to  legally  include  women  into  the 
Venezuelan  national  imagination  was  laden  with  processes  intended  to  separate  popular  demand 
from  state  power.  The  symbol  of  the  woman  as  bearer  of  the  nation’s  collective  identity,  in  this 
case  an  identity  intimately  linked  with  the  masculine  Chavista  identity,  can  perhaps  best  be 
summarized  by  the  label  “Chávez’s  women,”  a  term  used  by  the  regime  to  imagine  women’s 
political  participation  as  mobilized  yet  contained  (Elfenbein  2019,  196). 
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Indigenous  Venezuelans  have  faced  a  similar  struggle  in  the  sense  that  their  demands 
have  been  rhetorically  co-opted  by  the  regime  with  little  of  substance  to  show  for  it. 
Incorporating  indigenous  peoples  into  the  Venezuelan  national  imagination  is  something  that 
administrations  had  attempted  since  Puntofijismo,  but  many  tribes  only  aimed  to  maintain  their 
sovereignty  as  they  feared  that  their  own  politics  would  be  co-opted  by  the  governments.  Just  as 
with  the  feminist  organizers,  indigenous  demands  were  recognized  in  the  1999  constitution, 
which  included  indigenous  representation  in  the  National  Assembly  without  the  need  for  political 
party  affiliation.  Combined  with  the  rhetoric  surrounding  the  misiónes  described  above,  hopes 
were  high  that  indigenous  peoples  could  have  state-level  representation  that  respected  their 
sovereignty  and  addressed  their  needs. 
The  indigenous  response  to  these  efforts  towards  representation  has  been  predictably 
mixed.  Many  acknowledge  the  importance  of  inclusive  rhetoric  and  understand  that  the  Chavista 
regime  has  been  more  generous  towards  indigenous  sovereignty  than  previous  administrations. 
One  of  the  most  concrete  steps  taken  towards  the  goals  of  the  constitution  was  the  creation  of  the 
Indigenous  University  of  Venezuela,  which  “gives  indigenous  peoples  the  right  to  develop  their 
own  education  [in]  a  space  where  their  youth  can  be  educated  as  the  defenders  of  their  original 
ways;  able  to  resist  the  onslaught  of  the  Western  world  upon  their  peoples”  (Martinez  et  al.  2010, 
196).  Others,  however,  believe  that  attempts  at  increased  representation  are  merely  ways  of 
co-opting  indigenous  demands  only  in  the  capacity  that  it  serves  the  regime’s  anti-imperialist 
narrative.  One  member  of  the  Ye'kuana  tribe  said  in  an  interview  that  they  “have  an  indigenous 
representative  in  the  government,  Nicia  Maldonado,  whom  we  have  invited  various  times  to  the 
university  to  speak  with  us.  But  we  have  received  no  response.  Being  our  sister  and  having 
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political  power,  she  should  be  trying  to  support  us.”  Similar  claims  are  repeated  by  members  of 
other  tribes  when  it  comes  to  actually  receiving  material  aid  from  the  government  (Martinez  et 
al.  2010,  282).  The  question  of  legitimate  indigenous  representation  and  sovereignty  does  not 
have  a  consensus  across  the  community,  but  what  is  clear  is  that  at  least  rhetorically,  and  legally 
to  a  lesser  degree,  indigenous  peoples  have  been  incorporated  into  the  natioanlist  imagination  of 
Venezuela. 
As  has  been  evident  throughout  this  paper,  however,  including  in  the  case  of  feminist 
organizers,  the  regime’s  nationalist  imagination  is  welcoming  primarily  to  those  groups  that  the 
regime  itself  can  benefit  from.  Two  cases  will  be  looked  at  here  in  which  the  regime’s  thesis 
came  into  conflict  with  an  indigenous  antithesis  as  part  of  the  state-society  dialectic.  The  first  is 
the  ecocidal  proliferation  of  state-led  mining  operation,  the  Arco  Minero,  on  indigenous  land  and 
with  indigenous  labor.  The  second  is  the  massacre  that  took  place  in  2019  during  a  confrontation 
between  members  of  the  Pemón  tribe  and  state  armed  forces. 
Oil  is  far  from  the  only  natural  resource  resting  beneath  Venezuelan  soil.  Its  riches  of 
gold,  diamond,  nickel,  and  uranium  have  long  been  sought  by  state  and  nonstate  actors  both 
legally  and  illegally  (“Venezuela:  Violent  Abuses  in  Illegal  Gold  Mines”  2020).  After  the 
Venezuelan  economy  collapsed,  they  also  became  a  coveted  source  of  revenues  for  the  Chavista 
regime  under  Maduro.  In  2016,  the  Arco  Minero  del  Orinoco  mega-project  was  created  to  attract 
foreign  investments  to  extract  gold  from  mines  primarily  in  Bolívar  state  but  also  Amazonas  and 
Delta  Amacuro–  all  of  which  feature  some  of  the  highest  indigenous  populations  in  the  country. 
In  typical  extractivist  fashion,  as  Amnesty  International  (AI)  notes,  “prior  and  informed  consent 
of  Indigenous  Peoples  was  not  sought  and…there  were  no  publicly  accessible  environmental 
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impact  assessments,  meaning  the  potential  damage  to  their  territories  could  not  be  gauged”  (“The 
Deadly  Cost  of  Defending  the  Environment”  2018).  Protecting  indigenous  territorial  sovereignty 
was  said  to  be  a  cornerstone  of  resisting  “the  onslaught  of  the  Western  world”  and  colonialism 
itself,  but  these  promises  did  not  appear  to  matter  when  violating  this  sovereignty  became  a 
matter  of  state  policy.  AI  tells  the  story  of  Lisa  Henrito,  a  Pemón  activist  who  in  2018  declared  in 
response  to  the  mining  efforts  that  “it  was  the  state’s  duty  to  respect  and  recognise  the  rights  of 
Indigenous  Peoples  over  their  territories  and  resources;  this  had  a  serious  impact  on  the 
advancing  militarisation  and  financial  exploitation  of  the  Venezuelan  Amazon”  (“Venezuela: 
Violent  Abuses  in  Illegal  Gold  Mines”  2020).  The  military,  in  response,  accused  her  of  treason 
and  of  attempting  to  lead  an  indigenous  national  secession  from  Venezuela (“Venezuela: 
Indigenous  Activist  Slandered  and  Stigmatised”  2018) . 
According  to  the  Center  for  Strategic  and  International  Studies  (CSIS),  the  land 
demarcated  under  the  Arco  Minero  project  quickly  saw  nonstate  actors  and  local  gangs 
competing  for  control  of  the  mines.  The  Maduro  regime  and  its  security  forces  directly  and 
indirectly  benefit  from  these  illegal  mining  operations  by  taking  a  cut  from  these  groups  at  every 
step  of  the  process,  from  the  mining  itself  to  the  illegal  smuggling  out  of  Venezuela  (Rendon  & 
Sandin  2020).  The  International  Crisis  Group  (ICG)  writes  in  its  report  “Gold  and  Grief  in 
Venezuela’s  Violent  South”  that  these  state  security  forces  have  murdered  numerous  indigenous 
activists  who  stand  in  the  way  of  these  operations.  These  mining  operations  in  the  Amazon 
rainforest  have  had  a  predictable  impact  on  the  environment  as  well.  CSIS  reports  that  the  Arco 
Minero  has  destroyed  over  one  thousand  square  miles  of  forest,  half  of  that  land  marked  as 
“protected  territories”  (Rendon  &  Sandin  2020).  The  operations  have  also  been  linked  to  a 
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dramatic  rise  in  cases  of  malaria,  going  from  136,402  confirmed  cases  nationwide  in  2016  to 
404,924  in  2018.  This  is  because  working  conditions  have  greatly  increased  the  risk  of  the 
mostly  indigenous  laborers  to  mosquitoes  that  carry  it  and  because  the  deforested  mining  pits 
“provide  an  excellent  breeding  environment”  for  the  mosquitoes  (“Venezuela:  Violent  Abuses  in 
Illegal  Gold  Mines”  2020). 
The  second  case  is  much  more  localized,  taking  place  on  February  22nd  of  2019.  That 
was  the  day  in  which  a  US-led  humanitarian  effort  was  scheduled  to  bring  desperately-needed 
food  aid  into  Venezuela  through  its  border  with  Brazil.  This  was  taking  place  about  a  month  after 
Juan  Guaidó  ascended  to  the  presidency  of  Venezuela,  though  Maduro  continued  to  hold 
domestic  power  within  Venezuela.  As  the  two  dueled  for  legitimacy  in  the  eyes  of  the  people,  it 
became  clear  that  the  one  who  was  able  to  provide  food  to  the  starving  country  would  curry 
significant  favor.  It  thus  became  Maduro’s  mission  to  prevent  the  food  from  entering  the  country 
in  Guaidó’s  name  despite  the  brutal  conditions.  That  mission  manifested  itself  in  the  use  of  the 
military  to  forcefully  block  the  food  aid  from  entering.  Understanding  the  importance  of  the  aid 
and  disregarding  the  state  politics,  indigenous  tribespeople  from  the  Pemón  tribe  fought  to  keep 
the  border  open  to  allow  the  food  aid  through  (Ramirez  2019).  They  were  met  with  violent 
resistance  from  the  GNB,  who  opened  fire  on  the  Pemónes  and  killed  at  least  five.  At  least 
twenty-five  others  were  wounded.  The  message  was  clear:  indigenous  lives  matter  only  when 
they  do  not  interfere  with  the  national  identity  of  Venezuela,  which  in  this  case  was  partly  built 
on  resisting  “humanitarian  imperialism”  from  the  United  States.  According  to  the  advocacy 
organization  Survival  International,  a  Pemón  leader  sent  out  a  recording  as  she  fled  the  violence, 
saying  “‘This  is  a  war  taking  place  here.  They  have  orders  to  shoot  anyone.  Persecution  of  the 
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capitanes  generales  [council  of  Pemon  leaders]  has  started.  They  came  through  my  community 
shooting  with  rifles’”  (“Venezuelan  Army  Opens  Fire  on  Pemon  Tribe”  2019).  A  Reuters 
investigation  elaborated  more  on  the  aftermath  of  the  massacre  and  the  Pemón  response,  writing 
that 
[t]he  repercussions  included  the  arrest  of  23  Pemon  tribesmen,  some  of 
whom  say  they  were  beaten  in  custody.  Pemon  villagers  also  held  more 
than  40  members  of  the  military  hostage,  some  of  whom  suffered  severe 
bites  after  being  left  half-naked  atop  ant  nests  in  retribution  for  the 
killings,  according  to  interviews  with  Pemon  tribe  members  (Ramirez 
2019). 
 
These  examples  of  state-indigenous  relations  were  selected  because  they  represent  two 
cases,  one  systemic  and  one  specific,  in  which  indigenous  demands  and  state  interests  entered 
into  dialectical  conflict.  It  is  easy  for  the  regime  and  its  defenders  to  claim  unconditional  support 
for  indigenous  peoples  when  their  interests  dovetail,  but  the  true  nature  of  that  relationship  can 
only  be  surmised  when  those  interests  come  into  dialectical  conflict.  Even  a  cursory  analysis  of 
that  dialectic  shows  that  state  interests  will  always  supersede  indigenous  ones  even  when  it  is  a 
literal  matter  of  life  and  death  for  indigenous  activists. 
This  section  has  covered  only  two  marginalized  groups  in  Venezuela;  the  demands  of 
Afro-Venezuelans,  labor  movements,  LGBT  Venezuelans,  and  any  other  number  of  communities 
traditionally  excluded  from  national  imaginations  (and,  perhaps  ironically,  also  from  this  paper) 
also  merit  an  analysis  of  their  own  lived  ends,  but  space  constraints  require  that  it  be  done 
elsewhere.  What  this  analysis  has  shown  is  a  pattern  traceable  from  previous  sections  covering 
everything  from  foreign  policy  to  the  misiónes.  The  regime’s  national  imagination  is  open  only 
to  those  groups  from  which  it  can  personally  benefit.  Because  the  exclusion  of  these  groups, 
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particularly  indigenous  people  but  also  popular  women,  are  the  result  of  settler-colonial  politics 
of  empire,  their  inclusion  has  been  framed  as  an  anti-imperialist  act.  In  practice,  however,  the 
promises  exist  only  in  rhetoric. 
 
5.1 The  Economic  War 
At  this  point  in  the  argument  it  is  worth  revisiting  John  Pilger’s  claim  that  there  is  a 
“war”  facing  Chavista  Venezuela.  This  belief  is  articulated  against  the  very  real  background  of 
decades  upon  decades  of  Northern  imperialism  against  Latin  America  and  the  long  history  of 
US-led  or  -backed  coups  against  democratically  elected  leaders  in  order  to  install  fascist  or 
neoliberal  puppets  in  their  place.  As  has  already  been  established,  to  apply  the  logic  of  that 
imperialist  history  to  Venezuela  under  Chavismo  is  to  ignore  the  changing  patterns  within  the 
past  century  of  global  capitalism.  This  means  that  the  actions  of  the  Global  North  must  be 
analyzed  within  these  new  contexts  and  stripped  of  the  old  logics  that  no  longer  apply.  The 
nonagentic  anti-imperialist  argument  of  a  “war”  against  Chavismo  often  takes  two  forms.  The 
first  is  an  economic  war,  defined  by  sanctions  and  finance  capital.  The  second  is  military  might, 
the  threat  of  which  should  never  be  fully  discounted. 
Economic  sanctions  by  the  United  States  against  the  Chavista  regime  are  ultimately 
aimed  at  regime  change.  They  are  designed  in  theory  to  financially  strangle  the  regime  to  the 
point  of  surrender.  This  strategy  has  one  glaring  problem:  it  has  never  worked  in  any  context  it 
has  ever  been  attempted.  Sanctions  are  useful  only  when  seeking  particular  concessions  from  a 
government,  not  in  seeking  its  demise.  As  with  Iran  and  Cuba,  US  sanctions  aimed  at  regime 
change  fail  to  achieve  their  goals  and  are  continued  despite  their  unintended  consequences.  The 
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allies  Chavismo  has  surrounded  itself  with  are  more  than  capable  of  circumnavigating  any 
obstacle  placed  in  the  regime’s  way.  One  popular  nonagentic  anti-imperialist  claim  is  that  the  US 
sanctions  ultimately  hurt  the  people  of  Venezuela  because  there  is  ultimately  less  revenue 
available  through  which  to  fund  important  welfare  programs.  This  narrative  is  pushed  by  voices 
as  varied  as  UN  Special  Rapporteur  Alfred  de  Zayas  and  Venezuelan  NGO  Fundalatin,  arguing 
that  US  engagement  in  “‘economic  warfare’  against  Venezuela…is  hurting  the  economy  and 
killing  Venezuelans”  (Selby-Green  2019).  More  right-wing  elements  of  the  debate  will  argue  that 
the  sanctions  do  not  hurt  the  people  because  oil  revenues  already  were  not  trickling  down  to  the 
people  even  before  the  sanctions;  they  claim  that  they  are  effective  in  choking  out  the  regime. 
The  truth,  of  course,  can  be  found  in  the  synthesis  of  these  two  claims.  The  left  is  correct  in 
claiming  that  the  sanctions  hurt  Venezuelan  citizens.  Nicholas  Kristof,  the  center-left  liberal 
anti-Chavista  journalist,  argues  as  much  in  an  opinion  piece  for  the  New  York  Times  titled 
“Venezuela’s  Kids  Are  Dying.  Are  We  Responsible?”  (2019).  Kristof  claims  that  while  the  US  is 
not  the  cause  of  the  humanitarian  crisis,  its  sanctions  against  fuel  imports,  for  example,  do  harm 
the  most  vulnerable  Venezuelans  (Krauss  2019).  The  right-wing  elements  arguing  that 
government  money  wouldn't  be  reaching  the  people  even  without  sanctions  also  have  a 
significant  amount  of  evidence  backing  up  their  argument,  beginning  with  the  kleptocracy  that 
will  be  examined  in  a  later  section.  The  reality,  however,  is  that  even  the  little  that  did  trickle 
down  could  mean  life  or  death  for  many  of  the  country’s  poorest. 
But  to  truly  understand  the  role  of  the  sanctions  in  the  crisis  and  the  validity  of  the 
pervasive  language  of  “war”  on  the  part  of  nonagentic  anti-imperialists,  it  is  necessary  to  actually 
look  at  the  specific  sanctions  that  the  US  has  enacted  rather  than  make  assumptions  about  their 
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effects  based  on  the  term  and  its  historical  implications.  The  fact  of  the  matter  is  that  the  vast 
majority  of  Venezuela-related  sanctions  imposed  before  2018  targeted  specific  individuals 
involved  with  the  Chavista  regime,  not  the  Venezuelan  economy  or  oil  industry.  An  example  is  a 
round  of  2017  sanctions  that  targeted  then-Venezuelan  Vice  President  –and  credibly  accused 
drug  kingpin–  Tareck  el  Aissami  and  his  “primary  frontman”  Samark  Lopez  Bello.  Businessman 
Lopez  Bello,  who  describes  himself  as  a  philanthropist  and  innovator  on  his  website,  purchased  a 
luxurious  Miami  apartment  for  $3.4  million  in  cash  laundered  from  a  state-sanctioned  drug 
trafficking  scheme  allegedly  led  by  el  Aissami  (“Samark  Lopez  Is  Working  to  Transform 
Venezuela's  Future”  (n.d.);  Ramirez  2017).  The  sanctions  levied  against  these  two  men  blocks 
their  access  to  the  Miami  purchases,  which  also  include  another  two  multimillion  dollar 
apartments  and  a  private  jet.  Even  most  of  the  post-2018  sanctions  continue  in  this  tradition  of 
freezing  individual  assets,  but  the  effect  of  newer  sanctions  targeting  the  economy  at  large  and 
the  oil  industry  cannot  be  ignored. 
The  other  obvious  arm  of  the  language  of  war  is  the  threat  of  a  military  invasion.  This 
belief  has  roots  not  only  in  Latin  America’s  regional  history  but  also  in  conspiracy  theories 
regarding  the  CIA’s  perceived  role  in  the  failed  2002  coup  against  Chávez.  As  the  nonagentic 
anti-imperialist  narrative  goes,  the  CIA  funded  and  materially  aided  the  ill-conceived,  ill-carried 
out,  and  ill-fated  coup  in  a  play  resembling  the  Bay  of  Pigs  invasion  and  the  toppling  of  Allende 
(Ciccariello-Maher  2016,  Kindle  loc.  923-935).  CIA  documents,  of  course,  show  that  the 
organization  did  not  plan  or  aid  in  the  execution  of  the  coup.  The  CIA  did  know  about  it  ahead  of 
time  and  did  support  an  ouster  of  Chávez,  but  it  did  not  materially  aid  it.  Laying  the  blame  of  the 
coup  at  the  feet  of  the  CIA,  rather  than  at  the  elite  elements  of  Venezuelan  society  and  military 
78 
/
 
that  actually  conducted  the  operation,  is  another  manifestation  of  the  revocation  of  Venezuelans’ 
agency  to  rebel  against  a  Chávez  at  the  height  of  his  popularity  and,  yes,  put  that  rebellion  into 
action  in  a  way  that  even  its  primary  actors  have  recognized  as  a  brutal  mistake.  The  “military 
option”  has  rarely  been  off  the  table  when  it  comes  to  Venezuela,  especially  as  the  three  US 
presidents  of  the  twenty-first  century  have  used  it  sparingly  in  other  contexts.  In  numerous 
exploitative  attempts  to  gain  support  from  Cuban  and  Venezuelan  voters,  Donald  Trump  has 
floated  the  military  option  in  public  comments  but  there  is  no  evidence  to  suggest  that  this 
rhetoric  has  translated  into  legitimate  movement  militarily.  Regardless,  the  threat  continues  to 
color  nonagentic  anti-imperialist  and  even  genuine  anti-imperialist  attitudes  towards  the 
pressures  faced  by  the  Chavista  regime. 
There  is  a  legitimate  argument  to  be  made  that  recent  US  pressures  on  Venezuela,  both 
economic  and  military,  are  harming  the  Venezuelan  people.  But  when  support  for  this  argument 
is  used  to  justify  the  authoritarianism  causing  significantly  more  harm  to  the  people,  nonagentic 
anti-imperialists  are  firmly  putting  their  loose  ideology  far  ahead  of  the  needs  of  Venezuelans. 
 
5.2 The  Kleptocrats  On  Top 
In  2016,  two  longtime  ideological  Chavistas  came  out  with  an  allegation  against  the 
regime  that  serves  as  a  perfect  entry  into  the  tangled  chasm  that  is  twenty-first  century  corruption 
in  Venezuela.  The  two  were  Jorge  Giordani,  a  former  finance  minister  and  close  economic 
advisor  to  Chávez  for  nearly  his  entire  rule  described  as  “a  man  who  delivered  with  absolute 
honesty  in  all  of  the  tasks  entrusted  to  him  by  the  Revolution”  by  Maduro,  and  Hector  Navarro, 
another  loyal  Chavista  who  had  run  five  ministries  during  Chávez’s  rule.  Reuters  reported  that 
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the  men  calculated  that  the  regime  had  stolen  nearly  $300  billion  “of  the  $1  trillion  that  entered 
its  coffers”  from  approximately  2003-2013  as  a  result  of  exchange  controls  manipulation  dubbed 
a  “corruption  machine”  by  anti-Chavista  activists  (Chinea  &  Pons  2016).  This  chasm  of 
corruption  leads  to  the  following  assertion:  under  Chavismo,  Venezuela  was  run  less  as  a 
government  and  more  as  a  mafia  state  with  a  criminal  syndicate  at  its  head.  In  an  article  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  Venezuelan  intellectual  Moisés  Naím  and  Francisco  Toro  put  this  new  dynamic 
in  historical  perspective,  positing  that 
Maduro  continues  to  peddle  the  rhetoric  of  socialism,  but  his 
authoritarian  government  has  constructed  not  a  worker’s  paradise  but  a 
den  of  thieves.  The  classic  twentieth-century  Latin  American 
dictatorship—what  political  scientists  called  a  “bureaucratic  authoritarian 
regime”—was  a  highly  institutionalized  affair.  An  oppressive  but 
efficient  state  machine,  propped  up  by  a  large,  permanent  bureaucracy, 
worked  hard  to  maintain  power  and  squeeze  out  dissent.  Contemporary 
Venezuela  is  nothing  like  that. 
 
Rather  than  a  professionalized  bureaucracy,  the  Maduro  regime  amounts 
to  a  loose  confederation  of  foreign  and  domestic  criminal  enterprises 
with  the  president  in  the  role  of  mafia  boss.  The  glue  that  holds  the 
government  together  is  neither  ideology  nor  the  quest  for  rigid  order:  it’s 
the  scramble  for  the  spoils  that  flow  from  a  dizzying  array  of  illegal 
sources  (Naím  &  Toro  2020). 
 
While  Naím  only  mentions  the  Maduro  regime,  the  allegations  of  Giordani  and  Navarro  are  a 
worthy  reminder  that  the  mafia  extended  back  through  to  Chávez  as  well.  A  2018  report  by  the 
non-profit  investigative  organization  InSight  Crime  outlines  seven  reasons  as  to  why  it  is 
accurate  to  put  this  label  on  the  government.  The  first  is  “top  level  criminal  penetration  into  4
4  The  non-profit  foundation  InSight  Crime  studies  and  compiles  information  from  around  Latin  America  and  the 
Caribbean  as  it  relates  to  national  and  citizen  security  issues.  Key  funders,  according  to  its  website,  include  the 
“Open  Society  Foundations,  the  British  Embassy  in  Colombia,  the  International  Development  Research  Centre  of 
Canada,  and  the  Swedish  government.” 
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state  institutions,”  best  exemplified  by  the  Cartel  de  los  Soles  (Cartel  of  the  Suns),  a  drug  cartel 
actively  being  run  out  of  the  military.  Second  is  the  allegations  of  kleptocracy  such  as  the  one 
described  above,  though  that  is  far  from  exhaustive.  Third  is  “the  devolution  of  state  powers  to 
irregular  and  illegal  actors,”  something  that  has  already  been  addressed  as  an  element  of 
Chavismo  that  nonagentic  anti-imperialists  might  actually  support  without  recognizing  its 
ramifications  and  lived  reality.  This  feeds  directly  into  the  “exponential  growth  of  Venezuelan 
organized  crime,”  something  easily  visible  from  basic  statistics.  This  in  turn  creates  a  space  for 
“high  levels  of  violence  by  state  and  non-state  actors,”  which  is  known  only  through  the  work  of 
civil  society  organizations  since  the  state  does  not  keep  official  figures  related  to  this.  Such 
violence  and  criminality  naturally  cannot  be  prevented  from  spilling  beyond  borders,  so  it  is  no 
surprise  that  the  “the  exportation  of  criminality”  made  the  list.  And  lastly,  going  off  of  number 
two,  is  the  “widespread  international  accusations  of  criminal  behavior”  that  have  followed  the 
regime  for  years  (“Venezuela:  A  Mafia  State?”  2018). 
Only  the  clearest  highlights  of  the  kleptocracy  will  be  addressed  here  given  its 
unimaginable  depth,  beginning  with  the  network  of  government  officials  and  criminals  known  as 
the  Cartel  de  los  Soles.  That  Venezuela  plays  a  significant  role  in  the  international  drug  trade  is 
hardly  a  surprise;  its  geopolitical  location  makes  it  a  prime  location  for  cocaine  exports  to  the 
North  from  the  rest  of  South  America.  The  reality  of  Venezuela’s  drug  trafficking  scene  involves 
the  Chavista  regime  (here  is  a  major  component  of  the  mafia  state  that  Cuban  influence  helped 
craft),  the  Colombian  Revolutionary  Armed  Forces  (FARC),  and  individual  traffickers  with 
high-level  connections  (Dickey  2018).  One  of  those  individuals  is  Samark  Lopez  Bello,  whose 
story  fits  seamlessly  into  this  context.  Another  is  Syrian-Venezuelan  Walid  Makled,  often  known 
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as  “El  Arabe,”  a  longtime  trafficker  who  came  to  sell  “his  services  to  the  highest  bidder,  from 
corrupt  elements  in  Venezuela’s  military  [the  Cartel  de  los  Soles]  and  the  [FARC].  In  exchange, 
Makled  promised  safe  passage  of  cocaine  shipments,  which  left  Venezuela  by  the  ton.  He  also 
counted  with  the  support  of  certain  governors  from  the  United  Socialist  Party  of  Venezuela 
(Partido  Socialista  Unido  de  Venezuela  –  PSUV)  and  officials  from  the  administration  of  former 
president  Hugo  Chávez”  ( “Walid  Makled”  2019).  In  public  comments  after  his  arrest  in  Cúcuta, 
Colombia,  Makled  admitted  to  paying  off  around  40  military  generals  as  part  of  his  work, 
claiming  that  “all  my  business  associates  are  generals”  (“Venezuela:  A  Mafia  State?”  2018).  In 
addition,  he  conceded  that  in  exchange  for  “concessions”  from  Chávez  at  Puerto  Cabello,  the 
port  from  which  approximately  70%  of  the  narcotics  pass  through  in  Venezuela  from  Colombia, 
Makled  bankrolled  one  of  Chávez’s  presidential  campaigns  (“Condenan  a  14  Años  De  Cárcel  a 
Walid  Makled”  2015).  Diosdado  Cabello,  who  at  times  has  been  Vice  President  or  President  of 
the  National  Assembly,  among  other  positions,  is  widely  believed  to  be  the  mastermind  behind 
the  Cartel.  So  claimed  Leamsy  Salazar,  a  former  confidante  and  bodyguard  to  Chávez  who 
defected  and  went  under  the  Witness  Protection  Program  in  the  US  (Nagel  2015).  Equally 
damning  is  a  2015  audio  recording  of  two  nephews  of  First  Lady  Cilia  Flores  –wife  of  Maduro– 
following  their  arrest  in  Haiti  for  transporting  large  amounts  of  cocaine  (Romera  &  Cifuentes 
2017).  The  audio  recording  has  “one  of  the  nephews  refers  to  Cabello  as  ‘the  most  powerful  man 
in  Venezuela’  and  ‘a  guarantee  for  the  business’”  (Dickey  2018).  It  is  worth  mentioning  that 
Venezuela  is  a  country  where  drug  trafficking  is,  of  course,  illegal  and  severe  punishments  are 
meted  out  to  those  who  use  and  possess  drugs  (“En  Venezuela  La  Legalización  Del  Consumo  De 
Marihuana…”  2018).  The  policy  unsurprisingly  hurts  the  urban  poor  in  the  barrios  more  than 
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any  other,  just  as  it  does  in  the  United  States  (“Detenidas  Tres  Mujeres  Por  Distribución  De 
Droga  En  El…”  2019).  Chávez’s  crusade  against  drug  trafficking  was  renewed  in  2010  with  the 
Organic  Law  on  Drugs,  which  passed  a  mere  year  before  Makled  was  arrested  for  collaborating 
with  the  regime  on  acts  specifically  banned  in  Article  149  (National  Assembly  2010 c ).  The 
embeddedness  of  drug  trafficking  in  the  government,  severe  to  the  point  where  the  cartel  is  an 
effective  arm  of  the  government,  merits  calling  Venezuela  not  only  a  mafia  state  but  a  narcostate. 
Not  all  evidence  of  Venezuelan  kleptocracy  is  as  plainly  visible  as  the  Cartel  de  los  Soles. 
InSight  Crime  acknowledges  as  much  in  its  report,  admitting  that  “without  hard  data,  all  we  can 
do  is  recognize  the  scale  of  the  corruption  and  look  at  some  of  its  principal  motors.”  Many  of 
those  motors  have  played  pivotal  roles  in  previous  sections–  the  blatant  lack  of  transparency,  the 
lack  of  reliable  official  figures  for  a  variety  of  economic  indicators,  and  the  elite  gang  of 
Chavista  loyalists  who  revolve  around  important  posts,  which  allows  them  to  keep  their  methods, 
as  they  say,  within  the  family  (“Corruption  Perceptions  Index  2016”  2017).  One  more  example  in 
which  these  indicators  amount  to  a  smoking  gun  is  the  currency  exchange  control  scheme  cited 
by  Navarro  and  Giordani  as  the  $300  billion  fountain  for  the  regime  and  its  private-sector  allies. 
The  system,  which  began  under  Chávez  in  2003  and  continues  today  at  a  smaller  scale,  consisted 
essentially  of  inflating  “the  value  of  goods  brought  into  the  country  to  grab  American  dollars  at 
rock-bottom  exchange  rates.  Sometimes,  they  fake  the  shipments  altogether  and  import  nothing 
at  all.”  The  money  is  pocketed  by  the  Venezuelan  importers,  many  of  whom  can  attribute  their 
multimillionaire  status  to  this  practice,  and  traded  for  a  profit  in  the  black  market  for  US  dollars 
(Neuman  &  Torres  2015).  Leftist  economist  and  former  Chávez  ministerial  leader  Victor  Álvarez 
compares  the  practice  to  “the  robbery  that  our  people  were  subject  to  in  the  time  of  the  conquest 
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and  the  colonies,  when  the  gold  and  silver  were  carted  off  by  the  ton”  (Neuman  &  Torres  2015). 
The  practice  went  undeterred  when  oil  prices  were  high  during  Chávez’s  reign  because  the 
treasury  could  afford  to  have  holes  in  its  pockets. 
Today,  one  of  the  kleptocratic  schemes  most  directly  impacting  and  adding  to  the 
suffering  of  everyday  Venezuelans  is  the  fraud  surrounding  the  controversial  Local  Committees 
for  Supply  and  Production  (CLAP)  program,  created  in  2016,  which  offers  heavily  subsidized 
boxes  of  food  with  monthly  provisions  to  poor  communities.  The  opaque  pattern  of  operation 
characteristic  of  Chavismo  once  again  makes  it  difficult  to  determine  as  a  matter  of  fact  all  of  the 
workings  behind  the  scheme,  but  enough  evidence  is  available  to  create  at  least  a  partial  image  of 
yet  another  practice  contributing  to  the  starvation  of  the  people.  In  this  case,  however,  the 
Maduro  regime  is  quite  literally  profiting  off  of  the  historic  starvation  of  Venezuelans.  According 
to  investigations  by  the  Associated  Press,  the  Hong  Kong-based  firm  called  Group  Grand  that 
actually  receives  government  contracts  to  provide  the  food  is  widely  alleged  to  be  a  shell 
company  for  the  regime,  which  later  embezzles  the  funds.  The  government  purchases  these 
boxes  at  a  cheap  cost,  partly  because  they  contain  “beetle-infested  rice  and  other  spoiled  food,” 
and  then  sell  them  to  the  poor  at  up  to  twice  the  cost  (Goodman  2018).  The  monthly  boxes 
contain  enough  food  to  last  approximately  one  week.  Even  at  these  inflated  prices,  and  even  at 
such  an  unimaginably  low  quality,  these  “subsidized”  boxes  are  often  the  only  option  for  people 
who  have  found  their  grocery  store  shelves  empty  for  years.  And  for  the  Venezuelans  who  view 
this  as  sufficient  reason  to  support  anti-Chavista  parties  and  perhaps  join  a  demonstration  or  two, 
they  are  threatened  with  having  their  access  to  the  CLAP  program  cut  off. 
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Both  the  article  by  Naím  and  Toro  and  the  InSight  Crime  report  outline  numerous  other 
examples  of  the  Chavista  kleptocracy  that  has  corrupted,  starved,  and  cheated  the  country  from 
money  laundering  to  sex  trafficking  (Naím  &  Toro  2020).  A  further  exploration  of  the  network 
and  its  actors  would  serve  only  to  emphasize  a  point  that  has  already  been  made:  Chavismo  rules 
over  a  mafia  state,  a  criminal  syndicate  whose  authoritarianism  exists  to  protect  its  own 
member’s  financial  interests.  This  outright  kleptocracy  is  invisible  to  nonagentic  anti-imperialists 
who  continue  to  believe  that  the  regime’s  actions  are  taken  in  the  interests  of  the  people.  Even 
when  they  choose  to  accept  the  realities  laid  out  above,  they  might  argue  that  alternative  revenue 
streams  are  necessary  in  the  face  of  sanctions  and  “economic  warfare.”  They  might  argue  that  the 
corruption  does  not  compare  to  that  of  the  West  and  thus  does  not  merit  abandoning  the 
Bolivarian  project.  Such  logic  attempts  only  to  divert  attention  away  from  the  fact  that  the  very 
existence  and  active  promotion  of  the  kleptocracy  by  the  highest  levels  of  the  Venezuelan 
government  is  enough  to  collapse  the  thin  notion  that  the  Chavista  regime  exists  to  benefit 
everyday  Venezuelans.  The  role  of  nonagentic  anti-imperialism  here  is  to  cover  up  for  the  crimes 
committed  and  justify  the  legal  and  financial  assaults  against  the  Venezuelan  people. 
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6. Revisiting  the  Rhetoric  of  Nonagentic  
Anti-Imperialism 
Nonagentic  anti-imperialism  is  a  widespread  perversion  of  anti-imperialist  sentiment  that 
is  twisted  and  distorted  to  fit  the  narrative  of  oppressive  regimes.  The  example  of  prominent 
nonagentic  anti-imperialist  John  Pilger  was  brought  up  earlier  to  illustrate  how  this  perversion 
can  lead  anti-imperialists  to  support  actual  imperialism.  Having  now  understood  the  ways  in 
which  nonagentic  anti-imperialism  is  operationalized  by  the  Chavista  regime  and  its  supporters, 
this  section  will  look  at  how  Pilger  has  fallen  into  that  trap  as  it  relates  to  Venezuela  as  well.  It 
will  also  look  at  George  Ciccariello-Maher,  who  has  been  cited  throughout  this  paper,  and  his 
own  propagation  of  nonagentic  anti-imperialist  thought. 
It  should  come  as  no  surprise  that,  apart  from  being  a  stooge  for  Russian  imperialism 
even  during  the  invasion  of  Crimea,  Pilger  is  an  ardent  supporter  of  Chavismo  in  Venezuela 
because  of  its  stated  opposition  to  US  imperialism.  Similar  to  his  arguments  in  praise  of  Putin’s 
Russia,  he  makes  use  of  omissions,  misrepresentations,  and  outright  lies  to  justify  his  positions. 
In Rulers ,  he  mocks  the  “millions  of  readers  and  viewers  [in  Europe  and  the  United  States  who] 
know  next  to  nothing  about  the  life-giving  changes  implemented  in  Latin  America,  many  of 
them  inspired  by  Chavez.”  The  sheer  irony  of  Pilger  accusing  others  of  being  misinformed  is 
comical  to  say  the  least;  one  need  go  no  further  than  a  February  2019  article  entitled  “The  War 
on  Venezuela  is  Built  on  Lies”  to  appreciate  his  naked  hypocrisy.  The  article  is  short  but 
wide-ranging,  covering  everything  from  Chávez’s  contributions  to  the  poor  and  indigenous  of 
Venezuela  to  the  recent  presidential  crisis  that  has  rocked  the  Latin  America.  He  repeatedly 
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makes  the  case  that  Venezuela  is  victim  to  constant  imperialist  aggression  from  the  United 
States.  He  describes  “Washington’s  ‘sanctions’”  against  the  regime  as  the  reason  for  the  “loss  of 
at  least  $6  billion  in  Venezuela's  revenue  since  2017,  including  $2  billion  worth  of  imported 
medicines,  as  illegal,  or  the  Bank  of  England's  refusal  to  return  Venezuela's  gold  reserves  as  an 
act  of  piracy,”  ignoring  the  true  reach  of  the  sanctions,  the  legitimacy  of  the  Bank  of  England’s 
decision,  and  the  regime’s  own  role  in  manufacturing  the  crisis  he  describes.  And  lastly,  he 
characterizes  Guaidó  as  a  US  stooge  with,  once  again,  no  agency  outside  what  his  imagined 
handlers  in  Washington  demand  (Pilger  2019).  The  portrayal  of  the  Chavista  regime  as  the 
passive,  well-intentioned  victim  of  a  war  with  the  United  States  allows  Pilger  to  either  justify  or 
disregard  its  oppressive  actions  in  the  name  of  anti-imperialism.  For  the  Venezuelans  on  whom 
the  burden  of  those  oppressive  actions  fall,  making  them  invisible  is  not  an  option. 
The  writings  of  Ciccariello-Maher  have  been  used  throughout  this  paper  as  a  source  on 
pre-1998  Venezuela  because  his  historiographical  framework  places  those  at  the  margins  in  the 
center  of  his  analysis.  In  his  analysis  of  Chavismo,  however,  he  has  fallen  into  the  trap  of 
defending  governmental  abuses  in  the  name  of  anti-imperialism.  Unlike  Pilger, 
Ciccariello-Maher  actually  addresses  corrupt  elements  within  Chavismo  and  recognizes  that  they 
stain  the  integrity  of  the  more  ideological  elements.  The  primary  argument  made  by 
Ciccariello-Maher  has  already  been  addressed–  it  is  that  the  regime  has  fostered  and  legitimized 
a  form  of  “radical  democracy”  in  which  state  power  is  devolved  into  grassroots  political 
organizing  and  local  communes.  His  two  books  on  Venezuela, We  Created  Chávez and Building 
the  Commune:  Radical  Democracy  in  Venezuela ,  focus  on  the  people  who  organize  through  these 
communes  and  their  collective  relationship  with  the  state.  It  is  this  focus  that  still  made  his  work 
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useful  for  this  analysis.  While  Ciccariello-Maher  doesn't  portray  Chávez  as  a  saint  the  way  other 
writers  might,  he  still  views  the  direction  of  Bolivarian  power  moving  from  popular  demands  to 
the  palace  of  government,  rather  than  originating  from  and  being  executed  by  it.  When  we  put 
his  approach  in  the  terms  of  Arrighi,  Hopkins,  and  Wallerstein,  however,  gaps  in  its  logic  within 
the  Venezuelan  context  begin  to  emerge.  
As  many  social  movements  do,  Bolivarianism  began  to  show  national  face  in  1992  with  a 
Chávez-led  coup  attempt  and  became  a  distinctly  national  antisystemic  movement  in  1999  with 
his  democratic  taking  of  the  presidency  (Arrighi,  et  al.  66).  This  means  that  the  force  behind  the 
antisystemic  movement  came  from  the  taking  of  state  power,  not  from  grassroots  organization  at 
the  community  level  as  Ciccariello-Maher  asserts.  Despite  all  the  evidence  to  the  contrary,  which 
was  laid  out  above,  he  sustains  this  point  in  two  ways.  The  first  is  by  framing  Chavismo  as  a 
social  antisystemic  movement  that  has  maintained  its  class-struggle  nature,  allowing  him  to 
romanticize  the  ideals  of  Chavismo  while  downplaying  the  overbearing  authoritarianism  of  the 
state  he  claims  is  productively  devolving.  The  second  is  nonagentic  anti-imperialism  at  its  finest. 
Whatever  authoritarian  moves  Chávez  made,  such  as  censorship  of  the  press  and  speech,  is 
legitimate  because  the  revolution  must  be  protected  from  the  counterrevolutionary  empire  at  all 
costs.  In Building  the  Commune ,  Ciccariello-Maher  outlines  numerous  instances  where  Chávez 
censored  popular  voices  on  radio  and  television,  even  on  the  left,  if  they  criticized  his  policies  or 
his  regime’s  corruption.  Rather  than  recognize  these  actions  as  blatantly  antidemocratic  and 
authoritarian,  he  argues  that 
at  stake  in  this  debate  is  more  than  just  criticism  versus  discipline, 
hushing  radical  voices  in  favor  of  a  smoothly  unified  front.  It  is  also  a 
debate  between  militants  about  what  constitutes  a  truly  revolutionary 
outlook…  Against  some  of  the  most  vocal  critics  of  Maduro’s  policies, 
other  revolutionaries  with  even  deeper  roots  in  concrete  organizing  have 
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responded  by  insisting  that  critique  without  action  is  merely  empty 
posturing.  Revolutions  are  difficult  and  messy  affairs,  they  argue,  and  it 
is  unrealistic  to  expect  that  they  will  remain  pure  in  the  face  of  a 
protracted  and  complicated  struggle  against  unwavering  enemies 
(Ciccariello-Maher  2016,  79-80). 
 
In  Ciccariello-Maher’s  version  of  “radical  democracy,”  dissenting  voices  must  be  shut  out.  It  is 
contradictions  such  as  these  that  define  nonagentic  anti-imperialism  and  force  its  proponents  to 
tolerate  and  even  celebrate  the  very  aversions  of  democracy  they  criticize.  He  does  raise  an 
important  point,  however,  which  is  that  expecting  antisystemic  movements,  which  by  definition 
move  against  hegemonic  ideology,  to  remain  pure  against  enemies  in  the  world-system  is  in  itself 
idealistic.  To  call  out  corruption  in  the  way  that  these  censored  voices  did,  however,  is  far  from  a 
counterrevolutionary  act.  The  truth  is  that  Chavista  corruption  is  counterrevolutionary  and  so  is 
the  blocking  of  attempts  to  root  it  out.  For  nonagentic  anti-imperialist  Chavistas  like 
Ciccariello-Maher,  though,  to  go  against  the  regime  in  any  meaningful  way  is 
counterrevolutionary.  The  popular  self-organization  his  writings  celebrate  is  legitimate  only  in 
the  capacity  that  the  regime  approves  of  it.  
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7. Existing  Between  Invisibility  and  
Spectacle 
Relative  to  other  antisystemic  movements  and  competitive  authoritarian  regimes,  the 
study  of  Chavismo  has  the  unusual  distinction  of  having  its  legacy  defined  by  a  single 
phenomenon.  That  phenomenon  is  the  manufacture  of  the  single  largest  refugee  crisis  in  the 
modern  history  of  the  Western  hemisphere.  Such  a  claim  certainly  demands  significant 
corroboration.  Simply  piecing  together  the  previous  sections  offers  a  picture  of  how  it  came  to 
be.  The  mixture  of  unsustainable  economic  policies  with  a  kleptocratic  ruling  body  that  exists 
more  as  a  criminal  syndicate  than  a  functioning  state  inevitably  leads  to  a  desperate  situation  for 
members  of  all  socioeconomic  classes,  and  especially  so  for  those  at  the  bottom  and  at  its 
margins.  This  is  something  that  began  with  Chávez  and  was  intensified  under  Maduro.  On  paper, 
the  resulting  situation  is  as  follows:  As  of  2019,  more  than  4.6  million  Venezuelans  have  already 
fled  the  country  since  2015,  a  total  of  around  13%  of  the  2014  population  (Armario  2019).  In 
terms  of  scale,  it  is  expected  to  surpass  the  Syrian  refugee  crisis  at  some  point  in  late  2020.  Every 
single  day,  out  of  an  estimated  30,000  people  who  cross  the  border  into  Colombia  or  Brazil, 
5,000  of  them  don't  return  home.  Colombia  has  been  the  most  popular  destination,  due  to  its 
proximity  and  welcoming  immigration  policy,  taking  in  at  least  1.5  million  refugees  from  its 
neighbor  (  “5000  People  Flee  Venezuela  Every  Day”  2019).  One  in  five  asylum  seekers  globally 
are  Venezuelan  (Armario  2019).  The  United  Nations  has  called  the  “exodus  of  Venezuelan 
nationals…the  largest  in  the  recent  history  of  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean”  (“UNHCR 
Update  on  the  Venezuela  Situation”  2019). 
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The  Venezuelans  who  face  the  brunt  of  the  horrors  of  such  an  exodus  are,  as  should  be 
expected,  the  poorest  and  most  vulnerable  of  the  society.  Those  who  must  walk  for  weeks 
through  illegal  crossings,  freezing  temperatures,  and  mountains  from  western  Venezuela  into 
Colombia  do  so  because  they  cannot  afford  a  $2  bus  pass.  Those  who  must  cross  from  southern 
Venezuela  into  Boa  Vista,  Brazil  –primarily  indigenous  Venezuelans–  do  so  knowing  the 
attitudes  that  Brazil’s  Bolsonaro  holds  towards  both  indigenous  peoples  and  refugees 
(“Venezuelan  Refugees  Put  Strain  on  Brazilian  Border  Town…”  2019).  Such  extraordinary 
circumstances  so  clearly  dismantling  the  lives  of  the  most  marginalized  members  of  society 
should,  in  theory,  be  seen  by  the  international  left  as  a  situation  in  need  of  advocacy,  a  careful 
approach,  and  attention  towards  its  victims;  such  has  been  the  case  with  Central  American 
refugees  detained  at  the  US  southern  border.  Instead,  the  poison  that  is  nonagentic 
anti-imperialism  has  created  an  environment  in  which  the  left  has  chosen  to  make  invisible  the 
refugee  crisis  and  in  some  cases  even  condemn  humanitarian  efforts  to  combat  it. 
Within  the  framework  of  nonagentic  anti-imperialism,  there  is  ample  room  to  invisibilize 
the  refugees.  Some  outright  dismiss  the  issue  as  a  whole,  and  with  it  the  plight  of  the  refugees, 
by  making  the  economic  crisis  seem  nearly  irrelevant.  Ciccariello-Maher  is  once  again  the 
standard-bearer  here  when  he  claims  in Building  the  Commune ,  evidently  without  a  clue  as  to  the 
irony,  that  “it  would  be  foolish  to…deny  the  economic  crisis  of  the  present,  the  spiraling 
currency  and  spiking  inflation,  and  the  creeping  corruption  and  military  power  it  has  wrought” 
(Ciccariello-Maher  2016,  Kindle  loc.  1543).  Nowhere  else  in  Ciccariello-Maher’s  book, 
published  two  years  after  the  drop  in  oil  prices  triggered  the  massive  humanitarian  crisis  and  one 
year  after  the  refugee  crisis  became  global  news,  is  the  crisis  mentioned,  despite  being  focused 
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entirely  on  the  legacy  of  Chávez  and  Chavismo  on  the  poor  in  Venezuela.  An  extreme  version  of 
this  can  be  seen  on  teleSUR,  where  a  search  on  its  website  for  “refugees”  shows  zero  results  for 
Venezuelan  refugees  over  the  past  year  (as  of  early  December  2019),  other  than  a  single  story 
about  the  Russian  foreign  minister  accusing  the  United  States  and  Britain  of  training  “alleged 
refugees”  in  Guyana  for  a  vague  Bay  of  Pigs-style  attack  on  Venezuela  (“Russia  Denounces  Plan 
Based  in  Guyana  to  Destabilize  Venezuela”  2019).  This  story,  published  in  the  shadow  of  figures 
showing  that  Venezuelan  refugees  had  reached  the  4.5  million  mark,  has  no  sourcing  outside  of 
the  Russian  minister’s  words.  A  search  for  “Venezuela”  in  the  same  timeframe  displays  no 
results  for  Venezuelan  refugees.  This  is  significant  because  teleSUR,  as  an  effective  mouthpiece 
for  the  Chavista  regime,  should  be  able  to  at  least  articulate  a  response  to  the  crisis.  Instead,  it 
has  chosen  to  wholly  ignore  it.  This  goes  beyond  state-funded  media  as  well.  Means  TV,  a  leftist 
media  cooperative  which  brands  itself  a  post-capitalist  Netflix  “that  reflects  and  empowers  the 
99%,”  only  has  one  piece  of  content  dealing  with  Venezuela:  a  satirical  documentary  spoof  quite 
literally  mocking  Venezuelan  refugees  by  portraying  them  as  elitist  opportunists  (Means  TV 
(n.d.);  “Venezuela  in  Chaos”  2020).  In  outlet  after  outlet,  Venezuelan  refugees  and  their  struggle 
are  made  invisible–  even  by  content  creators  who  claim  to  empower  those  without 
representation.  
It  goes  without  saying  that  the  left  is  not  alone  in  its  prioritization  of  ideology  over 
refugees;  the  right-wing  of  the  spectrum  is  far  from  absolved  here.  While  the  position  of  many 
on  the  left  is  to  disregard  the  crisis  in  order  to  protect  those  responsible,  the  right  has  seized  on 
the  refugees  as  visible  victims  of  Chavismo  to  be  viewed  on  screens  and  at  a  distance.  The  very 
best  example  of  this  is  none  other  than  Donald  Trump,  who  rarely  misses  an  opportunity  to  decry 
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the  evil  of  the  socialist  government  of  Venezuela  yet  refuses  to  grant  temporary  protected  status 
(TPS)  to  the  millions  escaping  it,  instead  choosing  to  deport  them  back  to  the  tyranny  they 
escaped  (Davis  2019).  The  refugees  are  a  spectacle  to  point  to  in  order  to  win  support  from 
Latino/a/x  voters,  not  human  beings  in  need  of  material  assistance.  In  other  words,  the  legitimacy 
of  the  refugees  is  questioned  by  both  sides  of  the  political  binary.  Venezuelan  refugees  find 
themselves  between  invisibility  and  spectacle,  unable  to  escape  the  blind  politicization  that  keeps 
them  there. 
A  case  can  even  be  made  that  this  paper  is  politicizing  the  refugees  by  describing  their 
exodus  as  the  culmination  of  Chavismo  given  the  fact  that  the  regime  has  certainly  not  received  a 
free  pass  for  its  descent  into  authoritarianism  over  the  course  of  these  pages.  The 
contextualization  of  the  crisis  within  the  greater  scope  of  Chavismo  was  done  this  way  in  part  to 
provide  a  framework  through  which  to  think  about  the  crisis–  not  as  the  result  of  sanctions  or 
chance,  but  as  the  manufactured  apotheosis  of  a  criminal  mafia  state.  Still,  contextualization  is 
not  enough  to  avoid  the  trap  of  blind  politicization.  Avoiding  that  trap  means  looking  past 
ideologues  of  the  nonagentic  anti-imperialist  left  and  of  the  xenophobic  right  and  actively 
choosing  instead  to  listen  to  the  voices  of  the  refugees  themselves. 
These  voices  are  found  in  interview  footage  captured  for  the  360°  virtual  reality 
documentary  short Walking  for  Freedom:  A  Venezuelan  Story produced  by  the  Lima,  Peru-based 
production  firm  Mycrom  Films  with  support  from  the  Washington,  D.C.-based  NGO  Plan  País, 
the  World  Economic  Forum’s  Global  Shapers  for  Venezuela  community.  The  small  team  of 
filmmakers  went  to  Cúcuta  in  May  of  2019  and  traveled  across  Colombia  with  various  groups  of 
caminantes  over  the  course  of  a  week.  The  goal  of  the  film  and  its  virtual  reality  format  was  to 
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allow  viewers  to  “step  into  the  shoes”  of  the  refugees  and  follow  them  on  their  journey 
(“Walking  For  Freedom”  2019).  As  viewers  experience  the  diverse  spaces  the  caminantes  walk 
through,  they  listen  to  various  refugees  telling  their  stories.  The  interview  footage,  used  or 
unused  in  the  final  cut  of  the  film,  is  uniquely  useful  in  demonstrating  how  the  past  twenty  or  so 
years  in  Venezuela  have  affected  the  lived  ends  of  many  of  its  most  vulnerable  citizens.  The 
interview  process  does  not  capture  a  cross-section  of  all  Venezuelan  refugees,  but  it  did  get  the 
largest  slice  possible  within  one  geographic  area  since  Colombia  has  been  the  largest  emigration 
point  (“Venezuelan  Refugees  Put  Strain  on  Brazilian  Border  Town…”  2019).  The  remainder  of 
this  section  will  feature  transcriptions  from  three  interviews  that  give  a  voice  to  the  realities  on 
the  ground.  The  transcriptions  are  presented  without  edits  except  for  clarity.  All  were  translated 
into  English  from  Spanish.  The  italicized  information  in  brackets  summarizes  the  questions  the 
refugees  were  asked  to  prompt  responses. 
 
7.1 Rocío,  from  Valencia,  Venezuela 
[ Asked  what  she  did  back  in  Valencia ] 
I  dedicated  myself  to  homemaking.  My  husband  worked.  I  had  a  daughter  in  school.  Because  of 
what’s  happening  in  Venezuela,  because  of  the  situation  in  which  we’re  living,  my  daughter 
stopped  studying.  My  husband  stopped  working.  My  sisters  went  to  Chile.  From  my  family, 
many  went  to  Chile.  And  they  are  the  ones  who  have  been  helping  us  with  food.  Because  we 
can't  with  the  costs  in  Venezuela. 
 
[ Asked  what  finally  made  her  want  to  leave ] 
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That  was  a  decision  I  told  my  husband  about.  Because  on  the  first  of  May  they  were  going  to 
[raise  the  minimum  wage  again].  How  was  that  going  to  help?  It  would  do  nothing.  A  package  of 
bread  would  cost  15.  A  minimum  wage  is  18.  That  doesn't  allow  for  anything.  I  have 
hypertension,  but  I  can't  take  my  pills  because  they  can't  be  found.  And  if  they're  found…they’re 
too  expensive. 
 
[ Asked  if  the  coming  inflation  was  the  breaking  point ] 
Yes.  I  said  to  my  grandparents,  “now  that  we  have  some  money,  we’re  going.”  On  Sunday  I 
decided  and  on  Monday  I  took  off.  From  Valencia  to  San  Antonio.  When  I  got  to  San  Antonio, 
when  I  got  to  the  border  and  crossed la  trocha [an  illegal  border  crossing  connecting  Venezuela 
and  Colombia],  I  was  scared.  Because  this  is  the  first  time  I  leave  Venezuela.  I  was  born  and 
raised  there.  It’s  very  different,  the  Venezuela  I  grew  up  in  from  the  one  my  daughters  are  living 
in.  It’s  two  daughters,  because  my  first  daughter  came  two  months  ago  to  Bogotá  with  my 
grandson  and  her  husband.  I  decided  to  come  with  my  daughter,  the  youngest  one  of  fifteen 
years.  Because  sometimes  we  could  eat,  and  sometimes  we  couldn't  eat. 
 
[ Asked  if  she  has  lost  weight ] 
Yes.  I  weighed  almost  70  kilos  (154  lbs),  now  I  weigh  almost  43  (94  lbs)…I  got  sick  there  from 
hepatitis.  My  daughter  too.  I  almost  died.  I  didn't  turn  yellow,  I  turned  phosphorescent.  It  took  all 
the  pain  in  the  world  to  leave  my  husband  alone,  because  we  were  three  in  the  house  and  he  was 
used  to  being  there  with  us  when  he  worked.  But  he  stayed.  Well.  “If  you  go,  it’s  for  the  future  of 
our  daughter  and  for  your  future.” 
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[ Asked  if  she  came  with  her  daughter  of  15  and  her  son ] 
And  with  my  son.  Well,  with  my  son,  whom  I  haven't  seen  in  four  days.  In  four  days.  I  left  him 
in  a  camp  and  after  that,  I  knew  nothing.  People  are  coming  down,  and  when  I  see  that  I  get 
excited  to  see  my  son,  but  I  haven't  seen  him. 
 
[ Asked  why  they  were  separated ] 
Because  we  were  walking,  and  when  we  finally  almost  got  to  one  of  the  camps,  the  owner  of  the 
camp  picked  me  up  with  my  daughter  because  I  was  fainting  and  my  son  asked  him  to  give  us  a 
ride.  He  said  he  would  give  us  a  ride  here,  to  Bucaramanga,  and  from  there  I  would  wait  for  my 
son…They  said  that  the  last  time  they  saw  him,  he  was  crossing  the  Páramo  [de  Berlín].  And 
from  there  no  one  has  seen  him,  because  there's  so  much  fog,  no  one  can  see  him. 
 
[ Asked  what  was  going  through  her  head  as  she  nearly  fainted ] 
With  all  the  sincerity  in  the  world,  [I  was  thinking  about]  how  Maduro’s  government  ruined  the 
Venezuelan  family.  The  separation  of  families.  So  many  homes,  so  many  families.  And  above  all, 
the  children,  I’ve  seen  so  many  children  being  carried,  walking,  it  makes  me  so  sad.  And  still,  the 
sadness  is  with  me.  I’m  depressed  because  of  it. 
 
[ Asked  if  she  has  a  job  in  Bogotá,  her  final  destination ] 
No.  I  will  take  what  is  given.  If  I  have  to  sell  candies,  whatever,  I’ll  do  it.  Because  I  want  a  real 
future,  not  what  I  had  in  Venezuela. 
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[ Asked  what  she  wants  to  see  happen  in  Venezuela ] 
Well,  I  would  like,  honestly,  for  Maduro  to  leave  the  government.  Our  family  would  return  to  the 
land  where  we  were  born  and  raised.  Venezuela  was  so  beautiful.  It  had  so  many  riches.  And 
above  all,  the  love  of  all  Venezuelans.  All  the  Venezuelans,  we  were  so  beautiful.  I  would  like 
that  very  much.  Because  my  sisters  went  to  Chile,  I  also  decided  to  come.  Oh  well.  That’s  what 
happened.  Because  of  the  government.  That’s  really  what  I  would  like,  for  my  family  to  return  to 
Venezuela  so  we  could  be  together  like  we  were  before.  Christmas  for  us  was  really  nice.  With 
family.  Now  it’s  gone.  We  can’t  really.  I  wish  the  Maduro  government  were  gone.  I  really  do. 
 
My  daughter,  my  daughter  was  saddened  to  leave  her  dad.  She  was  with  him  all  the  time.  She 
says  “I  want  to  work  to  bring  dad  with  us.”  Because  she  doesn't  want  to  leave  her  dad  alone  so 
long.  What’s  more,  my  family  didn't  know  that  I  was  going  to  emigrate  as  well.  They  were 
surprised,  and  every  time  I  can  communicate  with  them,  they  say,  “Rocío,  be  careful,  remember 
your  hypertension,  you  can  get  hurt.”  And  I  give  them  strength  too.  “Don’t  worry,  I’m  fine.  I’m 
fine.”  The  only  thing  I  want  is  everyone’s  well-being.  It’s  true,  we  will  be  together  again,  but  in 
our  land.  Where  we  grew  up.  Where  I  grew  up,  it  was  so  beautiful.  I  said,  and  still  say,  that  my 
youngest  daughter  was  born  into  a  situation  that,  well,  was  unlike  the  one  my  first  daughter  was 
born  into.  We  got  the  most  critical  situation  of  all. 
 
[ Asked  how  she  has  been  treated  in  Colombia ] 
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Since  I  left  Cúcuta,  everyone  has  given  me  so  much  support.  I  would  hear,  “no,  they  discriminate 
a  lot  against  Venezuelans,”  and  I’d  say,  “to  me,  that’s  a  lie”  because  they  have  always  been  there. 
Here,  where  I  am  in  the  plaza,  even  the  military  from  here  has  been  too  kind  with  me.  They  have 
treated  me  well.  The  only  thing  I  would  not  want  is  to  return  to  Venezuela  in  the  situation  it’s  in 
right  now.  Only  after  a  change  in  government. 
 
[ Asked  if  she  has  a  message  for  people  thinking  of  emigrating ] 
For  me,  one  of  the  things  you  need  to  arm  yourself  with  is  bravery.  To  emigrate  from  Venezuela. 
You  must  be  strong  and  brave  to  do  it.  Because  while  Mr.  Nicolás  Maduro  is  there,  things  will 
not  change.  Everything  will  go  from  bad  to  worse.  And  whoever  wants  to  emigrate,  well,  it’s  an 
odyssey,  but  you  have  to  keep  going.  Here,  here  in  Colombia,  from  Cúcuta  to  Bucaramanga,  they 
have  always  provided  us  so  much  help  and  support.  They  have  treated  us  well. 
 
[ Asked  if  she  has  a  message  for  the  rest  of  the  world ] 
I  can  say  to  the  Venezuelan  who  has  not  emigrated,  who  wants  to  fight  for  our  Venezuela,  to  do 
it.  Because  there  are  so  many  of  us  who  are  cowards  and  we  didn't  do  it.  Because  the  truth  is  that 
it  has  to  be  done.  We  will  be  united  like  we  were  before,  us  Venezuelans.  But  there  are  so  many 
things  they  do.  What  they  do  is  kill,  imprison  people,  and  we  have  to  deal  with  that.  With  a 
government  that  does  what  it  wants.  I  have  nothing  more  to  say  because  the  truth  is  that  what  one 
needs  is  strength,  and  when  you’re  emigrating,  you  will  see  the  situation  that  we  have  been 
through.  Even  where  I  am  now,  the  Colombians  have  helped  us  so  much. 
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[ Asked  if  it’s  nice  to  cry  about  all  of  this ] 
Oh  yes.  It  was  the  best  thing  I  could  do.  Because  I  can't  do  it  in  front  of  my  daughter,  because 
she's  been  crying  these  past  few  days,  saying  “mami,  please,  lets  go  back.”  No.  We’re  not  going 
back,  I  will  not  return  to  Venezuela  until  justice  is  not  done. 
 
[ Asked  if  the  young  girl  next  to  her  is  her  daughter ] 
Yes.  She  says  “mama,  I  don't  feel  well,  let’s  go.”  No,  we’ll  be  strong.  You're  younger  and  I’m 
your  mother.  I’m  43  years  old,  you  need  to  support  me  and  tell  me  that  we’ll  keep  going.  And 
she  has  done  it.  She  has  done  it.  She's  been  very  strong  with  me. 
 
7.2 Karina  Torres,  from  Valencia,  Venezuela 
Good  afternoon,  my  name  is  Karina.  Karina  Torres.  I  come  from  Valencia,  Venezuela.  I  left  my 
country  because  my  country  only  gives  sadness.  I  came  quickly  because  I  lost  a  baby  of  one  year 
and  six  months.  My  son  died  from  a  lack  of  oxygen  and  medicine.  When  I  went  to  take  him  to 
the  doctor,  they  didn't  have  cotton,  there  was  nothing.  In  my  country  there  is  nothing. 
 
My  son  got  sick  suddenly,  and  there  was  nothing  in  the  hospitals.  They  couldn't  see  him,  and 
because  I  don't  have  money,  I  didn't  have  anything  to  give  to  them. 
 
[ Asked  if  that  was  the  last  straw ] 
I  have  a  child  who  suffers  from  diabetes  and  I’m  here  to  fight  for  his  medicine,  but  I  haven't 
found  any.  There's  no  food. 
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I  left  my  baby  with  my  mother  because  I  couldn't  bring  her.  I  only  have  the  nine-year-old  left.  It's 
hard  to  leave  my  children  and  my  family.  Emigrating  isn't  easy.  It’s  not  easy. 
 
[ Asked  what  the  most  difficult  part  of  emigrating  is ] 
Leaving  my  family.  And,  well,  I  can't  find  work.  I  don't  have  a  job  yet. 
 
[ Asked  how  long  she's  been  walking ] 
I'm  heading  into  my  eighth  day  of  walking…from  Cúcuta  to  Pamplona,  and  from  Pamplona  to 
La  Dolorita  and  here  I  am. 
 
[ Asked  what  her  plan  is ] 
My  plan  is,  well,  my  plan  is  to  find  work  and  bring  my  children  and  my  family.  Because  we 
cannot  be  in  Venezuela. 
 
[ Asked  if  she  will  stay  in  Colombia ] 
[laughs]  It’s  a  hard  question.  Whatever  happens,  I  will  always  love  my  country.  And  I  wish 
things  would  change.  However  it  has  to  happen. 
 
My  final  destination  is  Perú…because  I  have  my  sisters  there,  and,  well…there’s  work  there.  I’ll 
stay  a  while  in  Bogotá  waiting  for  my  daughter.  Because  right  now,  my  daughter  cannot  be  in 
Venezuela.  Because  I'd  end  up  with  no  children.  In  Venezuela  I  would  end  up  with  no  children. 
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So,  well.  Seeing  my  son  die  from  a  lack  of  medication  was  painful.  Because  of  cotton.  My  son 
died  because  of  a  lack  of  oxygen  in  Venezuela. 
 
[ Asked  about  the  nine-year-old ] 
He  suffers  from  diabetes.  Nutrition  for  him  is  very  important.  I  can't  take  him  to  a  doctor  or 
clinic  because  I  don't  have  a  job,  because  what  would  I  do  by  taking  him  to  the  doctor  and  not 
being  able  to  buy  any  medication  for  him? 
 
[ Asked  about  the  availability  of  work  in  Venezuela ] 
No.  There's  no  work.  In  Venezuela  there  is  nothing.  The  government  of  Venezuela  ended  all  of 
that. 
 
[ On  if  she  has  a  message  for  people  thinking  of  emigrating ] 
My  message,  well,  kiss  your  families,  be  strong,  and  whatever  happens,  keep  going  forward. 
Because  at  the  end  of  the  day,  emigrating  is  hard,  but  there  will  be  a  future  for  your  family. 
 
[ Asked  if  she  has  been  helped  in  Colombia ] 
Yes,  a  lot,  thank  God  for  the  care  houses,  the  Red  Cross.  I  thank  God  for  all  the  countries  looking 
out  for  Venezuela  and  giving  food  to  the  immigrants.  Because  if  not  for  them,  we  would  all  die 
along  the  route  from  the  hunger. 
 
[ Asked  if  she  has  anything  else  to  say ] 
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The  saddest  part  is  watching  our  country  destroyed,  destroyed  like  it  is,  without  food,  without 
medicine,  without  care  for  the  people.  Venezuela  needs  so  much  help.  I  wish  the  Venezuelan 
government  would  look  us  in  the  eye.  They’re  hurting  so  many  innocent  people.  Children.  Those 
who  suffer  the  most  from  this  immigration  are  the  children.  Nutrition  is  so  important  for 
Venezuela  because  there  are  so  many  children.  And  the  government  needs  to  realize  that  the 
children  pay  the  price.  They  make  me  so  sad.  One  tolerates  a  lot  for  the  children.  And,  well,  I 
keep  going  thanks  to  the  people  who  help.  The  people  from  other  countries…they  give  us  our 
strength.  The  support.  I  thank  God  because  they  have  treated  us  well  in  Colombia.  Whatever 
happens,  we  must  keep  moving. 
 
7.3 José  &  De  La  Cruz 
[ Asked  how  they  got  to  Bucaramanga ] 
José: Well,  now,  like  you  say,  we  are  in  Bucaramanga,  and  we’re  looking  for  a  place  to  stay. 
We’re  here  by  the  grace  of  God.  And,  well,  it’s  tough.  
 
De  La  Cruz:  Since  we  left  our  hostel,  we  arrived  at  the  Red  Cross  of  Pamplona,  who  I’m  so 
thankful  for  and  for  everything  they've  given  us,  for  the  flashlight.  They  told  us  it  was  the 
European  donors.  For  the  food,  for  the  medical  care.  Since  we  got  to  the  Red  Cross  and  accepted 
the  aid,  we’ve  been  waiting  for  someone  to  take  us  to  Bucaramanga.  There  were  so  many 
children,  so  many  women.  So  many  people  for  whom  the  cars  were  not  stopping,  there  were  so 
many  groups  left.  And  then  we  got  our  opportunity,  when  a  car  with  two  women  gave  us  a  ride. 
All  the  way  to  Bucaramanga…we  didn’t  know  them,  really. 
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José:  They’re  the  unknown  heroines. 
 
De  La  Cruz:  So  we  continued  along  the  path.  Past  el  páramo.  They  even  took  us  to  a  coffee 
place  and  offered  to  buy  us  some.  There  were  still  so  many  people  walking.  Women,  men.  Men 
sleeping  on  the  grass  from  being  so  tired  of  walking.  We  saw  everything  that  we  would  have  had 
to  walk  ourselves.  We  got  here,  and  thank  god  for  those  women. 
 
José:  When  we  got  out  of  the  car  for  the  coffee,  the  cold  was  extreme.  It  was  a  fridge.  The  cold 
was  incredible.  And  the  real  cold  hadn't  even  arrived.  Imagine  at  night.  And  still,  right  now, 
there’s  people  walking  there.  It’s  incredible.  It’s  so  high  up  that  you  can  see  above  the  clouds.  It's 
an  extreme  place.  And  it’s  incredible  that  people  are  suffering  there.  Something  has  to  be  done. 
You  understand? 
 
[ Asked  what  they  would  tell  the  people  about  to  cross ] 
De  La  Cruz:  I  would  choose  to  tell  them  not  to  cross  on  foot,  really,  to  always  have  patience.  A 
lot  of  patience.  Patience  because  there  will  always  be  the  opportunity  to  cross  in  a  car.  It’s  too 
dangerous  by  foot.  No  matter  what  you’re  wearing,  you  can't  stand  the  cold. 
 
José:  We  have  on  five  shirts.  This  sweater  and  this  sweater.  And  still,  we’re  cold.  It’s  tough.  My 
opinion  is  to  give  support  to  those  people.  From  there,  from  Pamplona.  There’s  a  transportation 
service  that  could  take  them.  Because,  really,  the  crisis  in  my  country  is  very  tough.  People  are 
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lacking  so  much  that  they  don't  mind  doing  the  walk.  Getting  to  those  levels  of  cold.  Risking 
themselves  in  that  way.  You  see? 
 
De  La  Cruz:  This  is  our  journey  to  find  a  better  future. 
 
[ Asked  what  their  plan  is  now ] 
José: Well,  to  improvise.  Improvise  where  we’re  going  to  spend  the  night.  He  has  a  talent  and  I 
have  a  talent,  so  maybe  those  will  help  us. 
 
[ Asked  what  those  talents  are ] 
De  La  Cruz:  He  draws.  And  I  sing.  Musician. 
 
José:  We  hope  to  continue  safely.  That  there  are  no  surprises. 
 
[ Asked  what  kind  of  singing  he  does ] 
Rap.  Conscious  rap. 
 
[ After  some  convincing  to  show  off  his  skills… ] 
En  estos  dias 
Vemos  como  el  amor  se  enfría 
Como  abunda  la  maldad 
Disminuye  la  alegría 
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Violencia,  muerte,  droga, 
Lo  que  vemos  en  la  vía 
De  nuestro  día  día 
De  tanta  monotonía 
Tanto  sufrimiento  a  causa  de  la  rebeldía 
Tantas  veces  que  fallamos  y  no  sabemos  perdonar 
Tantas  veces  que  actuamos  sin  importar  qué  hacemos  mal 
Más  no  te  apuesto  pensar 
Que  todo  esto  puede  cambiar 
En  vez  de  armas  usemos  lápices  y  cuadernos 
Si  cambiamos  el  ocio  por  arte  y  deporte 
Hay  que  aceptar  que  esto  no  es  solo  culpa  del  gobierno 
Y  lo  pueden  lograr  si  realmente  pones  de  tu  aporte 
Cambiándolo  rato  de  parranda 
Tomando  licor  con  el  buen  sabor  del  amor  en  familia 
Juntos  se  educaron  nuestros  hijos  a  golpe  es  un  error 
Cuando  sembrar  valores  es  la  clave  del  asunto 
Porque  la  educación  siempre  empieza  con  el  hogar 
Es  preciso  cambiar 
Nuestras  casas  por  hogares 
Y  si  esta  canción  te  hizo  refleccionar 
Con  tu  ejemplo  es  mejor  futuro 
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Ponte  a  brindarles. 
[cheers] 
 
[ Asked  about  the  backpacks  they  have  with  them ] 
José:  These  backpacks?  Yeah.  The  bag  the  government  gave  us  [laughs].  Who  would  have 
thought?  The  government  gave  them  to  us.  A  symbol  of  immigration.  They  gave  them  to  us 
during  a  time  of  fabric  shortages,  gave  them  to  students  in  university  and  high  school.  Well,  this 
bag  represents  Venezuela.  Most  use  them  so  that  we  get  recognized.  “Look,  we’re  Venezuelan.” 
It’s  our  flag.  This  is  all  we  carry  with  us.  
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8. Conclusion:  The  Magical  Bolivarian  
State 
Venezuela  is  a  place  where  modernization  was  a  facade,  where  democracy  was  a  ploy, 
and  where  revolution  was  a  lie.  None  understand  this  better  than  the  refugees  who  have  left  their 
home  in  search  of  a  future.  Still,  the  role  of  the  Chavista  regime  that  manufactured  the  crisis 
continues  to  be  obscured  by  its  defenders.  A  counterargument  to  the  points  laid  out  throughout 
this  paper  is  articulated  well  in  Julia  Buxton’s  foreword  to  David  Smilde  and  Daniel  Hellinger’s 
book  Venezuela’s  Bolivarian  Democracy .  In  it,  she  writes  that 
Certainly  it  is  the  case  that  if  Chávez’s  Venezuela  is  to  be  judged  by  the 
procedural  benchmarks  of  liberal  democracy,  there  is  a  deficit  of  checks 
and  balances  on  government,  the  rule  of  law  is  weak,  the  military  is  not 
apolitical,  and  executive  power  is  pronounced.  But  this  leads  to  a  number 
of  related  considerations.  It  has  never  been  the  case  that  liberal 
democracy  was  consolidated  in  Venezuela.  During  the  Punto  Fijo  period, 
the  country  had  a  model  of  illiberal  democracy  that  delimited 
participation,  restricted  access  to  power,  privileged  a  minority,  and 
politicized  all  state  institutions.  The  rule  of  law  was  historically  weak, 
and  corruption  and  human  rights  abuses  were  pronounced.  To  present  the 
Bolivarian  process  as  some  form  of  democratic  regression  or 
authoritarian  aberration  in  this  historical  context  is  misleading.  It  denies 
the  structural  legacies  of  Puntofijismo  and  negates  the  progress  that  has 
been  made  in  extending  social  and  political  inclusion  in  historical  context 
characterized  by  infection  with  political  parties,  politicians,  and 
institutions  (Smilde  &  Hellinger  2011,  xv). 
 
Buxton  is  correct  about  the  failures  of  the  Punjofijista  model.  Puntofijismo  outlined  the  standards 
it  wanted  to  abide  by  –stability,  democracy,  accountability–  and  it  failed  to  meet  those  standards. 
One  would  imagine  that  within  the  next  few  paragraphs,  then,  Buxton  might  include  a  sentence 
along  the  lines  of  “the  benchmark  to  which  Chávez’s  Venezuela  should  be  held,  however,  is…” 
107 
/
 
followed  by  an  alternative  framework  through  which  to  analyze  the  antisystemic  success  of 
Twenty-First  Century  Socialism  and  hold  it  accountable  to  its  principles.  No  such  statement  is 
found.  Despite  the  clear  abuses  of  the  most  basic  tenets  of  democracy  (participatory, 
representative,  whatever  it  may  be)  such  as  free  speech,  free  press,  and  independent  organizing, 
Buxton  continues  under  the  pretense  that  in  some  way,  under  an  environment  in  which  people 
have  severely  limited  access  to  information  that  the  government  does  not  approve  of,  a  vibrant 
post-liberal  democracy  exists.  To  most  observers  such  an  argument  is  dead  on  arrival.  But  to  the 
mind  of  nonagentic  anti-imperialists  on  the  left,  such  realities  do  not  matter;  this  quote  can  attest. 
It  accurately  points  to  the  failings  of  liberal  democracy  under  Puntofijismo  and  identifies  the 
expanded  inclusion  of  marginalized  communities  into  national  legitimacy  on  paper.  But  in  doing 
so,  it  confuses  acknowledgment  for  betterment.  It  excuses  action  in  defense  of  rhetoric.  It  ignores 
manufactured  catastrophe  in  the  name  of  imagined  revolution.  Corrales  and  Penfold,  also  writing 
in  2011,  offer  as  succinct  a  response  to  Buxton  as  can  be  given:  “Chávez  is  certainly  correct  that 
Venezuela  is  moving  away  from  liberal  democracy,  but  is  not  moving  towards  greater 
accountability  and  participation.  Instead,  Chávez  has  shown  how  a  democratically  elected  leader 
can  manipulate  domestic  institutions  to  crowd  out  social  and  political  groups  and,  by  extension, 
to  crowd  out  democracy”  (Corrales  &  Penfold  2015,  15). 
One  cannot  help  but  ask  if  Fernando  Coronil’s  thesis  of  the  illusion  of  Venezuelan 
modernity  under  Puntofijismo  also  applies  to  Venezuela  under  Chavismo.  Coronil  himself  did  so 
in  2000,  wondering  if  Chávez  is  “yet  another  magician  offering  only  the  ephemeral  illusion  of 
progress,  or  is  he  a  leader  using  his  remarkable  personal  magic  to  revitalize  Venezuela’s 
moribund  democracy?”  (Coronil  2000).  Colombian  writer  Gabriel  García  Márquez  asked  the 
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same  after  spending  time  with  Chávez  in  2000,  where  he  described  being  “overwhelmed  by  the 
feeling  that  I  had  just  been  travelling  and  chatting  pleasantly  with  two  opposing  men.  One  to 
whom  the  caprices  of  fate  had  given  an  opportunity  to  save  his  country.  The  other,  an  illusionist, 
who  could  pass  into  the  history  books  as  just  another  despot”  (Márquez  2000). 
The  twenty  years  since  these  questions  were  asked  provide  a  resounding  answer.  History 
points  to  more  than  a  magician  who  conjured  up  the  worst  fears  of  both  writers.  Unlike  his 
predecessors  from  the  Punto  Fijo  era,  Chávez  had  a  far  greater  arsenal  of  tricks  up  his  sleeve.  For 
the  Chavista  regime,  the  illusion  of  “post-liberalism,”  as  Buxton  would  put  it,  has  outpaced  the 
high  price  of  oil  that  kept  Puntofijismo  alive.  The  series  of  tricks  that  has  allowed  the  kleptocrats 
of  Venezuela  to  stay  in  power  all  fall  under  the  umbrella  of  nonagentic  anti-imperialism,  which 
has  proven  itself  to  be  an  even  stronger  force  for  the  regime  than  high  oil  revenues.  Beneath  the 
umbrella  hides  the  ever-present  specter  of  Western  imperialism  and  finance  capital,  resistance  to 
which  “forces”  the  regime  to  undertake  a  number  of  actions  to  ensure  its  own  survival–  actions 
which  include  press  censorship,  the  violent  repression  of  protests,  ecocide  in  indigenous  lands, 
and  the  co-optation  of  radical  democratic  organizing  towards  autonomy. 
This  paper  has  conducted  an  analysis  of  the  policy  of  Chavismo  and  its  effects  on  the 
people  of  Venezuela.  It  has  attempted  to  include  the  successes  of  Chavismo,  such  as  the  real 
attempts  to  include  marginalized  communities  into  the  classist  national  imagination  of 
Venezuela,  along  with  its  failures.  What  it  has  not  attempted  to  do,  however,  is  present  its 
successes  and  failures  as  equals.  The  logic  of  nonagentic  anti-imperialism  has  allowed  the 
regime  to  do  just  that  for  two  decades  and  the  only  thing  Venezuela  has  to  show  for  it  is  the 
desperate  exodus  of  five  million  refugees.  Hiding  behind  the  rhetoric  of  anti-imperialism,  the 
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logic  lays  bare  its  power  through  the  regime’s  perpetual  self-victimhood  amid  the  crisis  it 
manufactured.  This  paper’s  conclusion  cannot  be  arrived  at  by  just  looking  at  the  facts,  figures, 
and  statistics  surrounding  the  situation–  these  are  only  context.  The  tragedy  of  Venezuela  is  not  a 
plummeting  GDP  or  a  skyrocketing  inflation.  The  conclusion  is  arrived  at  by  actively  listening  to 
the  voices  of  those  affected  by  the  crisis,  of  the  members  of  those  marginalized  communities 
Chavismo  promised  to  lift  up.  It  is  the  families  separated  by  circumstance  and  the  incalculable 
displacement  of  people.  It  is  the  indigenous  peoples  thrown  into  a  crisis  where  they  would  rather 
become  refugees  in  Bolsonaro’s  protofascist  Brazil  than  remain  on  their  ancestral  lands  and  the 
women  like  Rocío  who  leave  their  families  behind  in  search  not  just  of  a  better  future  but  of  a 
future  at  all.  Their  voices  and  their  realities  are  the  ones  this  paper  has  aimed  to  highlight  in  an 
effort  to  bring  them  out  of  the  space  between  invisibility  and  spectacle.  It  is  the  hope  that  from 
there  they  can  see  justice  and  have  dignity  returned  to  their  lives.  
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